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Abstract 
This thesis highlights the critical impact the effects of regionalised organisational 
structure and external political pressures have on the development of public sector 
information systems. Through the extension of a socio-technical systems (STS) model 
which encompasses these effects, a tool is provided for their investigation and 
evaluation in past and present information system (IS) developments. The foundations 
for this model were derived through an in-depth study of a large scale, national public 
IS development. 
 
Despite a large volume of research into the development and implementation of 
information systems, a high incidence of failure of such projects is still observed. 
With information systems now commonly integrated into many facets of an 
organisation’s business processes the costs and consequences of such failures can be 
far reaching. Given the additional scope and scale of many national public sector 
projects such consequences can be profound. While public sector IS failure has been 
studied in the literature, its focus is observed to be primarily that of an examination of 
e-government systems, neglecting the back-end (non-public facing) support systems. 
The focus of such studies is predominantly on the public’s interface and interaction 
with these systems together with their adoption and acceptance by the public. This 
view is a valid contribution but it does not inform the literature on the full range of 
unique problems that can be encountered across a complete IS development lifecycle 
within the public sector. 
 
Seeking to investigate these matters further, a collaboration was formed with a UK 
public body to facilitate the examination of the issues affecting the development and 
implementation of a national IS project. Onsite observations, interviews and 
document sampling were used across the development cycle to gather information 
from the perspectives of the stakeholders involved. The analysis of the data collected 
from this exercise highlighted a number of factors that were observed to have a 
significant effect on the project’s ultimate failure. Examination of this analysis from 
an STS perspective allowed for the extension of an existing STS model. It was 
extended to encompass the significant adverse effects that an organisational 
regionalised structure and external political pressure placed on the development of 
public information systems.  
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Chapter 1 
People and Technology 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The primary motivation driving this research is the desire to understand the 
developmental issues behind the exceptionally high rate of information system (IS) 
implementation failure that is highlighted in a wide range of studies across the 
literature, and in particular the very high rate of failure among public IS projects. In 
order to better understand the issues present within the IS development lifecycle this 
research starts with an examination of the recognised primary causes of failures 
within such projects together with an  investigation of how existing literature 
examines and defines failure. This review highlights the predominantly technological 
and budgetary perspectives that are often adopted when examining the reasons behind 
a project’s demise. Analysing this position further, this research illustrates the fact 
that such a perspective on IS failure presents a number of issues in the true 
understanding of such concerns. The underlying failure to recognise the inherently 
social nature of an IS development prevents an understanding of many of the true root 
causes of such failures. Organisational culture, internal business processes and 
individuals within an organisation are seen to make up a complex social system 
heavily impacted by the integration of an IS within an organisation. 
 
Having isolated these failures to issues within each IS development’s methodology, 
this study takes a whole lifecycle IS development perspective in its investigation of 
these issues and how they can influence the final outcome and viability of a system. 
Embracing the recognition of IS as an inherently complex social system,, a Socio-
Technical Systems (STS) approach is adopted in the review of failed industrial and 
public projects within the literature. Existing STS models are examined and compared 
before a generalised model of an IS as a STS is adopted. Common problematic issues 
encountered during the development cycle within both industrial and public sector IS 
developments are then mapped onto this STS model to highlight system components 
affecting such issues. Within this analysis Public IS projects as a class are show to be 
particularly vulnerable to a number of factors affecting their development. As a result 
of their often large scale and complexity, their high visibility and their need to meet 
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politically driven time scales and demands (POST, 2004; Butler, 2004) and their need 
for increased engagement with the public as a stakeholder, many such problems face 
additional strains on their development. The addition of these factors, both internal 
and external to the main development, presents a number of challenges that must be 
overcome by developers in order to prevent such systems failing. Of note in this 
literature examination is the absence of literature examining the implementation of 
backend public information systems within the UK. While e-government systems 
have been studied extensively most reviews tend to focus solely on the perspective of 
the system’s interaction with members of the public and the engagement issues 
surrounding e-government adoption. There is little literature providing a true 
investigation of the developmental issues surrounding the implementation of 
predominantly public sector back-end support systems which support internal 
processes but that have little or no direct interaction with members of the public both 
generically and within the UK. 
 
Through a case study of a national public IS development this research examines the 
interaction between, people, processes, organisational structure and technology within 
the development cycle and it examines their impact on the successful systems design, 
implementation and uptake of IS within a in large public body. This study will 
highlight the profound effects the regional autonomous organisation seen in many UK 
public bodies have on the development of IS within this context and it will propose a 
new STS model to allow for their recognition and examination. 
 
1.2 Background 
With the now almost complete reliance of modern industries on the implementation 
and adoption of IS, which control nearly every facet of their organisation (Spathis & 
Constantinides, 2003; Buhalis, 2004; Kourouthanassis & Giagli, 2007) from finance 
and payroll through to manufacture and customer services, the importance of 
understanding the expectations placed on such systems and the way their development 
and interaction affect the host organisation has never been greater. 
 
Given this reliance on the successful implementation of IS for the support of business 
processes it is perhaps surprising to learn of the high rate of IS implementation failure 
that is highlighted in the literature. In the review conducted by Taylor (2001), a study 
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of 1027 IS projects within the UK examining the satisfaction of an organisation with 
its project implementations, 897 (87.3%) of those questioned reported that their 
projects were deemed to have failed to some degree. With such high rates of partial 
and complete failure the costs to industry of failed IS are high, not only in terms of 
lost money, time and resources but also in terms of the negative effect on morale and 
organisational culture that a failed IS can have on its target organisation. 
 
When examining existing literature on why such failures occur, a number of common 
themes emerge. Primary among these is the lack of a homogenous definition for IS 
failure (Sauer, 1993). The complexity presented by an information system’s 
integration within an organisation coupled with the human factors involved in such a 
systems design and use, make a clear-cut definition very difficult to reach. Each 
stakeholder within a development will have their own perspective on the IS and a 
unique perception of its success and failure. As a result of this, existing research has 
fractured into a number of differing perspectives, each looking at failure differently. 
As is commonly remarked, many large scale public IS projects have failed or suffered 
difficulties as a result of issues within their development methodologies, stemming  
from the purely technical approach adopted in their execution, (Olphert & 
Damodaran, 2007; Clegg & Shepherd, 2007). Treating IS development as a purely 
technical concern ignores the social and organisational impact that implementing such 
systems can have, ultimately leading to failures throughout the development’s 
progression. Noting this, this research adopts a STS approach in its examination of IS 
failure, mapping existing project studies onto a proposed STS model. This allows the 
identification of the nature of the issues that have caused public IS failure, 
highlighting the highly social components that have been ignored in existing 
developments. 
 
1.3 Aims and Objectives 
Through the use of a case study examining a national public IS development this 
research will seek to examine the many social, organisational and technological 
challenges involved in the development of  large scale IS projects within the public 
sector together with how these issues interact across a project’s lifecycle. 
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The objectives are: 
1. To understand what negative factors are prevalent within the development of 
public IS 
2. To investigate these factors as they occur within an ongoing public IS 
development and observe how these factors interact and affect the progress of 
the project 
3. To generate a model based on these observations to allow for a more detailed 
analysis of such effects in past projects and their prediction in future public IS 
developments 
4. To evaluate this model through an examination of secondary documentary 
data examining past and current public IS 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
The research begins with a comprehensive and critical literature review, examining 
the strategic importance of IS within business and government today. It explores the 
meanings and reasons behind the high percentage of projects that are deemed to have 
failed and never reached full uptake within their host organisation, isolating these 
concerns to problems within the development cycle. Noting the gaps identified from 
this review and the problems already encountered in IS development, a case study is 
proposed as the basis for an examination of development issues within a national 
public IS project. 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, this research takes an interpretivist perspective, a common 
stance in projects examining the social nature of IS (Walsham, 1995; Orlikowski & 
Baroudi, 1991). A Grounded Theory methodological approach is taken in the 
examination of the problems faced in public IS development. Supporting this 
approach a case study method, explored in greater depth in Chapter 4, was adopted as 
the primary means of data capture. Ongoing thematic analysis of the data generated 
was undertaken during the study’s progression to allow for the creation of a series of 
themes that were later used in the generation of the model proposed in this thesis 
before its evaluation against secondary data examining other public IS developments. 
 
The case is the result of a collaboration formed with the National Police Improvement 
Agency (NPIA) to allow for the examination of the Police Portal, a national public IS 
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development underway within the UK police forces.  In common with other Grounded 
Theory based case study examinations of large problem domains this case adopts an 
informed approach to the start of its study. A practice confirmed by (Eisenhardt 1989, 
Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988) is that in the case of such large scales it is useful to 
have a series of non-binding themes to serve as a preliminary research agenda and 
provide an initial scope of inquiry which can be amended as the study progresses. For 
use in this case such initial themes were chosen from the literature review presented in 
Chapter 2. After an initial consultation and familiarisation with police forces and with 
the central development team within the NPIA, the initial themes identified from the 
literature review were refined from generic points to more specific concerns relevant 
to the Portal as highlighted from the familiarisation exercise and used as an initial 
research agenda to guide the case study. Proceeding force by force, the system 
implementations within four regional forces were examined and these themes were 
refined, confirmed or rejected as new data was collected. Qualitative data gathered 
from the studies were examined via an iterative thematic analysis approach, extracting 
patterns and themes as the data collection progressed.  
 
Data collection occurred within both the development team and within regional 
forces, consisting primarily of semi-structured interviews, observation and document 
sampling. Interviews were conducted with staff at all levels of the organisation 
together with document sampling of relevant information as it was presented. 
Observations were conducted in conjunction with end-users to allow for firsthand 
study of the system in use in its real operational environment.  
 
The themes developed from the analysis of this data were then synthesised back into 
the literature to establish a theoretical model exploring how the effects observed 
interact with each other and the core components of an IS together with how such 
effects could affect a development’s progression. This model was then evaluated 
through its use in the analysis of secondary data examining a number of past and 
present public projects. 
 
1.5 Thesis Overview 
The next chapter provides a critical review of relevant literature for this research. First 
exploring the nature of IS failure, critical links to the IS development process are 
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highlighted. Such concerns are then explored and the many views taken by 
researchers in their analysis are considered, highlighting existing gaps within the 
literature. Chapter 3 outlines the details of a case study undertaken in partnership with 
the NPIA with the aim of filling these gaps in knowledge, outlining the details of the 
IS project to be studied. Chapter 4 outlines the methodological approaches applied in 
the examination of the problem domain. Chapter 5 presents the body of data from the 
Police Portal case study, outlining the systems and processes examined in addition to 
highlighting relevant themes emerging from the data. Chapter 6 presents the synthesis 
of this data into a coherent model allowing for an examination of the issues affecting 
public IS development within strongly regionalised national bodies. This model is 
then evaluated against secondary data of existing and past public IS projects and 
further refined. Chapter 7 concludes this work, identifies limitations presented in the 
conduct of this study and proposes areas of future work for consideration. 
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Chapter 2 
The Anatomy of Failure 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to examine the complexity inherent to the design and 
implementation of a modern large scale IS and in particular those which are operated 
in support of national public governmental bodies and initiatives. The nature of the 
modern IS and its complex integration into its organisational host is first examined 
identifying the needs of such systems and the criticality of their operation, the 
dependence on such systems across large corporations and governmental departments. 
The evolution of Public IS within the UK is then briefly examined. 
 
The concept of failure within the domain of IS is then explored and shown to be 
ambiguous. The definition of IS failure is demonstrated to be significantly influenced 
by the organisational context of the failure and the view point of the stakeholders 
involved. Criticisms of the way existing industrial and public IS have been 
implemented are then examined and key problems identified within the development 
practices utilised in such systems. The chapter then adopts a Socio-Technical Systems 
(STS) perspective in the analysis of problematic areas within IS development. This is 
illustrated through the examination of past failed projects, highlighting key concerns 
and relating these back within the context of public IS development.  
 
2.2 Strategic Role of Information Systems 
The potential benefits of implementing information systems; increased efficiency, 
productivity, profitability, decreased costs and enhanced communication (Spathis & 
Constantinides, 2003; Buhalis, 2004), have acted as a primary driver for their 
adoption across a wide range of industries and applications. Accompanying this 
spread of IS there has been a transition from traditional standalone systems that 
concentrate on one very specific task within an individual business unit. Modern large 
scale pervasive IS are now more intertwined with critical core business processes 
across an organisation, resulting in a critical dependence on their proper operation 
(Kourouthanassis & Giagli, 2007).   
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The growth and technological progression of the internet into a viable platform can 
also be seen to have had a profound affect on the implementation and integration of 
information systems into the core business processes of organisations. The ease of 
communication afforded by online applications has led to information systems that 
have extended beyond the boundary of individual organisations. This has allowed 
organisational and governmental systems to horizontally integrate core functions, 
determining efficiency and economy of scales for the organisation and its users. An 
example of such integration is the UK’s Directgov portal system (Cabinet office, 
2010). Directgov acts as a central repository for citizens to access many government 
facilities and provides a range of services from non-interactive text advisories, such as 
the provision of guides explaining tax and foreign travel advice, to interactive services 
allowing direct online access for submitting applications for a driving licence or a 
passport. 
 
As a result of these large integrated systems and the consequent sheer volume of data 
collected and stored across organisations and departments, the introduction of data 
mining techniques has allowed for the emergence of sophisticated strategic 
management systems providing a close to real-time view of the state of a business, 
(Davenport, 1998; Spathis & Constantinides, 2003). The sophistication and timing of 
this data in turn permits management to respond faster to changes on an operational, 
tactical and strategic basis than was previously possible with isolated systems and 
business units (O’Leary, 2004). 
 
2.2.1 Public IS Evolution within the UK 
Recognising the increasing success and potential of IS systems in the private sector 
there has been a concerted push by successive governments around the world to 
engage with IT and implement it within all levels of government.  For the purposes of 
this examination public sector IS are divided into two categories, those restricted to 
back office functionality with no public engagement, and e-government systems that 
seek to allow electronic access and provision of services to citizens via the internet. 
Back office systems such as the NHS Program for IT (Clegg & Shepherd, 2007), 
CRAMS probation system (National Audit Office, 2001) and Passport Office systems 
(National Audit Office, 1999) were designed to increase the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the non-public-facing business processes of their host organisations, 
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seeking to improve the volume of transactions that could be handled and to allow a 
more accurate understanding of information processing within the organisation.  
 
The term e-government was coined to describe the citizen-facing side of public IS. 
While the term itself has many definitions (Kaylor, Deshazo & Van Eck, 2001; Fang, 
2002), e-government can be seen as the drive to embrace IS as a tool to improve 
communication, engagement, accessibility and service provision between a 
government and its citizenry. Such services can take many forms, from initial, small-
scale, passive websites that provide information and forms, progressing to very large-
scale, complex IS. These IS can be observed to be fully integrated with their back-
office counterparts, providing full electronic case handling and service provision 
where entire business processes within government are encapsulated within the e-
government IS and are restructured around this new central point of interaction (Cap 
Gemini & Ernst & Young, 2006). 
 
Within the UK there has been a strong push from central government to ensure that all 
public services have at least some online presence, be that through static information 
or more engaged services (ODPM, 2003; Cabinet Office, 2005) with a more recent 
stronger drive both in the UK and globally to transform these initial offerings from 
mere information sites to strong interactive facilities, providing full service provision 
to the public (Layne & Lee, 2001; Cabinet Office, 2005). This requires much stronger 
integration with back-end IS within the host department. While many of these 
offerings have been centralised into the direct.gov portal, providing a central point of 
access to many core government services, the nature of service provision within the 
UK means that such centralised systems prove difficult to implement when certain 
services are provided at a regional rather than national level. Within the UK the 
provision of public services is commonly distributed amongst each of the constituent 
countries, with local and regional government being tasked with the delivery of many 
core services, (Olphert & Damodaran, 2007). This results in a complex organisational 
hierarchy that must be navigated and planned for when engaging in e-government 
service provision 
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2.2.2 Public Organisational Differences 
Public organisations, like their private counterparts, exist to provide a service or 
product to the consumer, in most cases the citizens. However, public organisations are 
observed to differ strongly in structure, culture and motivation. These are factors that 
must be taken into account when considering the development of an IS within such an 
environment. The primary difference between the public and private sector can be 
seen as the controlling factors that have influence on the operation of the 
organisations.  While private companies are subject to the control of the markets, be 
that via consumers, competition with rival companies or shareholders, public bodies 
are subject to political control by those in government along with the constraints of 
the prevailing political will and ideology, (Parker & Bradley, 2000). Many public 
bodies are observed to possess a more rigid and dominant organisational culture with 
a strong, defined hierarchy. Such structures are observed to promote adherence to 
stringent rules and procedures, discouraging innovation, sometimes leading to the self 
recognition of public organisations being described as risk-averse, (POST, 2003). This 
is in contrast to the often productivity and efficiency driven cultures that have arisen 
in the private sector as a result of market pressures to improve profitability, (Parker & 
Bradley, 2000). The roles of public bodies are commonly set down in legislation, 
often with significant specific, legal and statutory constraints which dictate their 
activities. This is in strong contrast to the more unrestrictive approach possible within 
the private sector, whereby companies are free to operate how they chose so long as 
they do not operate outside the law, (Murray, 1975).  
 
Internal political pressures are also observed to be greater within public sector 
organisations. While the private sector has a clear goal of generating increased 
revenue, the mixed demands of public bodies catering to the wide range of needs of 
their citizens can result in a more blurred vision for the delivery of such services 
across the full range of citizen demands. This lack of concise guidance coupled with 
the more dominant organisational structure can lead to conflict when those within an 
organisation are unclear on its true goals or the method of their delivery, (Vigoda-
Gadot & Kapun, 2005).   In addition, while both public and private bodies experience 
external pressures from outside their organisation, within the private sector these 
pressures can be seen to be primarily competitive in nature. Competition within the 
public sector can be seen as a concern, (Vigoda-Gadot and Kapun 2005), as discussed 
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later in this chapter, however, external pressures resulting from political differences 
and public demands also place considerable load on a project’s development.  
 
Accountability and visibility are also seen as major differences between public and 
private bodies, (SCOT, 2003; Mulgan, 2000). Private sector organisations are 
ultimately accountable to their shareholders for the profitability of their businesses. 
However, public bodies are placed under more rigorous scrutiny with regards to their 
processes and policies. Public sector organisations operate under guidelines governing 
fairness, rationality and equal access to public services, (Mulgan, 2000), as well as 
freedom of information laws which compel government departments to reveal 
information that would remain confidential within the private sector. 
 
2.2.3 Complexity versus Risk 
While the increasing integration of IS is shown to provide many benefits to a host 
organisation, it also generates complexity, an additional effect on the core areas of the 
business that enhances the potential for IS failure. With the traditional model of IS 
implementation, whereby IS were implemented as standalone systems supporting a 
singular business process, an organisation would have limited potential for 
interruption to the core business, should one such system fail. The all-pervasive nature 
of modern IS, with many core organisational business processes encapsulated within a 
singular IS means that the potential for organisation-wide damage and disruption 
caused by the failure of an IS can present severe problems for the businesses adopting 
them (Charette, 2005; Davenport, 1998). 
 
For mission critical applications, e.g. nuclear power plant control systems or 
emergency service control room functions, the immediate risk posed to human life by 
IS failure is extreme and obvious (Leveson, 1995). With more and more businesses 
and governments adopting increasingly complex information systems to manage their 
core business activities, their smooth operation is now key to their success. If large 
stock management or public services databases fail to live up to their specification 
entire organisations can lose time, money and alienate their customers and the public 
to their service offerings. 
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While small specific faults within an IS, such as intermittent crashes, can cause 
considerable detriment to the operators, both in terms of lost resources and impact on 
business processes, this is reduced by the limited impact of such faults. The true cost 
of IS failure may be more visible in the number of projects that suffer from a systemic 
failure of their development processes (Charette 2005) and the huge cost such failures 
represent to their host organisations. With the strategic role information systems now 
play within the modern organisation, the efficient, smooth implementation and 
management of such critical systems must be a priority (Galliers & Leidner 2003). 
 
2.3 What is Failure? 
Given the critical nature of such systems it is perhaps surprising to learn of the many 
examples of fully or partially failed information systems projects analysed throughout 
the literature. In the review conducted by Taylor (2001), a study of 1027 IS projects 
within the UK examining the satisfaction of an organisation with its project 
implementations, 897 (87.3%) of those questioned reported that their projects were 
deemed to have failed to some degree. This rate is reflected when examining failure 
on public and e-government projects specifically, (Heeks & Stanforth, 2007) where 
failure rates can be seen to range from a low of 60% (Gartner, 2000) to a high of 85% 
(Symonds, 2000). With such a high degree of failure when implementing information 
systems and the associated financial and organisational toll such failure can take, a 
critical understanding of the causes behind such failure is crucial in preventing them 
in the future. One of the primary problems when examining failure and attempting to 
gather statistics on its occurrence is the actual definition of failure, as no one single 
definition exists in the literature. (Lyytinen & Hirschheim, 1987). 
 
One of the most basic approaches to this is to look at ways in which projects are 
judged to be successful. Many definitions exist for such a goal, Wateridge (1998) 
suggests that there are six key indicators by which the success of a project can be 
measured; meeting user requirements, achieving its purposes, making the users happy, 
meeting timescales and budgets and meeting quality standards. Arguably the failure to 
meet one or more of these success factors could then be presented as a degree of 
failure within the IS. Other researchers, however, argue against such a simplistic view 
of failure within information systems. They stipulate instead, the complexity of 
modern day systems and the number of stakeholders inherent in IS design mean 
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failure is subjective to the stakeholder who perceives the failure (Fortune & Peters 
2005). Another approach argues for a three step performance assessment framework 
for the analysis of project failure, opting to observe the efficiency and delivery of the 
implementation process before going on to examine the more management centric 
views of cost and time Pinto & Mantel (1990). From this, the project team’s 
judgement on the success or failure is sought before finally examining client 
satisfaction. 
 
In contrast to these views both Lyytinen & Hirschheim (1987) and Sauer (1993) argue 
that the use of a generic term of ‘failure’ is too broad a label to apply to the 
complexities of an IS and instead opt to identify different classes of failure with their 






A failure to meet predefined objectives. The system does not correspond to 
what was required.
A failure to produce a system at all or a failure to produce it within 
reasonable budgetary and timescale constraints.
A failure in the levels of use or degrees of user satisfaction.
Inability of an IS to meet a specific stakeholder group’s expectation.
 
Table 2.1 Adapted from Lyytinen & Hirschheim (1987) Failure Classification  
 
The literature interprets the concept of IS failure in a multitude of ways and consensus 
on a single, clear, objective definition does not exist. An information system’s 
integration within an organisation together with the inherent variability that human 
factors bring to the design, implementation and use make a clear-cut definition 
difficult to establish (Sauer, 1993). 
 
It is suggested that many of the difficulties found in judging the success and failure of 
an IS are that such systems do not exist in isolation from the organisations in which 
they are implemented.  Instead, both the organisation and the IS impact each other in 
differing way. 
 
2.3.1 Public Systems Failure – the Technical Factor 
From a public IS perspective, while each project has its own unique set of problems 
and constraints, an overall consensus has emerged in the literature when examining 
why many public systems experience such high levels of failure. Individual studies 
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differ in their conclusions, however the overriding view taken is that there is a 
consistent failure to select the correct development model for such projects together 
with a failure to appreciate the social nature of IS and their development within their 
host organisation (Olphert & Damodaran, 2007; Clegg & Shepherd, 2007) 
 
Many of the public projects examined within the literature have taken a purely 
technological perspective when developing IS. Development is treated as a purely 
engineering pursuit, expecting the host organisation to adapt to the imposition of the 
IS with little regard for the social, organisational and cultural factors at play. 
 
Design of Technical System










A Technical Approach to IS Design
 
Figure 2.1 Technical Systems Design Approach (Adapted from Olphert & Damodaran, 2007) 
 
This technical approach to systems development, as illustrated in figure 2.1 treats the 
IS and the organisation as isolated entities with no significant connections between 
them. It sees IS development as an engineering task with technological problems that 
must be solved and with the aim of developing a merely physical artefact (Olphert & 
Damodaran, 2007). The host organisation is expected to provide requirements for this 
technical exercise and then adapt itself to the resultant system without regard for the 
impact this may have on the social structures already in place. Social issues, 
involvement of users and the buy-in of those at all levels within an organisation are 
considered to be insignificant concerns, generated from an assumption that the 
organisation will always adapt to the developed IS. 
 
2.4 A Socio-Technical Systems Approach in IS Development Examination 
As shown in this section, the adoption of this technical approach, while common for 
developers coming from a purely engineering background, is now regarded within the 
literature as outdated and incompatible with the way in which IS should be developed. 
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A social understanding of the host organisation is now considered to be vital for the 
successful deployment of any complex IS (Berg et al., 1998). Acknowledging the 
aforementioned research, this work takes a Socio-Technical Systems (STS) 
perspective in the examination of key problem areas within IS development that have 
been shown to have a detrimental effect on a system’s final implementation. STS 
theory argues that any ‘work-system’ or specifically in the case of this research an IS, 
is inherently a combination of the social and technological development, the people 
utilising the system and the organisational culture as a whole (Kling & Lamb, 1999). 
Recognising an IS as an STS and taking such an approach in its development requires 
active participation from all those affected within an organisation (Mumford 1993). 
As shown in Fig 2.2 the system is seen as co-developed along with its environment 
rather than simply being imposed upon it. No single aspect of the development can be 
treated in isolation from the other as all are directly linked. IS development is viewed 
as a process that must occur symbiotically between all components (Clegg, 2000), 
allowing them all to mature and develop at the same rate, influencing each other and 
permitting each to integrate without bias or force. Social factors and technical factors 
are considered equal. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 A STS Systems Design Approach (Adapted from Olphert & Damodaran, 2007) 
 
Many models of Socio-Technical Systems have been proposed. Each of these models 
varies in the academic approach adopted in their creation, the number and relationship 
of their components and the degree of granularity utilised in their definition. 
 
Wilson (2000) takes a personal interaction perspective in his interpretation of the of 
Socio-Technical Systems model, arguing that systems can be best perceived through 
the observance of individuals’ interactions within the system. Placing the person at the 
Co - Development of New  
Technical and Social  
Systems 
Existing Socio - Technical  
System New Socio - Technical System 
Identified Need for  
Change 
A STS Approach to IS Design 
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centre of his model, he defines eight core interactions, which in combination with the 
person form the core of the STS: 
 Cooperation interactions (other people) 
 Organisation interactions (structure, policy and roles) 
 Logistics interactions (supply chain) 
 Setting interactions (environment) 
 Task interactions (goals of artefact use, loading) 
 Interface interactions (hardware and software links with artefacts) 
 Contextual interactions (society, finance, politics) 
 Temporal and spatial interactions (remote agents) 
 
Carayon & Smith (2000) take a Balance Theory approach in their description of 
Socio-Technical Systems. Such an approach examines the working conditions for 
individual actors within these systems and how positive and negative effects of the 
system’s operation can be balanced in order to increase individual motivations. 
Differing from the Wilson (2000) model, each of the five core elements identified is 
seen to be interacting with each other rather than acting purely on the personal 
component of the system. The five components of the Carayon and Smith (2000)  
model are shown as: 
 The Individual 
 Tasks 
 Tools and technologies 
 Physical and social environment 
 Organisational conditions 
 
Lyytinen & Newman (2008) take a change perspective in their development of a STS 
model for information systems, highlighting critical components of an information 
system, which need to develop and change in synchronicity with each other in order to 
manifest good development results. Within their model four key components are 
identified: 
 Technology (development tools and technical platform) 
 Actors (users, managers and designers) 
 Task (goals and deliverables) 
 Structure (project organisation and institutional arrangements) 
 
Differing from these generalised models the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister 
(ODPM), ODPM(2003) argues that a more specific and focused STS model is 
required when examining the issues concerning e-government developments at a local 
level.  In their investigation of local e-government deployments they identify four key 
areas, each nested on top of the next: 
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 Technology 
 Business Processes 
 Working Practices 
 Public Participation 
 
Continuing this more specialised focus, Sittig & Singh (2010) differ from the more 
people-centred approaches illustrated above through their adoption of a technological 
approach to the examination of healthcare based IS. They present the argument that 
the technological aspects of systems within the healthcare context and the interaction 
of people with these components require more granularity and exploration than other 
STS models provide. They outline eight components of their systems model: 
 Hardware and software 
 Systems content 
 Human-computer interface 
 People 
 Workflow and communications 
 Organisational policies and procedures 
 External rules, regulations and pressures 
 System measurement and monitoring 
 
As shown, there are many differing perspectives from which to consider the 
components and key features of a STS. With these, come differing views on the 
granularity that is adopted, how many components can be isolated and how they link 
and interact with each other. When examining IS development concerns as a whole, a 
more generalised STS model is required rather than those already described. While 
these models are valid for their examination of specific concerns within the contexts 
of their chosen perspectives the specificity of the scopes used in their creation limits 
their use when examining the generic developmental concerns from a wider 
perspective. For the purposes of the following sections investigation into the specifics 
of these concerns the more generalised Piccoli (2007) STS model has been adopted. 




Principle Components of STS
 
Figure 2.3 Principle Components of STS (Piccoli, 2007 pg 25) 
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In adopting this generalised model of a STS, as illustrated in fig 2.3, an IS is broken 
down into four principle components. Structure and People represent the social 
components of the IS and Technology and Process the technical components.  
 
The people component represents the individuals and the groups involved in the use 
and development of an IS. It encompasses such stakeholders at all levels and degrees 
of involvement from end-users and managers to project leaders, developers and 
consultants. This component encompasses their skills, beliefs, attitudes, bias, and 
preconceptions and their willingness to use and work with the IS. In contrast with the 
approach adopted by Wilson (2000) the people component of this model is considered 
equal to all others rather than placed at the centre. With reference to public systems 
development, members of the public are considered, as will be discussed later, to have 
a considerable impact on such a system’s design. 
 
Structure encompasses the underlying design of the organisation, referring to its 
governance and internal political organisation. Structure affects the relationships 
between components together with how they communicate and interact. Of particular 
note, given the subject of this study, is the absence of a defined structural component 
within the ODPM(2003) model, of all the models examined it was unique in this fact. 
While the model recognises the need for increased communication across its 
components, a structural component is not seen to be significant within the local e-
government domain. This is a view that will be challenged in the progress of this 
investigation. 
 
Technology embodies the physical hardware and software chosen in the IS 
development. It represents the technological choices made and the reasoning behind 
these, together with the limitations such choice impose upon a development. 
 
Process represents the underlying business processes within an organisation. It 
includes those embedded within the IS, those interacting with the IS and those 
processes that occur around the IS. Within both of the specialised models examined 
above (ODPM, 2003; Sittig & Singh, 2010), business processes are examined with 
increased granularity. Splitting these actions into more refined components highlights 
their importance and effects on the system in question. It will be observed that as a 
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result of the often devolved authority allowed in the regional implementation of 
national services, similar services are often provided through the adoption of radically 
different business processes. 
 
Of note in the Piccoli (2007) model is the strong emphasis placed on the interaction of 
the individual components. The model contends that no one component acts in 
isolation and that any actions or changes in one component have a profound result on 
the others. Given the high degree of interconnectedness between these components it 
would be therefore reductionist, if not impossible, to examine concerns within the IS 
development lifecycle in isolation. As is stated, each component of the model should 
be considered of equal value and importance within the system. 
 
2.4.1 An STS Perspective on Issues in IS development 
An examination of problems encountered in existing industrial and public IS projects 
from a STS perspective allows the identification of the components at fault within the 
failing system and a better understanding of the relationships and knock-on effects 
such problems might generate. The next section examines existing literature on a 
number of common failures in IS development, both public and industrial. Following 
the discussion of the STS components above, the causes of problems within these 
projects are highlighted and indicatively mapped onto the adopted model, as shown in 
figure 2.4. This has been done in order to illustrate their perceived relationship with 
the social and technical sides of such systems. 
 
Social System Technical System








Figure 2.4 Indicative Problem Mapping within the STS model (Adapted from Piccoli, 2007) 
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2.4.2 Leadership, Management and Planning 
As seen in a large number of previous examinations of IS failures a lack of clear 
leadership and business commitment coupled with indecisive management can be 
seen to have a considerable bearing on the final outcome of an IS project (Lederer & 
Sethi, 2003; Basu et al., 2002). As seen in the case study of Akkermans & Van 
Helden (2002) examining a partially failed Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
system within the aviation industry, business commitment to IS development and a 
strong unified leadership are show as decisive indicators of a project’s success or 
failure. Ultimately people are responsible for the control of the other components 
within a STS. As seen in this example, when the top management did not understand 
the motivation behind the IS implementation or did not see how it was of benefit to 
their organisation, other parts of the development were neglected. The involvement of 
key personnel, with specific domain knowledge, was restricted and the system’s initial 
development was compromised as a result. Without the support of all layers of 
management within the organisation key requirements were missed.  
 
In addition to the leadership and motivational roles that management play as a critical 
factor affecting the success or failure of a project, they also have a role in conjunction 
with the developers as core planners behind IS implementation. This can be expressed 
in both financial and organisational terms. Modern large scale IS developments are 
often long term, resource-heavy projects that require detailed planning to assess and 
mitigate risks that may occur during their development. The nature of a business’ 
requirements from a given software project may change throughout its development 
as a result of external commercial pressures, costs may increase, legislation may 
change and availability of external resources may alter. Inability to adequately plan 
for such deviations can have a deleterious effect on the ongoing development of an IS, 
ultimately leading to its failure (Sauer, 1993). While cost overruns are a near universal 
occurrence in most business areas, the inherently dynamic nature of project 
development coupled with the use of innovative and sometimes untested new 
technologies leaves IS developments in considerable danger of exceeding the confines 
of even a well mitigated budget. The severity of these overruns can be seen in the 
many examples of failed public and private IS illustrated in Charett (2005) and Ewusi-
Mensah & Przasnyski (1991) highlighting the large percentage of projects that, while 
Chapter 2: The Anatomy of Failure 
Page 21 of 160 
coming close to attaining near full functionality, are abandoned due to the financial 
strain placed on the commissioning organisation.  
 
2.4.3 Failures in Requirements Capture 
Strongly linked to the issues of poor management and planning are the failures in the 
requirements capture process leading to illogical or unrepresentative requirements for 
the IS to be implemented. Of particular note is the significant level of occurrence of 
this type of failure within Taylor’s (2001) work, where such a concern was raised in 
over 70% of the 1027 projects studied. Directly linked to issues of poor management 
and leadership is that of a failure to adequately understand the business case and to 
define the scope for the project during the stage of requirements capture. Without a 
well defined scope, projects have no true focus around which to adequately examine 
and refine an accurate requirements specification. This is seen in the failed project 
case highlighted by Buschmann (2009), which observed a project’s attempt to create a 
common platform to unify processes across three different logistics industries. In the 
definition of such a large project scope assumptions were made in respect of the 
similarities of function between these industries. These scoping assumptions were 
proved incorrect and this resulted in the generation of a large and conflicting 
requirements set that ultimately could not be reconciled. 
 
A lack of proper stakeholder identification and engagement in the requirements 
capture process can also be shown to have a profound effect on the outcome of the 
development process. As seen in the initial stages of the Cambridge University 
CAPSA project, (Fortune & Peters, 2005) a failure to engage both the end users of the 
system and middle management responsible for the technical aspects of the system 
resulted in these groups demonstrating strong opposition. It was felt that the system 
was unrepresentative of the true needs of the organisation.  CAPSA failed to provide 
many of the accounting functions requested by its end-users and presented an 
interface that was illogical and less efficient than the use of manual in-house systems. 
 
Projects may have well scoped and defined requirements at their start, however 
organisations are dynamic entities, facing external pressures and changing needs that 
can impact the validity of the requirements which were captured at the start of the 
development process (Kiel et al., 1998). This requirements drift has a strong part to 
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play within IS failure. If such change processes are not managed and integrated well, 
the project being implemented, while meeting its original specifications, can fail as a 
result of no longer being representative of the business needs.  
 
2.4.4 Process Modelling 
Strongly linked to the issues of inadequate requirements capture is the failure to 
adequately understand and represent the business processes that will be encapsulated 
within such IS together with the system’s interactions with its surrounding 
environment, otherwise known as process modelling. Adequate sociological 
understanding of the complex processes taking place within an organisation is crucial 
to the success or failure of an IS development. Without such knowledge high 
functioning systems are unlikely to be created, as can be seen in the study of Berg et 
al. (1998). This study of an electronic patient records system illustrates the importance 
of balance when attempting to formalise existing work processes within a written 
specification. Practices within an organisation rarely follow exactly the written 
procedures dictating their implementation, instead procedures and tools are often 
modified by users to better reflect their perceptions of the goals they wish to achieve 
(McCarthy, Wright & Cooke, 2004). Given that implemented processes may differ 
substantially from those envisaged in planned documentation, observations must be 
conducted rather than relying on existing documentation outlining the processes in 
place. Otherwise, systems may fail as a result of being based on false assumptions of 
how processes are performed. 
 
Overly simplified representations of processes, once embedded within the IS, may 
hinder the end user. Berg et al. (1998) recite their experiences of a hospital in 
transition to a new electronic patient records system. Workers who were accustomed 
to a more dynamic work environment, where notes were taken on an ad-hoc basis, 
resisted attempts to formalise the traditional note taking process into a more rigid, 
structured system where preconfigured and pre-coded entries were mandatory. It was 
felt that such systems lost many of the subtle nuisances presented through free text 
input, potentially impacting the level of care provided to patients. 
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2.4.5 Communication 
Spanning all of these issues is that of poor communication, which has an underlying 
role in many of the causes of failure outlined so far. Given the significance and impact 
of its contribution to these issues, poor communication can be seen as not only 
contributory to these failures but as an issue in its own right. The complex nature of IS 
development and the many individuals and groups involved in the development of an 
IS necessitate a high degree of co-ordination and communication between the 
individual groups, Schwalbe (2000). The nature of business processes as interfaces 
between individual units of an organisation’s structure results from them being 
inherently communicative processes. Without adequate involvement of all those 
people involved in their operation there is a strong risk of user rejection (Krcmar & 
Lucas 1991).  Inadequate communication between management and developers 
results in poor aims and objectives, inadequate communication between management 
and end users results in a lack of acceptance of incoming change and trust of the 
development team. Given the complex nature of such systems it is essential that 
adequate communication provision be made in order to ensure that people within all 
levels of an organisation can ‘understand and accept the change process’(Teo & Ang, 
2001, pg462) and that  internal processes and culture are allowed to adapt 
concurrently to the IS implementation and development within the organisation. 
 
This is further complicated by the fact that many people’s job functions are no longer 
isolated to one department. People now work across geographic, organisational and 
cultural boundaries (Friedman, 2005). The expansion of processes across these 
boundaries increases the likely number of stakeholders for a given project together 
with the needs and difficulties of communicating with this increasingly disparate 
stakeholder group. Ensuring the identification of all of these collaborations can 
present a difficult task to the system’s developer. The increasing complexity of these 
systems and the expanding nature of the processes within them elevates the level of 
domain expertise needed to construct such systems and increases the need for 
communication and collaboration with those involved in controlling the underlying 
business processes (Carayon, 2006). 
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2.4.6 User Acceptance  
User acceptance is also seen as a key problem in the development of IS. Given that it 
has been discussed above that user involvement is essential for the proper definition 
of requirements and the true understanding of business processes, user opinion of the 
final implemented system as the ultimate operators of that system has a strong bearing 
on its final fate. Resistance to change and rejection of an IS can be seen primarily as a 
result of users feeling a system is of no use or an active threat to them (Lucas 1984). 
The perceived usefulness and the ease of use of a system are key factors in its 
acceptance. Issues of user acceptance can also be drawn across the line of voluntary 
versus mandatory usage of such systems. Brown et al. (2002) conducted an 
examination of the case of HBC, a bank holding company, seeking to unify the 
software and hardware utilised across its network of affiliate banks. It was observed 
within this case that the mandatory implementation of IS may be seen by some users 
as a loss of control or power or the weakening of autonomy and, therefore, treated as a 
threat to be resisted rather than a system to be welcomed. From a public IS 
development perspective where the public may be the ultimate end-users of such 
systems, their acceptance and adoption of provided technology are observed to be 
problematic. As seen in numerous examinations of e-government adoption Belanger 
& Hiller (2006), Carter & Belanger (2005) and Hung, Chang & Yu (2006), privacy 
and trust are key factors in the acceptance or rejection of e-government services by 
the local population. 
 
2.4.7 Public as a Stakeholder 
Of particular interest within public information systems is the consideration of the 
public as a stakeholder in the IS development, be that as a direct stakeholder with 
access to the system, such as in e-government programmes, or a citizen whose data 
may be held in such a system. Olphert & Damodaran’s (2007) study of three e-
government projects highlights that clear and concise engagement with the public has 
a string of proven benefits, both in assisting the clarification and design of a system as 
well as acting as a strong catalyst for wider public adoption and trust. However this 
has proven to be a very difficult process for developers to manage. Principle among 
this difficulty is the undefined and wide demographic nature of the public when 
classed together as a single stakeholder. Each member of the public differs from the 
next, they come from different cultures and backgrounds, different socio-economic 
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situations and will have differing needs from an IS that is presented to them. 
Ultimately it is these divergent needs that have to be catered for when developing 
public facing IS. Adequately engaging with and capturing these needs is essential to 
develop a system that both reflects the needs of the public and allows them to feel 
empowered by the development process. ODPM (2003) provides an example of a 
local council which developed a credit card possessing system for online payment of 
council tax. While performing technologically to specification, there was no use or 
need for the system from the public as the cheaper direct debit system was already in 
heavy use. Without such public engagement, systems can be developed that only 
consider management’s view of the problem, this can generate solutions for problems 
that may not actually exist. That said, actual efforts to engage with the public can also 
prove problematic. Many projects have found requirements elicitation from members 
of the public to be hard to manage and with limited success. As seen in (Damodaran et 
al., 2005), an examination of e-government implementation within six UK local 
authorities, the developers experienced considerable difficulty in maintaining 
engagement and eliciting requirements from citizens. Local authorities felt there was a 
lack of guidance and direction from a national level. As seen in the example of the 
NHS Programme for IT’s (NPfIT) deployment of a national electronic patients 
records system (Cayton, 2006; Leigh & Evans, 2006), a lack of adequate public 
consultation and transparency when addressing issues of electronic patient records led 
to a public backlash. The public, fearing the spread of very personal data at a national 
level felt alienated and powerless to control their own information, resulting in 
considerable changes to the system already under design. 
 
2.4.8 Political Environment 
The political environment in which an organisation exists can also be shown to have 
significant negative effects on the implementation of IS, especially within in the 
public sector. As highlighted in (POST, 2003; Butler, 2004) public projects are often 
subjected to a higher visibility than their industrial counterparts together with 
politically driven and restrictive time scales. Large programmes such as the NPfIT can 
form substantial parts of a government’s agenda (Clegg and Shepherd, 2007) and face 
considerable pressures to deliver on time and on budget.  In addition, media pressure 
on politicians when projects go wrong or over budget can force them to close the 
projects down prematurely. 
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As seen in the Libra project, a national program to unify the IS of the UK Courts 
System, (Fortune & Peters,2005), the lack of a political mandate to force change is 
also a problem within Public IS development. While the implementing office in 
charge had the powers to force lower courts to adopt new technology they did not 
have a mandate to force the local courts to centralise and unify their business 
processes. This created a range of conflicts across the courts and stirred political 
resentment as courts felt their autonomy was threatened. 
 
The internal political landscape within an organisation is observed to have a profound 
effect on the eventual outcome of the IS implementation. Subtle political 
manipulation by key actors within an organisation can hold the potential to either 
encourage others to participate in the development or to take the opposite position, 
seeking to derail progress if the actors within an organisation feel it is of little benefit 
to their political goals (Kling & Lamb, 1999). Recognition of these key actors at an 
early stage is an important step in harnessing their influence for the good of a project, 
ensuring that the benefits of a development are explained and using the influence of 
these actors to assist in the cultural changes that must happen alongside an IS 
development. 
 
2.5 A Common Social Bias  
In reference to figure 2.4 amongst the number of IS developmental issues examined in 
the execution of this review it is noted that the majority of such concerns are situated 
towards the social side of the chosen STS model. This corroborates strongly the 
concerns highlighted from the literature, (Olphert & Damodaran, 2007; Clegg & 
Shepherd, 2007), at the beginning of section 2.4 that many existing projects are taking 
a technical focus in their implantation of IS. The primary failure of the IS 
implementations discussed above is that of a failure to recognise the inherently human 
and social nature of information systems development and usage. Systems 
development in these examples was seen as a process to be completed in a very 
technically detached fashion, whereby the development of an IS is considered as a 
purely technical effort that is conducted in isolation from those that will eventually 
use such a system. Through a failure to recognise the complex social environment that 
modern information systems occupy, the many social factors present are sidelined or 
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ignored completely, resulting in a substantially increased chance of project failure. 
Principally the issues previously observed can be broken down into three main 
classes: 
 A failure to adequately identify and communicate with all the relevant 
stakeholders within an organisation 
 A failure to proactively engage all stakeholders fully in all stages of the 
development process 
 A failure to fully understand the nature of the host organisation and control the 
political influences and bias present in many of the projects examined. 
 
The criticality of the need for adequate communication between all parties and the 
benefits such communication brings are clearly illustrated in a number of studies. The 
link between the level of communication between parties and the final success of the 
project is clear. Increasing levels of communication have a profound effect on the 
probability of an information system’s successful deployment (Keil & Carmel, 1995). 
Mistakes and misinterpretations can be caught at a much earlier stage of the 
development cycle, preventing the build up of invalid and erroneous requirements.  
 
The problems encountered through a lack of end-user participation extend this need 
for adequate communication. While ensuring communication between stakeholders is 
shown to be an effective way to partially mitigate many of the failings identified, pro-
active engagement of the end-users at all stages of an information systems 
development is an equally, if not more important, factor determining the success or 
failure of a given project. As identified in many of the concerns above, without this 
active engagement with, and involvement of the end-users, systems that are 
technically fit for purpose, meeting all the specifications often fail post 
implementation, as a result of rejection by the end users. Without the necessary 
engagement of such groups, the true purpose and need for an IS cannot be adequately 
explained leaving users feeling alienated and threatened. Through active engagement 
and  integration with the development process, users can be made to feel like a part of 
a project, giving them empowerment and ownership over aspects of the project and 
greatly reducing the chances of rejection in the later stages of implementation (Gefen 
& Ridings, 2003; Wagner & Piccoli, 2007). In addition to this, the management of 
internal and external politics are also shown as key contributing factors in the failure 
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of information systems. With specific reference to Public IS development the external 
political pressures placed on a development can be severe and may lead to project 
disruption and abandonment.  
 
2.6 Under-representative View of Public IS Development within the Literature 
In the process of conducting this review it was noted that literature studying the 
development side of public IS implementation is sparse in comparison to its 
counterparts in the private sector. Whilst many studies of e-government information 
systems exist, the large majority of such studies focus their attention on problems 
occurring at the public interface with such systems and their adoption and use by 
citizens. There are few examples of studies that examine the specific problems and 
challenges faced when building general IS projects within the public sector 
environment across their entire development lifecycle. By their very nature e-
government projects’ primary focus is the reengineering of business processes and 
technology to reorganise communication with the public through a technological 
interface. As such, this will have ramifications for the development methodologies 
used in such systems. In addition many of the case studies reviewed adopt a post-
failure approach in their examination of the problem domain, relying on historic 
accounts and second hand data rather than studying the failures as they occurred. 
 
Back-end systems without a substantial public facing interface seem to attract less 
interest in the literature, and when they are studied, the focus is on the impact the 
system had within the organisation rather than lessons learnt from the development 
process. This is especially true when reviewing Public IS failure within the UK.  
While a limited number of high profile public IS failures are examined, it was noted 
that a number of failed projects examined by the National Audit Office (NAO) have 
gone unexamined within the literature to date. As a result, the literature is somewhat 
deficient of a true exploration of public IS development concerns, especially 
examinations of those public IS that are not so public facing in nature and which focus 
on the development of back end processes supporting a department’s function rather 
than a specific focus on citizen engagement. With the exception of the ODPM model 
examining STS from a local e-government perspective (ODPM, 2003), there is a lack 
of a tailored STS model looking at the development of IS from a public organisation 
perspective and the specific characteristics and challenges faced. 
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2.7 Summary 
This literature review has explored the history, growth and adoption of IS. It has 
illustrated the nature of the technologically-focussed methodological approach 
commonly adopted in their development. Through the adoption of a generalised IS 
STS model, the commonly observed causes of failure have been examined in light of 
the core components of such systems and found to be heavily clustered on the social 
side of the model. In the process of conducting the literature review it was noted that 
while many public systems have been studied within the literature, the majority of 
projects examined are that of e-government systems which an lack of investigation of 
the effects backend support systems have within public bodies. Recognising this gap, 
the next chapter sets out the details of a case study conducted in collaboration with the 
National Police Improvement Agency (NPIA) in the examination of factors effecting 
IS development a policing context. 
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Chapter 3 
The Police Portal Project 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter seeks to provide information on the public organisation and IS selected 
for examination within this study (UK Police and the Police Portal), to better equip 
the reader with knowledge of the target case before a discussion on the methodology 
implemented in this research is illustrated in Chapter 4. The reasons for this case’s 
selection will be discussed before an in-depth examination of its purpose and 
operation, the motives behind its creation and the illustration of the context in which 
the chosen IS operates. The information provided within this chapter is the result of 
initial observation and document sampling conducted as part of this study. 
 
3.1.1 Police Collaboration 
In support of the aims of this study, a research collaboration was sought with a UK 
public body in the process of implementing one or more, large scale national 
information systems. This collaboration was designed to allow for a full examination 
of the process of systems development, observation of its progress and issues that 
occurred during such a systems development. The information gained from such a 
study would then be used later to expand upon existing public IS development 
knowledge. For the purposes of this study the National Police Improvement Agency 
(NPIA) in conjunction with the UK Police forces were selected as the primary public 
body participants. The NPIA was selected as it can be seen as a clear example of a 
government entity with a diverse IS environment with a wide selection of 
stakeholders, both within and external to the core organisation. The NPIA also 
presents a number of unique opportunities for the study of organisational factors in IS. 
Explored in greater depth later in this chapter, the hierarchical structure of the police 
in the UK is more granular and fragmented than other government divisions, with 
each of the 53 regional forces, to a large extent, existing as unique entities with their 
own organisational culture, and with sole control over their individual IT 
infrastructure. The NPIA mission is to provide critical national services, build 
capability across the police service, and provide professional expertise to police forces 
and authorities (NPIA, 2011) developing national information systems and standards, 
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but with the added constraint of a lack of executive authority over the 53 UK police 
forces. The NPIA faces considerable challenges, as it has no mandate to impose IT 
systems onto the forces and must work within the confines of such a heterogeneous 
organisational environment in order to implement its solutions. Consequently the 
forces’ willingness and acceptance of proposed national IS developments can be seen 
to represent a significant factor in the ultimate success or failure of such systems. In 
addition, the issues of systems integration at this level become a serious concern. As 
explored in greater depth in the following sections, the independence of the individual 
forces has resulted in varied and individual IT infrastructure choices by each of the 53 
forces. This results in a complex IT environment in which to implement a national 
scale IS as it must contend and be compatible with the many different underlying 
architectures at each force. 
 
The diversity presented across each of the regional forces creates additional 
opportunities for a more in-depth examination of the issues under study. Given the 
unique geographic challenges, crime statistics and historical background of each 
force, a diverse range of organisational cultures, skill levels and degrees of actor buy-
in and participation exist among forces.  
 
This unique structure also serves to improve the validity of the resultant analyses. The 
independent autonomous structure of the forces provides the opportunity to observe 
the reaction of different organisations that, although sharing a common overall 
activity, policing, have different cultures, structure, processes and to some extent 
legacy systems in place. Such a situation allows for the collection of a larger volume 
of data across a wider range of organisational environments that would otherwise 
have been possible, improving the triangulation of emergent concepts across the 
forces and the organisational boundaries between NPIA and the individual forces. 
Common areas of concern can thereby be examined which provides a richer 
understanding of these areas from a number of different organisational perspectives 
and motives. 
 
3.1.2 IS Selection 
The IS selected as the primary focus of this study was the Police Portal. A suite of 
communication tools designed to improve engagement between police and citizens, 
Chapter 3: The Police Portal Project 
Page 32 of 160 
intelligence gathering and online reporting of non-urgent crimes. The case was 
selected for a number of reasons. The original project was in the mid to final design 
stages of development when first engaged by this study, permitting the research to 
follow it from this stage through to its ultimate implementation. It was a very large 
scale IS, covering many facets of the Police’s organisational structure, it had interests 
from a large number of stakeholders, (local, regional, national, political and public), a 
common politically-driven motivation and it was to be deployed nationally. The 
project was initially funded from a central government grant, however forces refused 
to pick up the cost of the system once it was deployed and the Portal system in its 
initial incarnation was terminated. The NPIA with a new change of leadership, 
foreseeing this collapse, commissioned the creation of the ultimately abortive Portal 2, 
a new generation of Portal designed to replace the failing system. The requirements 
engineering stages of Portal 2 were conducted along side the final implementation of 
the original Police Portal system. This further study of Portal 2 allowed for the 
expansion of this examination into the requirements engineering stages of 
development and permitted all areas of the development cycle to be covered. 
 
While ideally a large number of projects would have been chosen for examination in 
this study, time and access considerations place a constraint on the number of projects 
that could have been realistically selected for examination. As a result the Portal was 
chosen as it allowed for the most detailed evaluation of as much of the development 
lifecycle as possible and presented a complex national system that could be followed 
through different stages of development and implementation. 
 
3.2 UK Police 
The following sections will illustrate the organisational and control room environment 
within the UK Police and at the NPIA. Organisational structures and hierarchy will be 
highlighted and the interactions and relations between the various national governing 
bodies responsible for the implementation of policing in the UK will be discussed 
before the examination of the challenging IT environment across the UK Police 
forces. 
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3.2.1 Organisational Structure 
While at a local county level the 53 Police Forces that make up the UK Police have a 
clear hierarchy with a chief constable in charge of a force, delegating responsibility to 
his or her subordinates, at a national level the oversight and governance of the forces 
and the responsibility for implementing national systems becomes opaque. Under the 
Police Act (1996) the Secretary of State (for the Home Department) represented by 
the Home Office has the power to set the long term strategic vision of policing within 
the UK. However in practice, these responsibilities fall to a coalition between the 
Home Office, as the representative of government and the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO), as the representative body of all the forces. The latter is chaired by 
the head of the Metropolitan Police, as the largest force in terms of population 
covered. While both have the power to suggest and recommend changes to the way 
policing is implemented at a regional level, each force is regarded as an autonomous 
entity and such change can only be implemented with the consultation and agreement 
of its chief constable. Each force is also responsible to its Local Police Authority 
(LPA), an elected group of local council members and private citizens responsible for 
the strategic vision of the force and ensuring policing meets regional needs. 
















Figure 3.1 UK Police Organisational Structure 
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Sitting along side the Home Office and ACPO is the National Police Improvement 
Agency (NPIA), formerly the Police Information Technology Office (PITO), the 
established purpose of which is to provide expert advice to forces on information 
technology, information sharing and training across a wide range of law enforcement 
specialties. When requested by the Home Office or ACPO, it is tasked with the 
responsibility for the development of national IT systems for the police such as the 
Police National Database (PNC), IDENT1 (the national finger print database) or CJX, 
the Criminal Justice eXtranet. However, while it is responsible for the development of 
these systems, it has no mandate or legislative power with which to impose the 
adoption of these systems upon forces. It is up to the individual forces to cooperate 
with the development of systems as much or as little as they wish, and to decide how 
to implement the technology provided within their force. 
 
3.2.2 IT Infrastructure 
Coupled with this lack of ability to mandate change across forces is the absence of a 
homogenous IT environment within each individual force and at the national level. 
While the NPIA has the ability to coordinate the technology implemented for national 
projects on a national level it has no say over the IT systems purchased or 
implemented within each force. The near sovereign nature of each force, the unique 
crime situations present in each county, and their ability to independently select, 
design and implement IT infrastructure has resulted in a situation whereby nearly 
every force is running its own unique information systems, using differing hardware 
and software solutions to solve the different problems within each force. As such, it 
makes the development of any national solution difficult. The NPIA has to contend 
with a large number of disparate systems with which it will have to interact, all 
slightly differing from one force to the next. 
 
Together with the national, politically driven initiatives for the development of 
policing systems, a number of forces seek to innovate and are often seen to be ahead 
of national political will, experimenting with new technologies at a local force level as 
they become available. This allows some forces to become test beds for technology 
that may later be considered for a national deployment. However, it can also lead to 
the political tensions identified later in this study, whereby forces feel that their 
innovations are manipulated and taken out of their control. In addition this can result 
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in forces feeling that technical specifications are too generic and not fit for their 
individual policing needs. 
 
3.2.3 Organisational Priorities 
Similar to the disparate IT setups present across the forces, are the organisational 
priorities established by each of the forces and the national bodies of ACPO, the 
NPIA and the home office. While all branches share the common goal of assisting in 
the reduction and prevention of crime, no formal unifying organisational aim is 
present. The Home Office agenda is set by politicians and as such is very fluid and 
dynamic, often generated in response to public opinion. ACPO, as a neutral, non-
politically affiliated body, has a more isolated approach to the establishment of its 
goals and acts as a forum for all the heads of forces to establish UK wide policy that 
can benefit the majority of forces, as formed by consensus. The individual forces 
however are left to knot the differing priorities given to them at a national level, with 
their own regional and local priorities covering the types of crime most critical in their 
locality. There are considerable differences in these across all of the forces studied. 
With the exception of the Scottish forces, which stand alone as a group of forces that 
fully cooperate and align their resources and priorities as a national group, the 
remaining British forces can be seen to adopt varying degrees of cooperation and 
isolation in their approaches to policing. As highlighted in the Bichard Report 
(Bichard, 2004) and as observed during this study, individual forces are sometimes 
reluctant to engage with their neighbours; the gathering and sharing of information 
and intelligence across borders is noticeably difficult to achieve. This is often viewed 
as a result of institutional competition, conflict and a lack of homogenous business 
processes between forces.  
 
3.3 Police Portal 
As previously stated the project selected for study in the research was that of the 
Police Portal, a now redundant suite of communication tools implemented for the UK 
police service by the NPIA. The suite was developed for the purpose of allowing more 
efficient use of mobile, email and web-based communication technologies with the 
public, resulting in greater intelligence gathering abilities and a reduction of volume 
of calls for the reporting of minor crimes. It was based around 3 core systems, Online 
Crime Reporting, Public Message Broadcast and Content Management System, 
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which, when merged, formed what became known as the Police Portal. This study 
joined the Police Portal in its later stages of development and followed the system 
from this point throughout its implementation and rollout to a number of 
representative forces across the UK. 
 
3.3.1 Police Portal Inception 
The Police Portal arose as a result of a fundamental shift in the way policing was 
conducted in the UK. Prior to 2000 policing in the UK was conducted primarily in a 
reactive fashion, only responding to incidents after they had occurred. In 2000, 
Centrex, the organisation responsible for police training, published a document known 
as the National Intelligence Model (NIM) (NCIS, 2000). The NIM outlined a new 
business model for the conduct of policing within the UK, known as intelligence-led 
policing. With this new model policing would be pro-active, using intelligence 
gathered from numerous sources (e.g. the public and external agencies) to identify 
crime drivers and patterns, ultimately highlighting opportunity to preventing crime 
before it could occur.  
 
In support of these aims the NPIA (known as PITO in 2000), was commissioned to 
investigate the ways in which information technology could be used as a driver for 
this new intelligence-led approach. As a result of this investigation, in 2001 PITO 
released the national e-policing strategic framework (Centrex, 2001). This document 
outlined the overall national strategy for the integration of information technology in 
support of the new intelligence-led business model and pushed for a citizen-centric 
approach in modern policing. The Police Portal, as it would later become known, 
formed one of the core initiatives outlined in this framework and with strong political 
backing the Portal’s development was set as a priority for PITO. 
 
While the concept of the Portal had existed on paper for a number of years the 
physical commissioning of the project occurred very quickly. In response to external 
events, primarily the bombings of public transport in London in 2005 and the 
resulting political pressure to better engagement with the public,  the Portal was thrust 
to the attention of the NPIA. As a result of this external political pressure the 
development and lead-time on the Portal was considerably shorter than would be 
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expected for a project of this size and as a result had a significant impact on how the 
project developed. 
 
3.3.2 Prior Systems 
As a result of the each force’s ability to decide its own infrastructure and local needs, 
a number of forces had recognised the need for increased communication prior to its 
arrival on the national agenda. This resulted in a mixture of forces developing their 
own versions of a portal system prior to the launch of the national Police Portal. The 
functionality of these regional systems varied considerably across the forces and in 
comparison to the Police Portal with some local functionality exceeding that of the 
national system. At the time of the Police Portal’s inception a number of these 
systems had reached full implementation along with a number very far along the 
development process with forces having invested significant resources in their 
development. While the national Portal team were keen to examine these systems and 
learn from their development, a number of conflicts arose from these early efforts that 
are discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
3.3.3 Police Portal Functionalities 
As stated previously the functionality of the Portal can be divided into the three main 
services offered, Online Crime Reporting (OCR), Public Message Broadcast (PMB) 
and Content Management System (CMS). From the public facing side, all Portal 
functionality was presented to the user through a single website, police.uk as shown in 
figure 3.2.  
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Figure 3.2 Police Portal functionality as presented through police.uk 
 
From the police perspective, operators interaction with the system was a more 
complex process whereby all three subsystems were treated as separate entities as 
illustrated in figure 3.3. 
Chapter 3: The Police Portal Project 
































Figure 3.3 Police Portal functionality 
 
Explained in more depth below figure 3.3 illustrates the interaction of the three Portal 
components. Police message broadcast and content management systems allowed for 
the outwards communication of information to the public via the Portal website, 
telephone, and email. Inward-bound communications arose from the online 
submission of crimes from the online crime reporting system and the public response 
to intelligence requests from the content management system. 
 
 Online Crime Reporting 
The OCR system, the most heavily used of the three systems, was designed with the 
intention of allowing members of the public to report non-emergency and hate crime 
through an online portal.  
Prioritisation 
Filter
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Figure 3.4 Online Crime Reporting System 
 
As highlighted in figure 3.4 the OCR functionality was accessible through the 
Police.uk website and consisted of a series of on-line forms requesting details of the 
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crime and of the individual submitting the information. (e.g. name and contact 
address, address of crime, details of offence, time etc.). Examples of which are 
available in Appendix A. Once the user had submitted the form, the submission 
became known internally as a Notification of Crime (NoC). Upon submission the 
NoC was transferred to a priority filter system that analysed what had been entered 
and checked for keywords that were considered indicators of a more critical 
emergency, which should be transmitted / referred directly to a call centre with the 
email priority flag raised. The NoC was then scanned for its geo-code and sent via 
email to the command and control room of the geographically relevant force, after a 
copy had been stored in a central repository. The Command and Control within each 
force acts as the central locus of communication and command for operations within 
the force, handling both emergency and non-emergency communication with the 
public via the 999 and non-emergency number systems and communication with 
resources in the field. Each force control room received the NoC as an attachment to 
an email sent to an agreed inbox; if the NoC flagged any priority keywords the email 
would have been marked as having a priority status. The relevant force then 
transferred this information manually into its own crime systems and ensured contact 
with the member of the public within 3 working days from receipt of the NoC. NoCs 
were transmitted as attachments on an email containing both a plain text file for 
human usage and in an XML format for the forces to use if they wished to automate 
the integration of the NoC within their own crime systems. 
 
 Public Message Broadcast 
The PMB system was designed to equip the Police with an extensive and versatile 
tool for communicating with members of the public. Through the use of Email, SMS, 
Mobile Phone and Land Line telephony, the PMB system could be used to contact 
registered members of the public with information, news and alerts relevant to them.  
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Public Message Broadcast System
 
Figure 3.5 Public Message Broadcast System  
 
PMB was operated on a voluntary opt-in basis whereby as shown in figure 3.5 users 
must initially register for the service in order for the police to be able to contact them.  
Registration was a simple process of filing in an online form which collected personal 
details such as name, age, address, occupation, ethnic background, preferred contact 
methods, along with relevant information the user would be interested to receive in 
respect of their journey to work or place of residence.  When emergencies required it 
or when pubic events triggered the need to communicate with the public the PMB 
system was activated with the responsible officer within a force selecting a target 
demographic and message. A typical example of the SMS messages received from the 
Portal can bee seen below: 
 
“From:88588 
Bulletin 88 now available at ‘www.police.uk’ This bulletin contains specific 
information in relation to the 7
th
 July Anniversary and reporting Hate Crime.” 
(A typical SMS messaged received by subscribers to the PMB system, sent 07/06/2006) 
 
Additional examples of emails and text messages sent by the PMB system can be 
found in Appendix A. The detailed level of personal information collected was 
designed to allow effective communication with targeted groups (e.g. commuters to 
Liverpool street) and for rapid communication with large groups of people (e.g. in 
case of major incidents when information needs to be disseminated rapidly). All the 
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information submitted to the system was kept at a national and force level. PMB was 
also used for registered police personnel, allowing for them to be contacted in the 
event of emergencies or critical situations. 
 
 Content Management System 
The CMS system within the Portal was designed to support a number of separate 
applications. Its primary focus was the provision of a central interface for assisting the 
publication of information on both the internal Police intranet and allowing individual 
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Figure 3.6 Content Management System  
 
Internal and external changes to the websites were conducted through a centralised 
CMS web interface accessible to all authorised police personnel. The internal intranet 
was not accessible to the public and was principally designed to facilitate the rapid 
dissemination of information within and amongst forces. Prime examples observed 
were forces requesting identification of photos of suspects from other forces. The 
public side, published on Police.uk, was primarily seen as a route to publicise 
initiatives, provide information to the public and, in cases of emergency, provide 
reassurance and instructions to the civilian population. The system was also seen to be 
used in conjunction with the PMB system, allowing brief messages to be sent out to 
the public via PMB, referring to a broader set of information published on Police.uk 
via the CMS. In addition to this primarily outbound communication the CMS 
provided a route for the public to submit specifically requested information via 
police.uk to a relevant requesting officer. Known as the Information Request Form 
(IFR) system it was designed to allow the collection of intelligence from the public. 
Information submitted via these forms would then be emailed, as both a human 
readable text attachment and an XML file, back to the requesting force any time 
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intelligence was submitted by a member of the public it would later be fed into the 
force intelligence systems. 
  
3.3.4 Portal Control Operating Environment 
While the Portal’s many functionalities were presented to the public in a single easy 
to reach place, the police.uk Portal, the back-end of its various components was 
integrated in a number of ways at regional force level. While the PMB and CMS 
systems were integrated across the forces at a department level, the OCR system, the 
most developed and utilised within the Portal, was fixed with its back-end systems 
feeding into the email inboxes of each of the 53 forces regional command and control 
rooms. While each force’s control room is unique in its implementation and 
processes, commonalities in structures and procedures were observed across all of the 
forces examined.  Core to this was the division of control room roles and duties into 
those of Call-Takers and Dispatch.  
 
Call-Takers were seen to take on two primary roles within the control room 
environment. First, they act as the primary point of contact with the public, handling 
both emergency (999) and non-emergency calls. They record and enter details of 
crimes into the crime system when they are reported as being committed. Details of 
events are input into events systems when the public are making contact to provide 
the police with notifications of non-criminal events. Secondly, they provide 
Dispatchers with information relevant to crimes they are responding to by collecting 
background information from various information hubs within the police and local 
government in order to support the effective deployment of resources. Email, 999 
calls, non-emergency numbers and the OCR were observed as the primary ways in 
which the Call-Takers were recording interaction with the public. 
 
999 calls are routed from the national emergency call centres when the public or other 
emergency services request police assistance, emails and non-emergency numbers are 
published on each of the forces websites and were observed to be given a lower 
priority than emergency communications. OCR, as previously stated, came through to 
a separate prioritised email inbox within the forces observed. Dispatchers are charged 
with the coordination of police resources in the field and measuring the response and 
resources sent to an incident based on the information provided by the Call-Taker 
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together with the severity of the call. Both the Dispatcher and Call-Taker roles are 
fulfilled by staff on shift duties, ensuring that the control centre is manned 24 hours a 
day. 
 
The level and methods of interaction between Call-takers and Dispatchers varied 
considerably from force to force. While Call-takers and Dispatchers were always 
observed to be physically separate within a control room in each of the forces studied, 












Figure 3.7 Typical Control Room Layout (From Field Work) 
 
The typical layout observed across forces was the separation of Call-Takers and 
Dispatchers within the same physical control room as illustrated in figure 3.7 whereby 
Call-Takers and Dispatchers are physically separated within the same control room. 
While Call-Takers were grouped and responded to calls and emails as they came in 
without regard to the area of origin, Dispatchers were assigned geographic areas of 
responsibility and handled any events arising in those locations. Two control room 
supervisors of a rank of sergeant and inspector were always present in the control 
room, and served the role of ensuring the smooth running of the room, managing the 
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response to large scale events as they occurred and in the event providing 
authorisation for the use of armed response units. 
 
While having differing roles within the control room, the Call-Takers and Dispatchers 
working desk environments were observed to be very similar, both between roles, and 
across the different forces studied. Despite every area studied having subtle variations 
in desk layout between forces, three key systems; AirWave/Telecoms access terminal, 







Access to Email, PNN, Crime Recording System 
and other local databases
 
Figure 3.8 Typical Operators Desk Environment 
 
The AirWave system is a secure, highly resilient, wireless digital communications 
network deployed around the UK to facilitate communication between the emergency 
services and public safety organisations. It is utilised by the UK police forces as their 
primary method of communication with resources while they are in the field. Within 
the control centre the AirWave/Telecoms access terminal acts as the controller’s 
primary access point into this system, allowing them to establish contact with any 
resources in the field, and vice versa for any Police resources to contact the control 
centre when in need. In addition, this terminal acts as a regular telephone, allowing 
the user quick access to make standard telephone calls, and presenting them with a 
quick call list of relevant council/emergency contact numbers. For Call-Takers this 
terminal also acts as the primary point for incoming emergency calls. 
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While the dual display setup for interacting with the computer systems was common 
across all the forces, the nature of the displays and the systems the operators have to 
work with varies considerably across the forces. As stated earlier in this chapter each 
force has been free to implement its own technological solutions to problems faced 
and it is at this point that such differences become clear. Each force has five key 
systems in common that control room staff must have access to: 
 
 A crime system for recording crimes as they are reported 
 An events system for recording notifications from the public 
 Access to the Police National Computer (PNC) for vehicle and criminal 
background checks 
 Geographical Information Systems (GIS) that provide localisation and mapping 
data on coordinates or locations provided 
 Email 
 
Each of the forces studied had its own method of implementing these systems in terms 
of the software and hardware chosen and the level of integration between each of 
these systems. With the exception of the PNC all the above systems are isolated and 
specific to the force in question, not allowing for the data sharing among forces. 
While there are some forces that share the same crime/event recording software these 
are very few in number and of those forces studied all had their own bespoke systems. 
This has resulted in a unique Graphical User Interface (GUI) approach to each crime 
and events system’s design, one force opting for a touch screen approach as their 
primary input method, with others preferring a more standard type-and-click GUI. 
The PNC system represents one of the oldest national systems amongst the forces, 
given its roots as a computer system created in 1974, its primary method of interaction 
was that of a command line interface.  This was sometimes operated in stark contrast 
to the more modern GUI approaches adopted by the crime systems. In two of the 
forces studied PNC was still used in its traditional command line style, treated as a 
separate application and used independently when needed by a Call-Taker. In the 
other two forces it was observed that PNC had been integrated into the crime 
recording systems and its command line interface hidden from the user, offering 
seamless integration, search and transfer of the data into the crime system when 
Chapter 3: The Police Portal Project 
Page 47 of 160 
needed. Such integration was seen as beneficial as it prevented the repetition of tasks 
across a number of systems and allowed for the automatic entry of data from the PNC 
into the crime systems. 
 
3.4 Summary 
Ultimately while the Police Portal was an incredibly versatile and flexible new tool 
for the UK Police its true worth and utility were never realised. While many 
appreciated the value it brought, its development was beset by a diverse range of 
problems that ultimately led to a critical lack of support from the forces. As a result of 
many of the same problems that affected the original Police Portal system, the Portal 2 
collapsed towards the end of its requirements engineering stages. Forces were left to 
develop their own bespoke portal applications as needed.   
 
This chapter has provided the reader with background information on the 
organisations and IS case under study in this research. It has highlighted the complex 
organisational hierarchy present within the UK Police and outlined the Police Portal’s 
functionality, operation and limitations. Chapter 4 presents a discussion of the 
methodological choices made in the execution of this research and how these were 
implemented within the case to allow for a full exploration of the issues surrounding 
the Portal Case’s design and implementation. 
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Chapter 4 
Methodological Research Approach 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to illustrate the methodological approach applied in the 
conduct of this research. It begins with an introduction to the overall research aim in 
order to facilitate the explanation of the methodological and ontological choices 
made. Following, the study’s overall design is outlined, highlighting the stages 
adopted in this investigation. The chapter also provides the rationale that has driven 
planning in each individual phase. 
 
4.1.1 Ontological Perspective 
As stated previously, the primary outcome of this thesis is a greater understanding of 
the social and organisational problems effecting IS development within the public 
sector. In common with many studies which examine social issues within IS, this 
research adopts an interpretivitst viewpoint in its execution, recognising the complex, 
context-dependant properties of such situations and their subjective character 
(Orlikowski and Baroudi, 1991; Walsham, 1995). 
 
4.2 A Grounded Theory Approach 
As a result of the lack of literature surrounding the specific public IS development 
environment and with relevance to this study the police environment in particular, a 
deductive approach to the examination of the problem domain could be seen as 
impractical. As seen in other IS investigations of new problem domains (Sarker, Lau 
& Sahay, 2001) an inductive approach is best adopted in such situations to allow for 
an organic understanding of the problem domain. This understanding is based on the 
inputs and experiences of those under study without being guided by preconceptions 
present in such deductive approaches. While secondary data alone could be used in 
examining the stated research aim, much of the existing published work on the 
examination of developmental issues takes a post-project failure evaluation 
perspective and tends to focus on individual, specific problems within the 
development process. This results in a wealth of literature that is relevant but very 
narrowly focused on specific areas within a development and which does not always 
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follow the evolution of such problems continuously throughout the progress of the 
development cycle.  
 
With this in mind, as seen in a number of studies investigating issues within the IS 
development process (Coleman & O’Connor, 2007; Hansen & Kautz, 2005), a 
Grounded Theory methodology has been chosen. As first proposed by Glaser & 
Strauss (1967), this provides a number of advantages over the traditional deductive 
approaches taken by many of the papers examined in the literature.  Through the 
adoption of an inductive logic approach a Grounded Theory methodology permits the 
systematic discovery and generation of theory from data and practice, in contrast to 
the a priori theory generation of deductive methodologies. This, when combined with 
an iterative case study approach, as adopted here, enables the ongoing generation of 
theory and exploration of concepts as they arise. Such a flexible approach is essential 
in the study of social and organisational factors, where the relationships between 
actors involved are often complex, dynamic and unpredictable and where many of the 
factors involved are unique to the host organisation.  
 
4.3 Case Study Design 
Complementing the implementation of a wider Grounded Theory methodological 
perspective is the adoption of a case study approach for the acquisition of data in this 
study as observed in many previous IS studies (Carver, 2004; Dingsøyr, 2002), which 
also adopt a Grounded Theory methodology. While a number of techniques have been 
proposed in the execution of case studies within a Grounded Theory methodology, 
this study has chosen to adopt the informed approach as proposed by (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988). Recognising the scope and scale of modern 
case study investigations, this approach allows for the generation of initial and non-
binding themes by which to guide the investigation. These themes serve not to 
generate theory but as an initial defining scope within which to base the investigation. 
While examined in greater detail in the next section of this chapter, the iterative 
approach taken within the case-study methodology is tailored to allow for the 
structured and progressive generation of theory as the case study proceeds (Gersick, 
1988; Yin, 1994). 
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As discussed in Chapter 2 many of the case studies investigating issues within IS 
development in general and within public IS specifically, take a post-failure 
evaluation approach in the analysis of the problem domain. While a valid and 
common approach to the evaluation of these factors, the post-failure approach may 
fail to capture information that was present at the time when events were occurring. 
  
Actors’ opinions can become coloured over time, bias and organisational politics can 
skew the resultant information gained from interview, and a large percentage of the 
data collection must be acquired through secondary sources. This can result in a 
limited view of the problem domain based on perspectives and opinions that may not 
be truly representative of real issues at the time of their occurrence and may provide a 
less complete understanding of the reasons behind the problems within public IS 
development. 
 
With this in mind, as shown in Chapter 3, this research has as its subject a public IS 
project still in development. This allows for a full exploration of the development 
cycle and the examination of the social and organisational factors affecting the 
development process. Through the observation of an ongoing project throughout all 
stages of its development, many of the issues identified in a purely post-event 
evaluation approach can be avoided. The IS development can be examined as it 
proceeds along its lifecycle, providing the opportunity to adjust the research direction 
as new factors and relationships are identified and recognised. This gives a more 
thorough insight into the causes of such issues as they arise. In addition this approach 
provides the researcher with multiple perspectives on the issues occurring, both as 
they happen and post-event, reducing the bias that can be introduced when using a 
purely retrospective approach, and permitting the cross comparison of actors’ views 
as they change over time.  
 
It could be argued that at the beginning of the implementation of such an approach the 
researcher is unaware of the ultimate success or failure of the IS development. While 
this is a valid criticism, it is held that all IS will suffer from some issues within their 
development and the adoption of such an approach will provide a more in-depth view 
of these problems. This will enable a more thorough exploration of problems in public 
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IS, regardless of the project’s ultimate success or failure than would be allowed by a 
purely post-event approach. 
 
4.4 Overall Study Design 
The following sections will outline the overall study design. Figure 4.1 provides an 
overview of the structure adopted in pursuit of the stated research aim. The overall 
structure of this study can be broken down into three main stages of research. 
 
 Initial Theme Generation & Familiarisation 
Establishes the researcher familiarisation with the target IS problem domain and helps 
to determine an initial research agenda.  
 
 Data Collection and Theme Evolution  
Examines the approaches adopted in the main body of data collection for this study, 
the reasoning behind force selections, the processes of thematic analysis and the 
evolution of the research agenda as the study progressed.  
 
 Theme Set Finalisation and Synthesis  
Examines the consolidation of all the information collected into a final list of themes 
highlighting concerns identified from all areas of data collection and their synthesis 
with existing literature to suggest solutions to the research questions posed.  
 
Each of these stages will be reviewed in order, discussing each of the individual tasks 
encompassed within each stage as illustrated in figure 4.1. Each stage will be 
discussed and its purpose outlined before the individual tasks in each stage are 
discussed in detail and their contribution to the progress of this study demonstrated. 
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Figure 4.1 Methodological Structure 
 
4.5 Initial Theme Generation & Familiarisation 
This stage concerns the initial generation of themes to guide the study research agenda 
and the preliminary investigation and initial site visits to allow a more in depth 
understanding of the organisation and IS under scrutiny. In accordance within the 
informed approach adopted in this case study, prior to any engagement with the target 
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project initial themes were selected from the literature review to act as an initial 
research agenda. A period of organisational familiarisation was then conducted in 
order to understand the target project and its operational environment. This 
preliminary examination allowed for the initial generic themes identified from the 
literature to be redefined, making them more representative of the observable issues 
within the Police Portal development. 
 
4.5.1 Initial Theme Generation 
Starting with a generalised view of the problems encountered during IS development, 
the literature review conducted in Chapter 2 highlighted a number of key problem 
areas observed in the execution of IS projects, both in industry and within the public 
sector. The most common of these problem areas were adopted as the initial starting 
themes: 
 Poor leadership and planning 
 Failures in requirements capture 
 Lack of public consultation 
These themes served to guide the research agenda in the initial stages of the Police 
Portal investigation. 
 
4.5.2 Organisational Familiarisation 
With these initial themes in place, the researcher began a period of organisational 
familiarisation within the Portal development team and with the forces. Starting with 
little specific knowledge of the Portal and the operational environment of the Police, 
this stage was designed to familiarise with both the operational police environment, 
internal and external business processes, and to serve as an initial starting point to 
focus the main data collection stage. Informal visits to three police forces were 
conducted to observe the overall business processes in place within each force, with 
specific focus on control room operations, IS/IT development and command 
structures (The internal formal and informal command hierarchy found amongst 
officers and staff). They also served to: 1. familiarise the researcher with domain 
jargon, 2. allow observation of the relationships between personnel and, 3. Permit the 
researcher to become familiar with the development processes adopted in house 
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within the NPIA. Given the exploratory nature of this stage, no formal data recording 
took place other than the researcher’s notes  
 
4.5.3 Observation and Focus Groups for Initial Theme Refinement 
Once the researcher was familiar with the operations and processes within the Police 
and had gained sufficient operational knowledge of the Portal system, observations 
and focus groups were conducted to refine the initial generalised themes into Portal 
specific areas of investigation so as to form the initial research agenda for the main 
empirical data collection phase of this research. This stage focused on working with 
the forces and development team to identify existing technological and social issues 
within the development. Initially non-participant observation of the development 
team’s meetings was used to form a view of how the Portal was progressing and to 
highlight any areas of initial concern. Focus groups were then conducted with the 
forces and with the development team to gain a deeper understanding of these issues.  
 
The issues identified from this exercise were then compared to the initial themes 
extracted from the literature. Section 4.9 outlines the processes adopted in the analysis 
of the data collected from the observations and focus groups and how themes were 
extracted from the this data. These refined themes, while serving to direct the initial 
case study investigation, represent only the first stage in establishing the true research 
agenda. Throughout the iterative process of data collection and analysis, this agenda 
was altered and refined as themes were found to be irrelevant or in need of 
modification as new areas requiring exploration were identified. 
 
4.6 Data Collection & Theme Evolution 
This stage represents the main body of data collection executed within this study and 
the ongoing process of iterative thematic analysis conducted alongside this collection. 
It highlights the continual refinement of the research agenda that acted to guide 
further force visits and investigations with the development team. 
 
4.6.1 Identification of Research Protocol 
Upon completion of the initial research agenda, negotiations began with the forces 
and amongst the development team in order to secure access to a full examination of 
the Police Portal’s implementation. In total four forces and the development team 
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within the NPIA were selected for participation in the data collection process. Within 
the NPIA a core set of the development team was identified. This included developers 
who were external contractors to the NPIA, seconded officers who were responsible 
for the development and  management of the project together with those responsible 
for its roll out and implementation. This team will henceforth be referred to as the 
‘development team’. Selection of the forces was conducted to collect the most 
representative set of data available that examined the Portal’s implementation. In 
conjunction with the development team, the forces which were selected were chosen 
to allow a representative cross section of: 
 
 Force Size 
 Current State of Portal Implementation 
 Volume of Public Submission to the Portal System 
 Geographic Diversity 
 
In conjunction with the development team a decision was made to select four police 
forces to be involved as the primary participants in this study. While ideally all 53 
forces would have been included, the time constraints placed on this research and the 
depth of study required to produce accurate qualitative information describing the 
phenomena present within each force limited this scope to four.  
 
Force A covers a large geographic area encompassing both rural and urban 
populations. It has a medium sized work force and a strongly developed Portal 
implementation receiving a below average volume of Portal submissions. 
 
Force B is a relatively small force, covering a large, predominantly rural geographic 
area. As a result of its size it has a relatively simplistic although efficient 
implementation of the Portal with a low volume of submissions. 
 
Force C covers a relatively small metropolitan area with a high population density. It 
has a large work force and a limited implementation of the Portal receiving medium 
levels of submission. 
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Force D is a mid sized force, both in terms of geographic area covering a wide range 
of rural and urban centres, and in terms of officer numbers. It has a strongly 
developed Portal system receiving a higher than average number of submissions. 
 
Each force was visited at least once, with such visits often over a period of days. 
Participants at each force were chosen to form a generally representative view of the 
Portal’s usage and effect. While there were subtle differences in the selection of staff 
across each force due to differing control room and staffing organisation, a consistent 
set of staff roles were consulted as discussed further in the individual data collection 
sections below. Data collection was further complicated by the stringent security 
controls in place within the police environment in general and more so in the 
command and control rooms. With few exceptions, photography and voice recording 
was strictly prohibited in many of the forces examined, thereby forcing the use of 
diagrammatic depiction of the operating environment. Interviews, when conducted, 
were not allowed to be recorded and verbatim transcripts prohibited. Detailed notes 
for each interview were kept, highlighting key points brought up and interview 
subjects were asked to verify the accuracy of the notes at the conclusion of the 
interview. Document sampling was again restricted due to the confidential and 
classified nature of many of the documents identified. While physical access to these 
documents was often permitted and the documents were allowed to be included in the 
analysis, their physical reproduction in the appendices of this work was not allowed, 
and as such the data contained within these documents has been surmised in a way to 
protect the original source. 
 
4.7 Data Collection 
Data collection proceeded in two parallel strands. The investigation of concerns 
within the development team proceeded as an ongoing process throughout the conduct 
of this study, informed by problems encountered within the forces. Individual forces 
were examined in turn. Data collection techniques were agreed both with the NPIA 
for the examination of the development team and with the individual forces involved 
before each study commenced. The primary techniques adopted are discussed below. 
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4.7.1 Document Sampling 
Document sampling was chosen as one of the primary methods of data collection as it 
allows for the collation and examination of formally documented procedure and 
policies within an organisation (Bryman & Bell, 2007). The primary aim of document 
sampling in this study was to gather supporting evidence of witnessed procedures, 
historical documents outlining areas of the Portal’s development and regulatory 
documentation governing areas of its implementation. These were then compared to 
statements made by participants during the interviews and other data collected to 
either support their views or highlight disparities between documented procedure and 
those occurring in the field (Yin, 2003). Where such disparities existed themes were 
generated for the theme sets discussed in 4.9. 
 
Document sampling was employed with the development team and at the four forces 
during the duration of this study.  The Portal development team was asked to provide 
documentation surrounding a number of areas of the Portal’s Systems: 
 
 Policies and Frameworks guiding the Portal’s initial inception 
 Development procedures used in the Portal’s creation 
 Training materials for users of the Portal’s various components 
 Legislative documentation regarding legal issues around the Portal’s use 
 Documentation highlighting the organisational and managerial structures 
present within policing in the UK 
 
At a force level, the individual forces were asked to provide documentation regarding 
their implementation of the Portal System and supporting documents examining 
business processes in place within each force before and after the Portal’s 
implementation.  
 
Document sampling was conducted at all stages of the data collection process and 
served two primary purposes. It enabled cross comparison of theoretical planned 
models of business development with the actual facts of the implementation of 
systems in the field and provided valuable information and familiarisation with 
individual details of a force’s implementation prior to the force visit.  
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4.7.2 Interviews 
Interviews were selected as a method of directly eliciting information from those 
involved in the Portal’s development, implementation and use. For this study a semi-
structured interview was selected because they grant flexibility in the interrogation of 
the interviewee (Bryman & Bell, 2007). A Semi-structured approach in this instance 
offered benefits over a freeform or fully structured interview method by allowing 
predefined topics to be discussed and explored with the interviewee while allowing 
the flexibility to explore these issues in more depth than a structure interview would 
permit. Such an approach also enables the interview to explore new areas that are 
identified during the process of the interview and elicit a wider and more complete 
understanding of the problem domain in question. 
 
Interviews were conducted with the development team and within the forces, across a 
wide range of subjects and staff, as themes were identified. This ensured exploration 
of these themes at a deeper level than document sampling would allow on its own. At 
a development team level interviews were primarily conducted amongst the Portal 
development team and their seconded officers. These interviews examined the 
processes and procedures adopted in the development of the Portal, the organisational 
structure within the NPIA and the political and social relationships between the 
development team, between the NPIA and the development team and their wider 
relationship with regional forces. 
 
Interviews were conducted at each force visit to better understand individuals’ 
reactions to the systems being considered and to enable a greater familiarity of the 
complex interpersonal relations within each force. Interviewees were selected to 
ensure a representative distribution of participants. While not restricted to this 
following list, a core of organisational personnel were interviewed across each force 
 
 Chief Officer in the force (where permitted) 
o Functional head of the force, ultimately responsible for force’s reaction 
to the Portal’s implementation and their level of engagement with the 
NPIA. 
 Senior officer in charge of command and control 
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o Responsible for command and control operations in general with 
authority to amend internal business processes. 
 Control room supervisor (One or Two within each force) 
o Responsible for day to day control room operation and the quality of 
data handled during each shift. Direct line manager of end users of the 
Portal and mindful of the effects new systems have on their operational 
staff. 
 Portal operator within the control room (One or Two dependant on Force) 
o End users responsible for the operation of the Portal within forces and 
the transfer of data from NoC submissions to the crime systems in 
force. 
 Dispatcher (One or Two dependant on Force) 
o Those responsible for the management of police resources currently 
deployed in the field. Acting off information submitted from the Portal. 
 
Outside of this list when it was felt that more information could be provided by 
another member of force staff due to their roles or responsibilities such staff were 
invited to participate in the interview process. 
 
The interviews lasted no more than 30 minutes and sought to elicit the interviewees’ 
opinions on a number of the themes identified during the progression of the study. 
Interviews topics differed based on the roles and responsibilities of the interview but 
remained consistent across forces when interviewing those in comparative roles. At 
forces a core set of questions to be examined were identified from the initial theme 
generation and refined as the research progressed with the research agenda being 
updated to reflect the inclusion of new information. When new themes emerged from 
analysis or particular areas of concern were identified within a force, interview topics 
were added to examine these areas in greater depth. Within the development team, 
interviews were performed from an initial set of questions which were generated prior 
to each interview in order to ensure that the conversations were guided to examine the 
concerns in question.  
 
As a result of the stringent security concerns, the recording of interviews was 
prohibited. Field notes were taken as interviews progressed, recording the information 
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offered by the interviewees. At the end of each interview these were reviewed by both 
parties to ensure that the information was a true and accurate reflection of the 
interview process and that no bias or misconceptions had been introduced during the 
note taking process. 
 
4.7.3 Observations 
Observations were used as a tool to examine and capture tacit knowledge of the 
Portal’s usage within the control room environment. Although all Portal operators 
were interviewed, it was possible that differences between their perceived actions and 
their actual actions may occur. Observations also allow for the capture of everyday 
interactions with other members of staff and other systems that the operator may not 
be aware of or that they regard as too common sense to raise unprompted as an issue 
during interview. Observation in conjunction with the interview process allowed for 
an understanding of the true implementation of the Portal within forces and permitted 
an exploration of the variance between the intended implementation as planned by the 
development team and within the forces, and the actual implementation on the 
ground. Development team meetings were observed in a purely non-participatory 
form in order to better understand the relationships and dialogue between team 
members and to identify where development progress differed from documented 
examples 
 
Within the forces, observations were conducted with the aim of examining four main 
components of the Portal’s effects on its environment: 
 
 Interaction between users of the Portal system 
 Interactions between user and the Portal 
 Interaction between users and ancillary systems 
 Interaction between the Portal and ancillary systems 
 
Using Gold’s (1958) classification of the observer roles, the observations of the Portal 
operators were subdivided into two main stages. Firstly, the researcher took the role of 
a non-participant or ‘complete observer’ whereby no interaction with the user was 
initiated. The user was observed performing their normal tasks without interruption 
from the observer so that activities could be observed without interference in the 
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normal flow of work. This allowed the capture of events as they proceeded with notes 
taken highlighting issues observed that required clarification for the later stages of 
observation. Once satisfied that all relevant information had been captured the 
observation moved to an ‘observer-as-participant’ approach, engaging with the user 
and asking them to describe their activities as they progressed and clarify actions 
where these were felt to contradict existing information held by the observer or where 
the users actions were unexpected or new. Many observations were then followed up 
by a semi-structured interview to address any issues observed and reduce the risk of 
misinterpretation of the operators’ actions during observation. Within the 
development team non-participant observation was used in developer meetings to map 
and track the progress of the Portal and to highlight any issues with the ongoing 
development. Follow-up interviews were often conducted post-observation to clarify 
any issues that arose at these meetings. 
 
4.7.4 Bias Control 
Within this research a number of steps were taken to ensure the impact of bias on the 
study was minimised. The forces chosen to take part in this study were selected in 
conjunction with the NPIA to be representative of the target systems’ usage in terms 
of volume and in the case of the Police Portal, type of Portal submission, existing IT 
infrastructure and geographical location. Interviews were conducted with a large cross 
section of the Portal operation staff spanning, age, gender, rank and responsibility. On 
an individual force basis, participants in this study were assured that all data collected 
were anonymous and guarantees were in place that information gathered would not be 
fed back to the individual forces involved, reducing the fear of repercussions if 
participants were to give negative feedback. Where applicable the duplication of 
interviews and observations was performed across a number of individuals conducting 
the same task to account for the individual bias of those participating. On a force by 
force basis, triangulation of the data collected across all the forces was performed to 
spot those themes common to many against those that were unique to the force in 
question. 
 
4.8 Data Analysis 
For this study thematic analysis was chosen as the primary technique used in the 
collation and analysis of the data collected. Thematic analysis was selected for two 
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principle reasons, the overwhelmingly qualitative and social nature of the information 
collected and its strongly associated use in conjunction with a Grounded Theory 
approach (Crabtree & Miller, 1999). Thematic analysis has a proven history as a 
methodology assisting in the interpretation of a wide range of qualitative data types, 
with extensive use across a large number of academic fields (Boyatzis, 1998). 
Coupled with its ability to be used in an iterative manner in the generation and 
understanding of themes and narratives in data, this approach is often used together 
with a Grounded Theory approach, as adopted here.  
 
Such an approach was adopted in the transformation of the data collected through the 
interviews, observations and document sampling conducted throughout the execution 
of this study. Rather than adopting a single monolithic data collection stage followed 
by analysis, this research conducted data analysis iteratively throughout. As 
highlighted in figure 4.1, new themes emerging from the ongoing investigation served 
to refocus the research agenda allowing for them to be investigated in greater depth 
and for their examination within forces and the development team where necessary.  
 
4.9 Analysis Structure 
Within the three main stages of the methodological structure, a number of analytical 
processes were conducted, see Figure 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 Analysis Structure 
 
As stated is section 4.5.3 within the Familiarisation & Theme Generation stage the 
initial themes obtained from the literature review were revaluated in the context of the 
organisational familiarisation undertaken in order to tailor these initial themes to be 
more specific to the Portal development. Data from meeting observations and focus 
groups were analysed in order to extract common themes that reflected issues within 
the development, the initial themes were then compared to these. Where 
commonalities were found or issues from the literature were believed to be present but 
not necessarily brought up in the preliminary meetings, these were highlighted and 
retained as part of the theme set for the main investigation.  
 
4.9.1 Theme Identification and Comparison 
In concert with the data collection approach the analysis of data generated within the 
main body of the Data Collection & Theme Evolution stage proceeded in two parallel 
strands. Analysis within the development team study was conducted as an ongoing 
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process as new information was collected and the research agenda modified as new 
themes emerged.  Force data were analysed upon completion of the study within that 
force. Upon completion of each data collection stage the gathered information was 
collated. The evidence was parsed looking for issues affecting the social and 
organisational aspects of the system or highlighting areas where technological 
development methodologies might have been in use. From these, a set of themes 
representing the views expressed and the researcher’s observations were compiled. 
Within the forces these themes were then evaluated against those derived from 
previous forces and those amalgamated within the evolving research agenda. Themes 
no longer deemed relevant were removed and new emergent themes added to allow 
for further exploration as the research progressed. Within the development team the 
research agenda was modified as new themes emerge from the collected data and 
reviewed as completed force studies highlighted new areas to be investigated within 
the development team. 
 
4.9.2 Overall Final Theme Review and Cross Comparison 
As the research neared the end of its data collection phase the themes generated from 
the individual force themes were triangulated to form a representative view of the 
problems encountered across all of the forces studied with themes shown to be 
isolated to an individual force removed. These were then evaluated against the themes 
observed within the development team to provide a final theme set representative of 
the issues observed across the entire breadth of the targeted IS and its host 
organisation. 
 
4.10 Model Generation and Evaluation 
In Chapter 6 the problems emerging from this final theme set are discussed in the 
context of wider literature concerning the issues identified within the analysis, with 
these themes then being used in the generation of an expanded STS model which 
illustrates the difficulties identified in this study. This proposed model is then 
evaluated in the context of secondary data that examines additional past and present 
public IS projects and is confirmed against the findings of this evaluation with 
amendments made to the model where necessary. 
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4.11 Summary 
This chapter has outlined the grounded inductive case study approach adopted in the 
execution of this research. The case study used in the progress of this research has 
been identified and the iterative approach and methodological choices behind its 
design and execution explained. In the next chapter, data and observations from the 
case study will be outlined, analysed and the final theme set documented. 
 
 Page 66 of 155 
Chapter 5 
Situational Outline and Analysis 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a detailed explanation of the body of data collected in line with 
the methodology presented in Chapter 4 highlighting problems encountered within the 
Portals development. In order to familiarise the reader with the issues encountered, 
the chapter begins with an informal account of the situation encountered within the 
Portal development before proceeding with an in-depth examination of the themes 
resulting from the progression of the analysis will be presented.  
 
5.2 Outline of the Portal’s Development and Implementation 
As stated in Chapter 4, the main body of data analysis was conducted in the process of 
theme extraction from interviews, observations and by comparison to documents 
collected. As a result of the complexities of the various problems with the Portal 
development that were identified from this, together with the scale of the 
implementation, an informal narrative commentary of this data is first presented. Its 
purpose is to provide the reader with background information on the problem domain 
before the formal themes resulting from the data are examined in section 5.3. 
 
5.2.1 Portal Implementation Differences 
The functionality and implementation of the Portal, which is presented in Chapter 3, 
illustrated the technically simplistic nature of the features that were being 
implemented. However, a number of difficulties arose when examining the Portal’s 
physical implementation within the control room. The lack of any homogenous IT 
infrastructure presented a number of issues for the development team when 
considering the best way to integrate the Police Portal into the control room’s existing 
systems and processes. Ultimately a compromise was reached. In an ideal world the 
information submitted via the Police Portal would have automatically been integrated 
into the relevant force’s crime system and an operator notified, however no such 
universal crime system exists. Many of the forces operate their own custom built 
systems for recording crime, each with its own specifications, unique APIs and 
storage schemas. None of the four forces examined shared a crime system with any 
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other. As a result of this, the development team decided that individually designing 
and catering for each force’s crime system was too complex, costly and would have 
taken too long to achieve. Instead, email was chosen as the simplest manner in which 
to relay the information to each force. The Portal submission was attached as a text 
file, or NoC as referred to previously, and sent directly to a nominated inbox at each 
force. This NoC was then manually input into the crime system by a control room 
operator. Recognising that this was a less than ideal solution, an XML file containing 
identical information in a marked-up form was included in each email. This would 
allow each force, if they should choose, to develop a system to automatically import 
the XML NoC into their crime system. However, during the lifetime of the Police 
Portal no force studied chose to implement this option. 
 
While the addition of a new stream of emails to the command and control 
environment may seem trivial and nonintrusive at first, the introduction of the Portal 
system initiated a series of profound and unexpected changes within the control room 
environment. A lot of training was provided for those using the PMB and CMS side 
of the Portal’s implementation but very little was provided for those utilising the OCR 
system as it was assumed that each force would be able to cope with a new stream of 
emails. In fact, an entirely new and uniquely structured stream of information was 
being introduced into an already ‘information heavy’ environment, creating its own 
monitoring and usage requirements. With varying degrees of instruction and 
communication from the core development team, each force had to decide how best to 
integrate the Portal NoC emails into its existing business processes. This resulted in 
very different handling procedures across the forces in this study. Many forces 
ultimately adopted similar processes for the entry of NoC data into their crime 
systems, however the differing technological abilities of the forces lead to stark 
differences in the way NoC information was tracked from arrival, handled and input 
into the crime system. The level of involvement of the core Portal development team 
and the differences in training across the four forces were also very apparent in the 
varying degrees of knowledge or lack thereof on how the Portal system operated, of 
the priority and keyword systems and how errors in the system were handled. 
 
In both forces A and D the Portal inbox was monitored 24/7 by a single designated 
Call-Taker from each shift, who handled NoC requests as they came in, in addition to 
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their normal duties. Information was transferred from the NoC text files by manually 
retyping it into the force’s crime system. From this point it was processed as any non-
urgent crime coming in over the phone would be. The operators were asked why the 
use of a copy and paste function was not employed in the transfer of the data. 
Responses indicated that because the information arriving in the NoC was so 
different, both in format of the data and order of the fields from their existing CMS 
GUI, they found manual re-entry to be the only viable method for inputting data from 
NoC into the CMS. It was observed that this need to manually duplicate all the 
information in the NoC placed considerable extra burden on the operators and 
consumed a large portion of their working time. In addition, errors made in the 
transposition of information from NoCs to crime system were observed to be 
commonly made. While many were caught by the Call-Taker in the process of data 
entry some where not, this issue was raised by the command centre supervisors when 
stating that it was common to find typographical errors in NoCs that had been 
transposed in this fashion. Within Force A, these errors were complicated further by 
their inefficient email configuration, where by the operator had many additional email 
inboxes to monitor. Operators in both forces stated that they had had no formal 
training in understanding the Portal’s NoC submissions other than to copy the 
information into the CMS. They were unaware of the priority filter system or the 
existence of raised priority messages that could indicate an emergency, treating them 
the same as non-emergency requests and inputting them into the system with no 
increased level of urgency. The Portal inbox at Force A was also seen to suffer from 
an issue of ‘spam’ as referred to by the Call-Takers, whereby the forces information 
bureau would forward any requests for information they could not answer to the 
command and control room via the Portal’s inbox, clogging the system and distracting 
operators from real NoCs. 
 
In Force B the monitoring of the Portal inbox was the responsibility of the control 
room duty manager and was monitored on a 24/7 basis, being kept open minimised on 
their display and NoCs being transferred into the CMS as soon as they arrived. Given 
the similarity in layout between the NoC format and that of their CMS GUI the 
operators stated that copy and paste was the preferred method of inputting data into 
the CMS. The operator was well versed in the Portal’s operation and understood the 
purpose of the priority system, with clear procedures in place for dealing with flagged 
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NoCs through immediate contact with the submitter. However, the operators did 
comment that they found the online submission forms for the Portal on the public 
side, cumbersome and complex to navigate. They suggested that plain email was a 
better solution to the problem from the public’s perspective. 
 
As a result of the way in which the processes for handling non-urgent crime in Force 
C were structured and the issues surrounding its use of a different email client to other 
forces, (an email client which lacked significant functionality), the implementation of 
the Portal within this force was seen as particularly time-consuming, burdensome and 
duplicative by those using the system. As a result of misgivings about the security of 
the Portal infrastructure as a public facing internet application and concerns over 
viruses and hacking attempts, Force C chose to implement the Portal mailbox with a 
partial client side air-gap between systems. In this setup there were two PCs side by 
side for the Portal’s use. The sole purpose of one of the PCs was that of an email 
client no link to any other of the forces systems, this PC received the incoming NoCs. 
The other PC was a standard Call-Taker’s terminal. Any incoming NoCs from one PC 
had to be manually retyped by the Call-Taker into the crime system on the other. The 
Portal inbox was monitored 24/7 by a given Call-Taker on their shift alongside their 
own personal inbox. The Call-Taker was again not given any formal training on the 
NoC system and was unaware of the prioritisation systems as a result of their use of 
an email system that did not understand prioritisation flags. In addition to this, a 
process of duplication of logs from the CMS was observed to take place. Within force 
C once non-urgent crime was entered into the CMS, the information was passed onto 
a relevant Operational Command Unit (OCU) for follow up. With normal telephone 
calls the incident was logged on the CMS and then left to the OCU for resolution. 
However, with NoC submissions a duplication process was observed whereby once 
the CMS log had been raised the original NoC text file was printed out and faxed to 
the relevant OCU as well as being kept as a hard copy that was filed in the control 
room, with the electronic copy being stored in their email client. None of the staff in 
the control room were aware of the reasons for this duplication; the same was true of 
the senior officer in charge of the command centre.  It was suggested it was a process 
that had evolved from when the Portal was first implemented and had just been 
followed since then. The duplication of NoCs and the manual re-entry across the air-
gap presented a considerable workload for the Call-Takers assigned to the duty. 
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As state previously Force D and Force A’s implementations had significant 
similarities. One area of note at Force D was the method of tracking which NoCs had 
been processed. While none of the other forces had implemented methods for tracking 
the progress of a NoC and its entry into the CMS other than using the read or unread 
markers within their respective email clients, Force D edited the subject line of each 
NoC to reflect its CMS reference number and its current status as it progressed 
through the system. This system was observed to make the tracking of NoCs much 
easier than at other forces, and the addition of this data meant that shift supervisors 
from other shifts were immediately able to indentify what NoCs needed to be 
progressed further. 
 
5.2.2 Business Process Effects of the Portal 
While the Portal itself was seen by a number of forces as valuable tool and brought a 
new and modern channel for gathering information from the public, its 
implementation was observed to induce a number of problems within the forces. The 
most obvious of these was the effect the Portal system had on the existing business 
processes within the host force and of particular note the arduous processes observed 
within Force C, the duplication of all work both on the PC and then again manually 
printed and faxed. As stated by a number of the control room commanders, one of the 
principle problems was the lack of training provided by the Portal system. Because of 
its implementation primarily as an email message it was treated as a simplistic system 
that didn’t need much explanation. This was seen to result in forces trying to integrate 
this new information source into their infrastructure as best they could. As the system 
was new and forces were unaware of the popularity the system might gain with the 
public together with the number of emails that they may receive, the forces treated the 
Portal as a system from which they expected a low volume of communications. In all 
forces observed this assumption led to the Portal’s input being added onto an 
operator’s already busy workload and often in a sub-optimal manner, increasing the 
stress on the operators. This was particularly evident in forces with high Portal NoC 
submission volumes where the Call-Takers remarked they were under considerable 
strain keeping up with the volume of NoCs in addition to their other duties. This ad-
hoc implementation of the Portal by the forces, with little planning, was seen to result 
in visibly skewed and stressed business processes that were often prone to errors. This 
was compounded by the lack of any formal GUI uniformity across the forces. The 
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standard NoC template in use across all forces was seen as a source of constant 
frustration by Call-Takers. While ultimately viewed as part of the job of monitoring 
the Portal inbox, many users expressed dissatisfaction with the need to retype all the 
information from the NoC into the crime system and often asked why such an email 
couldn’t have been tailored to each force’s needs. With the exception of Force D, 
these errors were observed to be compounded by shift change, when new operators 
took over the monitoring of the Portal inbox and were not able to ascertain the state of 
NoC that had already been read (a number of NoCs being overlooked on one 
occasion). 
 
Adding to this confusion was the lack of formal training covering the NoC system. 
While the CMS and PMB systems had well structured training regimes, it appeared 
there was an assumption that the simplicity of the email system meant that no formal 
training was required. This was observed to have a number of knock-on effects. From 
a business process perspective the lack of training led to erroneous assumptions of 
how the Portal operated by those tasked to implement it within force. As seen in Force 
C with the implementation an air-gap to provide additional security where none was 
required, placing additional burden on the Call-Takers operating the system within 
force. From the Call-Takers’ perspective this lack of training resulted in a number of 
observed problems. It was commonly remarked by Call-Takers in all the forces 
studied that they did not fully understand how the system operated, why the NoCs 
arrived in the format they did, and what some of the mark-up provided meant. This 
lack of understanding and control over the system lead many participants to express 
frustration and a feeling of helplessness, especially those forces dealing with high 
NoC volumes. Outside of this frustration was the point that operators in three quarters 
of the forces examined were not aware of the priority function of the Portal. This 
keyword system was designed to alert the operator to NoCs that contained phrases 
which may indicate that an immediate response was needed for these. With such little 
understanding of the meaning of such a critical system it is possible that such NoCs 
could go unattended for at least an hour before being checked. In addition, unexpected 
events were seen to cause significant interruption to those using the Portal system. 
Issues such as NoCs being accidentally routed to the wrong geographic force 
presented forces with issues they had not formally encountered before and had no 
processes in place to deal with. Often the chain of command for dealing with NoC 
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submissions was unclear and many operators were unsure how to deal with such 
situations. 
 
The difficulty in poor quality submissions was also seen to be a problem by those 
using the system. While in the traditional synchronous modes of communication (e.g. 
telephone) the Call-Takers could request all the information they needed to progress a 
case through the CMS systems, ensuring that all fields were filled in and all 
information was valid, this was not the case with the Portal NoC submissions. Portal 
submissions were often incomplete or vague, while the system did require mandatory 
fields to be filled in by the submitter, they were often filled with invalid information, 
or the data provided was not enough to progress the case. The asynchronous nature of 
email meant that the Call-Takers were left to try and contact the submitter to clarify 
information before entering a number of NoCs into the system. In the forces where 
processes did not allow for the tracking of progress of NoC, this was seen to place an 
additional burden on the Call-Takers as they had to keep track of those NoCs that 
needed more information before entry, as it was often hard to reach the submitter at 
the time of the NoCs entry into the CMS.  
 
5.2.3 Force Cooperation 
Force opinion and the degree of cooperation with the Portal development were also 
seen to differ greatly. Each force had its own opinion on the usefulness, effectiveness 
and value of the service. Whilst all forces recognised that the system provided a 
valuable extra channel for communicating with the public, the degree to which they 
embraced the system differed significantly. From the interviews conducted, the degree 
of this support was observed to hinge on five factors: 
 The degree of consultation and involvement of the force in the system’s 
development 
 Trust and attitude towards the NPIA 
 The degree of agreement between the force’s individual priorities and 
requirements and those of the Portal 
 Whether or not the force had developed their own local portal system prior to 
the inception of the national project. 
 The force’s enthusiasm to adopt new technologies 
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This last factor was observed to be a generally isolatable, which was more a product 
of the engrained culture within the force. Depending on the degree to which they were 
prone to taking risks on innovative technology or risk averse, the first three factors 
were seen to exist in a complex relationship with each other. The amount of 
consultation with the individual forces was seen to vary greatly. Those forces that had 
not been as involved in the consultation stated that they felt left out from the system. 
It was felt that even though the benefits of the Portal were clear in some respects, they 
viewed the system as being imposed on them rather than as a product of constructive 
discussion and development. This degree of consultation is also linked to alignment of 
the forces’ priorities with those of the Portal project. The forces which had been 
consulted and had had the opportunity to contribute to the system’s development felt 
able to shape it more to their own needs. However, those forces which were 
marginalised, risk averse or which did not participate were more of the opinion that 
the need for the system was not actually present. While these forces welcomed the 
additional contact such a system provided, they did not feel that it was tailored to the 
unique needs and demands of their force’s geographical area and crime makeup.  
 
A key issue in willingness to adopt the Portal, which came across in interviews with 
the forces and with the development team, was the existence of prior portal systems 
within a force. While forces that had no such existing system were left to judge the 
Portal based on its own merits, those forces that had innovated and deployed their 
own portal systems prior to the national Police Portals inception were seen to have 
strongly polarised views about the new national system. These views were observed 
to come about as a result of how the forces had been approached and how their 
existing systems had been appraised. The forces which had developed their own 
systems had invested significant amounts of time and resources in producing them so 
they felt that their systems accurately reflected the needs at that force. Those forces 
whose systems’ aims congruently matched those of the national system were 
enthusiastic supporters. However, the forces whose existing systems either exceeded 
the national system’s capabilities, or whose functionalities were overlooked in the 
consultation stages, were seen to be significantly more hostile to the national 
development. Such was the extent of feeling that one of the forces studied actually 
continued to run their portal system in parallel to the national system. 
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5.2.4 External Political and Development Team Issues 
At a national level the effects of the implementation of the Portal were seen to cause 
widespread issues across a number of business areas and across all the stakeholder 
groups involved.  It was stated by those within the development team that the complex 
organisational structures, ambiguity of responsibility and the inherently political 
nature of many of the pressures placed on the police by external political forces and 
internal organisational political agendas all presented challenges to the system 
development environment.  
 
Competition for and ambiguity over control and leadership were noted between a 
number of groups throughout the duration of this study, all having an observable 
detrimental effect on the systems implementation. Starting at the highest level, the 
often vague relationships observed between the Home Office, ACPO and the NPIA in 
respect of to the Portal Project were observed to affect the motivation and buy-in of 
those lower down in the chain of command. Unlike other large IS projects developed 
by the NPIA the Portal projects lacked a single ACPO officer to act as its ‘champion’. 
Such an officer would have allowed the forces to perceive ownership and leadership 
of the project. While the idea of a national Police Portal had been around for a number 
of years before its creation, growing organically as the forces foresaw a need for one, 
external terrorist events prompted the Home Office to respond. The degree of its 
response and the intense pressure it placed on the Portal was often seen as a key factor 
involved in many of the issues described above. As part of its plans it pursued the 
accelerated development of the Portal from initial ideas to implementation within a 
critically short space of time. A time period often brought up by the NPIA 
development team in conversation. It was often noted that the Portal’s development 
had been artificially advanced and the pressures from the national bodies had reduced 
consultation that would otherwise have been conducted. Funding of the Portal at a 
national level was also one of the prime reasons for its downfall, while the Home 
Office and ACPO had agreed to fund the initial development costs of the Portal to 
bring the project to implementation, no agreement could be made to meet the running 
costs of the system after implementation. With both national bodies stepping back, the 
individual forces were asked to contribute to funding, engendering additional hostility 
towards the project. 
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Internal to the NPIA were the issues between the central NPIA management and the 
development team of the Portal.  The core architectural development of the Portal 
system was outsourced to an external company but a sizable staff remained within the 
NPIA to coordinate the project’s development, liaise with forces and manage the 
rollout of the system. Complements and praise for the external contractors were often 
observed with them typically being described in conversation as experts in their field. 
The NPIA members of staff, however, were often concerned with a delicate political 
balancing act: The internal organisational structure of the NPIA was observed to be 
highly politicised, with a number of the leadership figures having strong and 
sometimes conflicting views, opinions and plans. This lead to comments that a 
number of decisions were politically influenced rather than being what was the best fit 
for the Portal project.  
 
The NPIA staff team was also observed to be in a constant state of flux, people 
joining and leaving was a common occurrence. This constant change in team 
members, many being seconded from forces, resulted in a NPIA staff team that had 
very different levels of understanding and interests in the system that was being 
implemented. Specific knowledge was often observed as being compartmentalised in 
one individual staff member, resulting in confusion or delays if that staff member was 
absent or away on force visits. 
 
The development team was frustrated by the lack of cooperation from some forces 
and the forces were frustrated by a perceived inability on the part of the NPIA to 
create a balanced system which was representative of the needs of their force. As 
remarked by one of the development team, this was seen as a “double edged sword” 
for the project. Some people were unwilling to work with the project as it was seen as 
excluding the views of some forces, while the NPIA couldn’t get the views of those 
forces as they were unwilling to cooperate. This was further complicated by the 
matter of the wildly different IT infrastructures across the forces. As seen a number of 
times throughout this chapter, these difficulties caused considerable problems for the 
Portal team. Without having the power or resources to effect universal changes to IT 
systems at the forces it was necessary to pick the lowest common compatible 
denominator, email. Given the severe time constraints of the project, the different 
crime systems and the complexity of implementing a new template for each force the 
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NoC came into being as the rigid entity it was. These issues were compounded by the 
greatly differing organisational cultures across the forces. While some of the forces 
studied were observed to be very progressive in their beliefs about the benefits of IT, 
the sharing of information and cooperation, a number of the forces were reluctant to 
embrace the incoming change for a selection of reasons.  
 
Many of these issues arose from the differing leadership styles of the chief constables 
of each force. As stated previously with the exception of the Scottish forces, the 
leadership of many forces can be seen to act in with an isolationist view with varying 
degrees of consideration or engagement with forces around them and when dealing 
with the implementation of a national system, these issues were observed to create 
considerable tension amongst the development team. In an attempt to bridge this 
divide a number of the NPIA staff members on the development team were seconded 
officers from varying forces around the country, providing valuable in-the-field 
knowledge and insight for the Portal’s development. These officers provided more 
informal channels into individual forces, easing some of the development process.  
 
Moving from these internal organisational issues, the development team within the 
NPIA also suffered from a lack of representation of their largest stakeholder by 
numbers, the public. The citizenry, for whom the Portal was ultimately built, had 
limited involved in the development of the IS. With such a diverse range of external 
‘customers’, understanding and responding to their needs was seen as a large task and 
sometimes viewed as secondary to the views of the police themselves. The Portal 
system was ultimately viewed as a success by the public, judging from the high 
demands placed on the system in areas where its functionalities had been well 
advertised. However the lack of any detailed formal consultation lead to a number of 
unexpected usage scenarios. The sheer volume of NoCs submitted in some areas 
surprised the development team and overwhelmed the operators at a force level. 
Different usage scenarios were generated by members of the public and companies 
(that were not originally considered in the use case of the Portal).  NoCs on classes of 
crime that were never intended for submission via the Portal often confused and 
slowed down business processes, which had not been designed to cope with the 
volume or class of information submitted. 
 
Chapter 5: Situational Outline and Analysis 
Page 77 of 160 
5.3 Analysis 
Analysis of the collected data will now be presented. As described in Chapter 4, the 
initial themes generated to guide the preliminary research agenda will first be 
discussed, examining how these choices were made and where literary synthesis 
occurred. The evolution of the emerging research themes is then evaluated as the 
analysis progresses, highlighting how new themes have become apparent or changed 
over the course of the research. An analysis of the issues experienced at each force is 
first presented before all force themes are cross-compared to produce a map of themes 
that are representative across a majority of forces studied. Themes identified from the 
investigation of the development team are then explored before being combined with 
the cross force themes to generate the final representative theme set covering issues 
identified across the development cycle. 
 
Within this analysis the central themes identified within the data have been given a 
number (Theme 1, Theme 2). Within these central themes, sub-themes (labelled in the 
format Theme 1a, Theme 2a) are presented to provide a more granular view important 
issues encountered within the main themes. 
 
5.4 Initial Theme Generation and Refinement 
As illustrated in Chapter 4 the literature review lead to the adoption of a number of 
initial themes that were identified as problematic within IS development. Acting as a 
base for the preliminary familiarisation exercise the three most common themes from 
the literature were selected to form the basis for the initial research agenda to guide 
the investigation. These three were: 
Initial Theme 1 
Label Poor leadership and planning 
Definition Project lacks leadership or direction. Project management fails to 
adopt appropriate methodologies or support decisions made. 
Confrontational approach to implementing the given IS. 
 
Initial Theme 2 
Label Failures in requirements capture 
Definition Requirements capture incomplete, stakeholder opinions and needs 
do not reflect the project specification produced or bias introduced 
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Initial Theme 3  
Label Lack of public consultation 
Definition Inadequate consultation with members of the public. Their needs 
of such systems are not established and they are not actively 
encouraged to engage with the development or use the system post 
implementation. 
 
Table 5.1 Initial Themes 
 
Following the initial familiarisation phase of the study and the observations and focus 
groups examining issues within the Police Portal development itself, this list was 
refined and discussed within the context of the Portal’s development. Previously 
excluded concepts were reintroduced when deemed necessary and new themes added 
to form the starting point of the main body of the investigation. 
 
Revised Initial Theme 1 
Label Poor leadership and planning 
Definition Initial tensions observed between the goals of the Home Office 
and ACPO and their implementation within the NPIA.  
  
Revised Initial Theme 2 
Label Failures in requirements capture 
Definition Requirements capture incomplete, stakeholder opinions and needs 
do not reflect the project specification produced or bias introduced 
into the requirements capture process. 
 
At this early stage of investigation sufficient evidence has not been 
obtained to either confirm or contradict this statement. 
  
Revised Initial Theme 3 
Label Variable level of cooperation from forces (Organisational 
Structure) 
Definition Given forces’ independent nature there are greatly differing levels 
of cooperation from forces for the Portal project 
  
Revised Initial Theme 4 
Label Lack of public/end user Consultation 
Definition Developers highlight that there was little public involvement in the 
design of the Portal system, it is apparent not all users of the 
system have been consulted. 
  
Revised Initial Theme 5 
Label Difficult regulatory environment 
Definition Both PITO/NPIA and forces are constrained by current legislation 
and regulations governing their operation and ability to handle and 
manipulate data. Placing constraints on the methods used to store 
and transmit information. 
Table 5.2 Revised Initial Themes 
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From the familiarisation exercise within forces and the focus groups that were 
conducted, tensions were observed to be present at various levels within the 
development with a lack of clear leadership being expressed. The lack of participation 
and engagement from many of the forces was observed and misgivings were raised by 
forces in respect of their view of the NPIA. It was also apparent that so far little 
attempt had been made at a full consultation with the public. Significant regulatory 
burdens were also seen to be present at both the forces and NPIA.  
 
All three initial themes were carried over into the refined theme list. While failures in 
requirements capture were not identified from the initial familiarisation exercise they 
could not be actively excluded and as such the theme was left in place. Two additional 
themes were added based on evidence of the regulatory environment placing 
constraints on the development team and the variable levels of cooperation 
experienced from each force. 
 
5.5 Theme Evolution 
As stated in the analysis design, these refined initial themes were used as the basis for 
the preliminary research agenda for the main body of the Portal investigation. While 
non-binding they provided insight and initial areas of investigation for the 
examination. Theme evolution was divided into two linked processes, the examination 
of the Portal at a force level and within the development team.  
 
5.6 Force Themes 
The following sections outline the elicitation of themes from data collected at the 
force investigations, drawing on interviews, observations and comparisons against 
planned procedures gathered from document sampling. The themes identified from 
individual forces are first discussed before their triangulation into representative 
theme set covering all the forces studied. Force themes focus on the issues encounter 
as relevant to the Call-Takers and force level staff. Analysis in the wider context of 
the development is conducted in the later sections of this chapter. 
 
5.6.1 Force A 
Force A is a medium sized forced covering a large area. Among the forces studied, it 
was widely seen to be the most proactively engaged with the Portal’s delivery. While 
Chapter 5: Situational Outline and Analysis 
Page 80 of 160 
at a control room level they felt there was a lack of support from the commissioning 
and developing team, at a management level the force could clearly see the benefits 
the Portal could offer them. Consequently Force A actively dedicated resources to 
promoting the system usage within its communities. From an examination of the data 
collected from Force A three key primary themes emerged: 
 
Force A Theme 1 
Label Stress caused by additional workload created by the Portal 
Definition Implementation of Portal has introduced new work flow patterns 
that were observed to place increased stress on the system 
operator. Implementation of the Portal has increased the volume of 
information to an operator above a level they felt comfortable 
managing. 
Derivation From observations examining Call-Taker operations and post 
observation interviews. 
 
Force A Theme 1a 
Label Frustration at data entry method and integration 
Definition Users felt frustrated by the complexities of transfering the NoC 
data manually into the crime system and raised issues regarding 
the lack of an appropriate NoC format compatible with the force 
legacy system. They expressed concerns over the lack of 
integration of the Portal system with existing systems. 
Derivation From observations examining Call-Taker operations and post 
observation interviews. 
Table 5.3 Force A Theme 1 
 
Theme 1 identifies the commonly reported effects of additional stress placed on the 
Call-Takers responsible for the Portal’s operation within the command and control 
rooms. As shown in the observations it was often remarked that the Call-Takers had to 
invest significant amount of additional time in managing the Portal system to the 
detriment of their other work. Due to a combination of the volume of new information 
that operators had to manage, in addition to their existing duties, the lack of 
integration of the NoC emails with existing systems and the need to copy and paste 
data in a different format to the crime system, additional stress was placed on 
operators by the Portal. 
 
Force A Theme 2 
Label Lack of engagement in the development 
Definition Users felt the system has been forced upon them and that they did 
not have the ability to raise concerns and complaints to a higher 
level. 
Derivation Direct response from Call-Takers during interview. 
Table 5.4 Force A Theme 2 
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Theme 2 leads on from the stress that was placed on the Call-Takers and was 
observed on a number of occasions to compound this. In interviews with the Portal 
operator it was stated that whilst feeling stressed by the new system they also felt 
limited in their ability to affect change to their situation. The role had been given to 
them and they felt they had to act without being able to voice their concerns. 
 
Force A Theme 3 
Label Lack of training availability 
Definition Individuals felt that they did not receive appropriate training on 
the Portal system. Supervisors expressed concerns regarding 
access to training of their team members. 
Derivation From interviews at both a management and operational (control 
room) level and observations during call-handling operations. 
 
Force A Theme 3a 
Label Lack of awareness 
Definition Individuals were unaware of essential parts of the Portal’s 
implementation. Call-Takers had poor understanding of the 
prioritisation flags system, and management lacked strategic 
knowledge of how the system operates at a national level or the 
process by which NoCs reach the force. 
Derivation From interviews at both a management and operational level and 
observations during call-handling operations. 
 
Force A Theme 3b 
Label Perception of Portal as being implemented in an ad-hoc rather than 
planned fashion 
Definition Individuals express dissatisfaction at the perceived ad-hoc nature 
of the implementation of the Portal. 
Derivation From interviews at both a management and operational level. 
Table 5.5 Force A Theme 3 
 
Theme 3 examines issues from a slightly more abstract level and reflects concerns 
from responses at the Call-Takers and management level during interview. In general 
the management of the force was very keen and active in its engagement with and 
deployment of the Portal. However, the management’s general knowledge of how the 
system operated at a national level and Call-Takers awareness of important areas such 
as prioritisation flags was considerably lower than would be expected. Key to this was 
the apparent lack of training on the Portal system itself. While the PMB and CMS 
parts of the Portal system came with extensive training the OCR side of the Portal was 
deployed with little information provided to those responsible for its implementation 
and use at a force level. Managers reported that they implemented the system as best 
they could, given the information supplied to them. This lack of a shared strategic 
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plan from the NPIA development team ultimately resulted in negative perceptions 
from the Call-Takers when it was felt the system was cumbersome in its operation.  
 
5.6.2 Force B 
Force B was the smallest of the forces studied, in terms of both its physical size and 
population under its jurisdiction. While overall its management had no issue in 
adopting the Portal system, their involvement with and promotion of the system was 
limited. Unique to this force was the higher level of knowledge Call-Takers and 
operators had of the system, with each being aware of how the system operated at a 
national level and how the prioritisation system functioned. Within Force B four key 
themes emerged from the data collected: 
 
Force B Theme 1 
Label Frustration at data entry method and integration 
Definition Users felt frustrated by the complexities of having to transfer the 
NoC data manually into the crime system and raise issues with the 
lack of an appropriate NoC format. The express concerns over the 
lack of integration of the Portal system with existing systems. 
Derivation From observations examining Call-Taker operations and post 
observation interviews. 
Table 5.6 Force B Theme 1 
 
Theme 1 again highlights the frustration that Call-Takers felt when moving data from 
the NoCs to the force crime systems. Users at Force B didn’t feel as though the 
system was adding additional stress to their workload due to the small number of 
NoCs submitted on a daily basis, however the lack of formatting consistent with their 
crime systems and a need for manual re-entry was remarked on a number of times as 
being a key area of concern for the Call-Takers 
 
Force B Theme 2 
Label Perceived lack of communications with national Portal team 
Definition Individuals felt isolated from the Portal’s national operators with 
little avenue for communication with them over how the system 
operates or a means to report issues, concerns or errors in the 
system. 
Derivation Direct response from management during interview. 
Table 5.7 Force B Theme 2 
 
Theme 2 echoes the need for communication with the NPIA Portal development team. 
Expressed at both a Call-Taker and management level, when NoCs arrive by error that 
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are destined for adjacent forces there was little avenue to communicate this fault other 
than by forwarding the NoC to the relevant force. Officers felt there limited options 
for providing feedback to the main development team. 
 
Force B Theme 3 
Label Imposed system usage 
Definition Individuals felt they are using the system because it has been 
given to them and they have been told to use it rather in contrast to 
an active willingness to integrate the Portal into their organisation. 
Derivation From interviews at both a management and operational level. 
Table 5.8 Force B Theme 3 
 
Theme 3 originates from opinions expressed by the Call-Takers. Staff at a managerial 
level have a generally neutral opinion of the Portal, adopting it as it provides benefit 
with little cost or effort on the force’s part, yet the Call-Takers express a different 
opinion. Prior to the Portal’s implementation at Force B, the force already operated a 
system whereby members of the public could email reports of non-urgent crime 
directly to the control room. On a number of occasions it was expressed that given 
that this system was in use they did not see the need for the implementation of the 
Portal as well. 
 
Force B Theme 4 
Label Public facing site overly complex 
Definition Individuals felt that the public interface of the police Portal was 
overly complex and confusing for members of the public to use. 
Derivation From interviews with Call-Takers. 
Table 5.9 Force B Theme 4 
 
Theme 4 leads on from comments made by the Call-Takers regarding the imposition 
of the Portal system over that of the prior email reporting functionality. Call-takers 
expressed frustration that the public interface of the Police Portal at police.co.uk was 
overly complicated. It was remarked a number of times that the system requested too 
much information from the public and that the Call-Takers regarded the process as 
ineffective due to the long process of information input required for the NoC 
submission. 
 
5.6.3 Force C 
Force C, a metropolitan force, was paradoxical in its use of the Portal system. While 
the staff at both Call-Taker and management level seemed keen to embrace the system 
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internally, their physical implementation of the Portal expressed a misunderstanding 
of its mode of operation and presented a number of challenges to those using the 
system. Four key themes were identified from the data collected from Force C 
 
Force C Theme 1 
Label Lack of training availability 
Definition Individual felt that they have not been properly trained in the use 
of the system or expresses concern that their staff had not had 
adequate opportunity to train on the system. 
Derivation From interviews at both a management and operational level and 
observations during call-handling operations. 
 
Force C Theme 1a 
Label Lack of awareness 
Definition Individuals’ were unaware of essential parts of the Portals 
implementation. Call-Takers had poor understanding of the 
prioritisation flags system, and management lacked strategic 
knowledge of how the system operates at a national level or the 
process by which NoCs reach the force. 
Derivation From interviews at both a management and operational level and 
observations during call-handling operations. 
 
Force C Theme 1b 
Label Inappropriate duplicative implementation of system 
Definition Business processes implemented to support the Portal were not fit 
for purpose and redundant to accommodate a perceived system 
reliability problem. 
Derivation Document sampling and observations. 
Table 5.10 Force C Theme 1 
 
Theme 1 shows that again limited training and communication with regards to the 
features and functionality of the system presented issues in its use at a force level. Of 
particular note at Force C is theme 1b. While all forces examined up to this point had 
difficulties arising from the way they implemented the Portal to their understanding of 
the system, the method of implementation adopted by Force C was conducted in a 
redundant way, having significant effects on the efficient use of the Portal system 
within the force. 
 
Force C Theme 2 
Label Stress caused by additional workload 
Definition Implementation of Portal has introduced new work flow patterns 
that are observed to place increased stress on the system operator. 
Implementation of the Portal has increased the volume of 
information to an operator above a level they were comfortable 
managing. 
Derivation From observations examining Call-Taker operations and post 
observation interviews. 
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Force C Theme 2a 
Label Frustration at data entry method and integration 
Definition Users felt frustrated by the complexities of having to transfer the 
NoC data manually into the crime system and raise issues with the 
lack of an appropriate NoC format. They expressed concerns over 
the lack of integration of the Portal system with existing systems. 
Derivation From observations examining Call-Taker operations and post 
observation interviews. 
Table 5.11 Force C Theme 2 
 
Theme 2 again recognises issues within the force over the manual transfer of NoCs 
between systems and the poor format of the attachments relative to the crime systems. 
While this theme was observed to also emerge as a result of the particularly inefficient 
method of implementation within this force, it is treated as a theme in it own right due 
to the high volumes of NoCs submitted to this force. During interview it was 
highlighted that it was a combination of both NoC volume and the processes that had 
to be followed that led to the stress felt by the Call-Takers. 
 
Force C Theme 3 
Label Novel systems usage 
Definition Unexpected business use of the Portal system greatly increasing 
NoC submission rates. 
Derivation Document sampling and interviews with Call-Takers. 
Table 5.12 Force C Theme 3 
 
Theme 3 is of particular note in Force C as it led to a very significant rise in the 
volume of NoCs submitted via the Portal system. Unlike other forces where primarily 
members of the public used the Portal, in Force C the primary users were businesses 
reporting crime, commonly damage to property and street furniture that they owned. 
The Portal was never intended for this use and its fervent adoption by business was 
not anticipated by either the forces or the development team.  
 
Force C Theme 4 
Label Unwillingness to cooperate 
Definition The force has acted in an isolationist way not willing to cooperate 
with other forces on certain matters. The force acted to keep 
control of its resources within its boundaries and has limited 
national control and interaction. 
Derivation Discussions with staff, Observation, Interview. 
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Force C Theme 4a 
Label Misunderstanding of PITO/NPIA role 
Definition Failure to understand the role of PITO as a national body. Mistrust 
over their true intentions. 
Derivation Discussions with staff, Observation, Interview. 
Table 5.13 Force C Theme 4 
 
Theme 4 was exhibited not just through formal means but also casual conversations. 
Within this force there was an isolationist view that the force could better control its 
resources. There was also a barrier to the acceptance of PITO as a poor reputation 
based on past projects had developed of PITO/NPIA within the force.  
 
5.6.4 Force D 
Force D was among the most innovative and able to cope with the implementation of 
the Portal system. A medium sized force with average technical abilities, it 
successfully coped with the implementation of the Portal despite not having a full 
understanding of the system itself. NoC submission rates were very low in 
comparison to other forces and the low demand on the Call-Takers time allowed the 
development of coping mechanisms to ensure the integrity of data submitted via the 
system. Four key themes were identified in the data from Force D: 
 
Force D Theme 1 
Label Frustration at data entry method and integration 
Definition Users felt frustrated by the complexities of having to transfer the 
NoC data manually into the crime system and raise issues with the 
lack of an appropriate NoC format. They have expressed concerns 
over the lack of integration of the Portal system with existing 
systems. 
Derivation From observations examining Call-Taker operations and post 
observation interviews. 
Table 5.14 Force D Theme 1 
 
Theme 1 highlights the common issues with the transfer of data from NoC to crime 
system. Raised by management and Call-Takers, it was identified as the primary area 
of criticism by those involved in Portal operations at Force D. 
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Force D Theme 2 
Label Lack of awareness 
Definition Individuals’ were unaware of essential parts of the Portals 
implementation. Call-Takers had poor understanding of the 
prioritisation flags system, and management lacked strategic 
knowledge of how the system operates at a national level or the 
process by which NoCs reach the force. 
Derivation From interviews at both a management and operational level and 
observations during call-handling operations. 
Table 5.15 Force D Theme 2 
 
Theme 2 again highlights the lack of awareness the Call-Takers and managers had 
over the Portal’s operation and the meaning of priority flags. It was regularly 
observed in interviews that there was a lack of understanding over the Portal system 
as a national project and how NoCs made it to the force. 
 
Force D Theme 3 
Label Novel systems usage 
Definition The force had implemented novel mechanisms for controlling data 
flow through the Portal system. 
Derivation From interviews at both a management and operational level and 
observations during call-handling operations. 
Table 5.16 Force D Theme 3 
 
In spite of these difficulties Force D stood out among the other forces for its ability to 
adapt and respond to the challenges cause by the lack of training and information 
about how the system operated. Through the use of modified subject line 
manipulation and internal inbox monitoring at both the Call-Taker and control room 
supervisor levels, Force D took control of the incoming NoC data, managed it and 
structured its flow in an effective way, allowing for considerably reduced stress on the 
operators. 
 
Force D Theme 4 
Label Lack of proactive cooperation 
Definition The force has acted to keep control of its resources within its 
boundaries. 
Derivation Discussions with staff, Observation, Interview. 
 
Force D Theme 4a 
Label Misunderstanding of PITO/NPIA role 
Definition Failure to understand the role of PITO as a national body. Mistrust 
over their true purpose and intentions. 
Derivation Discussions with staff, Observation, Interview. 
Table 5.17 Force D Theme 4 
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A lack of proactive cooperation with others and a poor engagement with PITO was 
also found at Force D. Again those in charge were found to hold a more isolationist 
attitude to the way in which their force controls its resources. 
 
5.6.5 Force Data Amalgamation 
Upon completion of the force studies the themes generated from each force were 
triangulated and merged into a coherent set of views representative of the problems 
encountered amongst the forces. From this, five common themes were identified and 
are discussed below: 
 
Cross Force Theme 1 
Label Poor business processes result in stress caused by additional 
workload  
Definition Implementation of Portal had introduced new work flow patterns 
that were observed to place increased stress on the system 
operator. Implementation of the Portal had increased the level of 
information flow to an operator above a level they were 
comfortable managing. 
Derivation From observations examining Call-Taker operations and post 
observation interviews. 
 
Cross Force Theme 1a 
Label Frustration at data entry method and integration 
Definition Users felt frustrated by the complexities of having to transfer the 
NoC data manually into the crime system and raise issues with the 
lack of an appropriate NoC format. They expressed concerns over 
the lack of integration of the Portal system with existing systems. 
Derivation From observations examining Call-Taker operations and post 
observation interviews. 
Table 5.18 Force Cross Force Theme 1 
 
While the level of stress placed on the operators at each force was variable based on 
their chosen implementation methodology, a universal theme was the expression of 
dissatisfaction at the need for manual re-entry of the data from the NoC into the crime 
system and the very different formatting of the NoC to the input fields on the system. 
At every force it was observed to result in operators having search for the field in the 
NoC before entering it into the crime system, rather than having the NoC fields 
ordered in the same order and progression as the crime system in use within that 
force. Looking from a wider cross force perspective the themes of Stress caused by 
additional workload, and 1b from Force C (Inappropriate Duplicative implementation 
of system) have been merged. While distinct both can be seen to have their roots in a 
lack of strategic understanding of the Portal’s operation and how this would merge 
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with business processes at the forces. The adoption of a ‘one size fits all’ approach in 
the implementation of the Portal system resulted in inefficient business processes that 
placed additional undue stress on those using the system.  
 
Cross Force Theme 2 
Label Perceived lack of communications with national Portal team 
Definition Individuals felt isolated from the Portal’s national operators with 
no avenue for communication with them over how the system 
operates or a means to report issues, concerns or errors in the 
system. 
Derivation Direct response from management during interview. 
Table 5.19 Force Cross Force Theme 2 
 
Many forces expressed discontent at the lack of communication with the national 
team. Each force had its own reasons for the need to communicate, however all but 
one felt that when they attempted to do so the access to the central team was often 
inconsistent. For this final force cross-comparison, Force A, Theme 2 has been 
partially merged into this theme. While a desire for better communication with those 
higher up the chain of command was a common to many the active feeling of isolation 
was only truly expressed by those within Force A. as a result the communications 
aspect of this theme were kept and feelings of isolation removed. 
 
Cross Force Theme 3 
Label Unwillingness to cooperate 
Definition The force acted in an isolationist way not willing to coordinate 
with other forces on certain matters. The forces acted to keep 
control of its resources within its boundaries and resisted national 
control and interaction. 
Derivation Discussions with staff, Observation, Interview. 
 
Cross Force Theme 3a 
Label Misunderstanding of PITO/NPIA role 
Definition Failure to understand the role of PITO as a national body. Mistrust 
over their true intentions. 
Derivation Discussions with staff, Observation, Interview, Document 
Sampling. 
Table 5.20 Force Cross Force Theme 3 
 
Theme 3 recognises a wider institutional issue of mistrust and problems with sharing 
within the police community, as highlighted by Bichard (2004). With the exception of 
a minority of forces, degrees of institutional isolationism were common throughout 
the UK police forces. Individual forces were viewed as reluctant to engage with each 
other and could view the implementation of large system on a national scale as 
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attempts to control their operations and for resources to be taken out of their 
jurisdiction. This, coupled with a generally poor reputation of PITO/NPIA within 
forces, exacerbated the lack of buy-in from the forces. 
 
Cross Force Theme 4 
Label Lack of training availability 
Definition Individuals felt that they have not been properly trained in the use 
of the system or expresses concern that their staff had not had 
adequate opportunity to train on the system. 
Derivation From interviews at both a management and operational level and 
observations during call-handling operations. 
 
Cross Force Theme 4a 
Label Lack of awareness 
Definition Individuals’ were unaware of essential parts of the Portals 
implementation. Call-Takers had poor understanding of the 
prioritisation flags system, and management lacked strategic 
knowledge of how the system operates at a national level or the 
process by which NoCs reach the force. 
Derivation From interviews at both a management and operational level and 
observations during call-handling operations. 
Table 5.21 Force Cross Force Theme 4 
 
Theme 4 embodies the desire across the forces to have more information and training 
on the Portal system. While all the forces recognised the simplistic nature of the email 
system they often underestimated the impact of either the volume of information it 
would create, the reliability of the system and the substantial added value that the 
Portal functionalities could deliver in conjunction with other legacy systems. It was 
observed that this lead to mixed and strong feeling of frustration amongst users and a 
lack of awareness of key features directly responsible for highlighting issues of life-
saving importance. This frustration resulted in a negative perception of the Portal 
system, which at times was emotional rather than substantiated. 
 
Cross Force Theme 5 
Label Novel systems usage 
Definition Unexpected usage of the Portal system outside of its original 
expected usage and design parameters. 
Derivation Document Sampling, Observation, Interviews. 
Table 5.22 Force Cross Force Theme 5 
 
Theme 5 highlights the issue of novel systems usage at all levels. While the 
development of the Portal itself was well controlled, once implemented at a force 
level the NPIA/PITO had little control over its day-to-day operation. As a result, both 
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forces and the public were left to utilise the system in the best way they could 
individually engineer. This mode of operation resulted in a number of unexpected 
system uses, both positive and negative, that had an impact on how the system 
affected the forces studied. Theme 5 encompasses both Theme 3 from Forces C and 
D. 
Cross Force Theme 6 
Label Variability between forces 
Definition Strong differences in the resources, technologies and processes 
employed within each force. 
Derivation Document Sampling, Observation, Interviews. 
Table 5.23 Force Cross Force Theme 6 
 
Theme 6 emerges from the wider examination of all of the forces as a whole, the 
autonomous nature of the forces, able to decide their own internal business processes 
and choose technological systems they implement has resulted in a wide variance 
between each force. As a result of the unique circumstances faced by each force in 
terms of operational priorities, crime and population demographics and the differing 
resources available to each force the systems implemented differ considerably across 
each force with none of the forces observed sharing similar processes for 
implementing the same task. Each force has its own variant on the requirements 
needed for the Portal system, something the one-size-fits-all approach of the 
implementation has failed to adequately address. 
 
From Force B both Theme 3 (Imposed System Usage) and Theme 4 (Public facing 
site overly complex) were dropped as there was no evidence to support these themes 
outside Force B. While it could be argued that Force B Theme 4 has some similarity 
with the general Theme 4 as highlighted in the final cross comparison, the primary 
influencing factor in force B was brought by the Call-Takers as end users more than at 
a senior force level as shown in Forces C and D. 
 
5.7 Development Team 
Running alongside the iterative investigation of the Portal implementation within the 
forces was the ongoing investigation into the Portal’s national development with the 
NPIA development team. Investigations within the development team were conducted 
in parallel with force visits to allow for the direction of the development team 
investigation to be partially guided by themes emerging from the forces as they were 
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studied. This allowed issues at forces to be examined within the development team 
environment, exploring any root causes for these issues in order to provide a wider 
picture of how the Portal’s development had progressed and why. The themes that 
emerged from the data collection, interviews and observations of the development 
team are detailed below: 
 
Development Team Theme 1 
Label External political influence 
Definition National bodies and political figures are seen to be exerting 
pressure on the Portal’s development. Short deadlines or attempts 
to steer the course of the project for political benefit were 
observed.  
Derivation From observations at and interviews at a development team level. 
Table 5.24 Development Team Theme 1 
 
From the beginning of the Portal’s inception it has been observed that there were 
intense time and political pressures exerted upon the Portal’s leadership and on the 
development team to deliver a workable Portal product within an incredibly short 
space of time. This rush placed unrealistic time constraints on the development, 
leading to compromises and assumption that are discussed latter in this section, and 
which significantly contributed to the problems seen in the Portal’s development. As a 
result of this rush the Portal project was never accurately defined. While initial 
specification of the project was provided in the e-policing framework (Centrex, 2001), 
the scope of this proposal was adopted without sufficient re-examination of situational 
changes since its design. 
 
Development Team Theme 2 
Label Poor awareness of force makeup 
Definition Development team took a one-size fits all approach to the 
implementation of the Portal at a force level failing to take into 
account the unique makeup of each force. 
Derivation From observations and interviews at a development team and 
force level. 
 
Chapter 5: Situational Outline and Analysis 
Page 93 of 160 
 
Development Team Theme 2a 
Label Poor force relations 
Definition Divergent attitudes and approaches in interaction with the forces 
lead to the exclusion or bias of stakeholders. Fostering resentment 
or negative perceptions amongst other stakeholder groups. 
Derivation From observations and interviews at a development team and 
force level. 
 
Development Team Theme 2b 
Label Failure to establish adequate communications 
Definition Development team fail to establish adequate avenues of 
communication with the forces. 
Derivation From observations and interviews at a development team and 
force level and document sampling at a development team level. 
 
Development Team Theme 2c 
Label Regional innovation 
Definition Forces had developed their own portals prior to the inception of a 
national system. A lack of involvement in the national Portal’s 
design or a feeling that the national system was somehow inferior 
to their own introduced a barrier to cooperation. 
Derivation From interviews at force and development team level. 
Table 5.25 Development Team Theme 2 
 
One of the principle issues raised by the development team and observed in the 
progress of the Portal’s design was the lack of adequate engagement and 
communication with the large number of forces within the UK. The regionalisation of 
the forces presented significant challenges to the development team. The autonomy 
granted to the forces resulted in 53 distinct entities, each with its own distinct needs 
and requirements. Some elements of policing and the data needed by forces are 
universal. However, the autonomy and varying priorities, crime and population 
demographics within each force resulted in a wide disparity in the technology and 
business processes that were implemented. This was seen to greatly fragment the 
problem domain. Each force having its own opinion on the functionalities of such a 
system resulted in the need to reconcile a large number of differences. The 
development team’s failure to reconcile the impact this would have and the need for 
adequate communication lead to a situation where forces were alienated as they felt 
their needs were not being represented. It had significant repercussions on 
requirements capture and implementation planning, as highlighted in Theme 3. 
 
The principle underpinning Theme 2 is that of a lack of understanding of the 
organisational culture that exists within the UK Police. This represents a failure to 
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recognise the intricacies of the regionalised inter-force relations together with how 
they view their national governing bodies and the effects the variations observed 
across forces would have on the development process. Many of the issues at a 
development team level, and to some degree at the forces, were observed to be rooted 
in the regionalised structure and autonomy granted to each force. National bodies such 
as the NPIA were often viewed with a degree of mistrust and seen as acting to take 
away power from forces. As highlighted in the Bichard report (Bichard, 2004), with 
the exception of a small number of forces, many were seen to act to isolate themselves 
and their resources, despite the presence of national policies such as the National 
Intelligence Model (NCIS, 2000), which state that forces should share information 
and intelligence. Each force acts autonomously not just from an IT/IS perspective but 
across the large range of their business processes. This has lead to a community 
environment where other forces and national bodies can sometimes be treated as ‘the 
competition’. Forces were reluctant to commit additional resources to an unproven 
technology and, with the differing systems in place, the development team was forced 
to compromise.  
 
Such difficulties were further exacerbated by the limited communications established 
with the forces. The large number of forces present within the police presented a 
difficult challenge in terms of the organisation of formalised frequent communications 
channels. The use of seconded officers was seen as sufficient communication at a 
force level but failed to be truly representative of the actual picture on the ground. As 
we will see, without adequate levels of communication, an accurate requirements 
capture was hindered and the development team lacked the information to recognise 
or respond to issues as they occurred and limited their ability to predict future 
incidents.  
 
Regional innovation amongst the forces was noted by the development team to have 
been occurring at a number of forces. Forces that had not developed their own portal 
systems were left to decide the relative merits of the system on their own. However, 
those forces that had taken the initiative and developed their own portals prior to the 
inception of a national system, presented a number of challenges to the NPIA. Those 
with existing portals had a system by which they could compare the national Police 
Portal’s offerings. As innovators those forces felt that they should be closely 
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consulted so that lessons from their systems could be learnt by the NPIA development 
team. These forces felt proud of the systems they implemented, as they were created 
for each force’s specific needs, closely matching their forces’ business requirements. 
The attitude and buy-in of forces who had implemented a system prior to the national 
Portal, was the result of their level of engagement and participation with the NPIA 
development team. Those forces who felt that they had been listened to and 
considered as stakeholders, who could offer experience and informed views on the 
design of the national Portal system, were welcoming of it. On the contrary, forces 
that were not consulted developed a hostile attitude towards the system, attributing to 
it a less than acceptable level of usability. 
 
 
Development Team Theme 3 
Label Poor leadership and planning 
Definition A lack of clear and decisive leadership and compromises made 
result in a flawed planning process. 
Derivation From observations, interviews and document sampling at 
development team level. 
 
Development Team Theme 3a 
Label Incomplete and selective requirements capture 
Definition Processes within the requirements engineering stage of 
development had a detrimental effect on the Portal’s 
implementation. 
Derivation From observations at development team, interviews and document 
sampling at force and development team level. 
 
Development Team Theme 3b 
Label Lack of full public consultation 
Definition Development team fail to establish sufficient avenues of 
communication with the public. 
Derivation From observations, interviews and document sampling at 
development team level. 
 
Development Team Theme 3c 
Label Slow and reactive approach to problem solving 
Definition Portal team and forces are slow to identify and react to problems 
when they occur. Problem solving is done in a reactive fashion. 
Derivation From observations and interviews at a development team and 
force level. 
 
Development Team Theme 3d 
Label Limited implementation planning and post-implementation 
evaluation 
Definition Limited availability of implementation planning and a lack of 
post-implementation evaluation. 
Derivation From observations and interviews at a development team and 
force level. 
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Development Team Theme 3e 
Label Unexpected systems usage 
Definition Forces and members of the public utilised the Portal in ways that 
were not envisaged by the development team. 
Derivation From observations and interviews at a development team and 
force level. 
Table 5.26 Development Team Theme 3 
 
Theme 3 represents the issues observed in the overall leadership and project 
management of the Police Portal. While the leadership and management of the Portal 
was generally observed to be well structured and thought out within the constraints 
placed on the project a number of issues were noted. As observed in Theme 1 while 
the e-policing strategy (Centrex, 2001) clearly stated a need for some form of Portal 
system, the actual details of the system were not as clearly defined as they could have 
been. ACPO and the Home Office failed to adequately scope the project and, as a 
result, the true aim and direction of the project was not felt to be established. 
Leadership of the project was also seen to be atypical within the context of past NPIA 
projects. Traditionally large infrastructure projects implemented by the NPIA are 
‘championed’ by an ACPO officer. This gives ownership and leadership of the project 
to a chief police officer from a force and so the project is seen to be lead by the police 
themselves. Atypically this did not happen within the Portal. With no champion from 
ACPO to speak for the project the leadership and direction for the Portal was taken in-
house within the NPIA, further isolating the development from the forces.  
 
Aside from the apparent lack of a lead figure the constant changes within the 
development team were seen to have contributory effect on the issues of the Portal’s 
planning. While it is common for development teams to grow and shrink as a project 
progresses from requirements capture to development through to implementation, the 
changes within the Portal development team were often seen to occur very rapidly. 
With a large number of seconded officers from a limited number of forces 
participating in the development team. Seconded officers were selected to provide a 
police perspective to the developers, a view that was restricted due to the limited 
representation of forces amongst the secondments. Amongst these officers and in 
general within the NPIA staff, people commonly changed job roles, seconded officers 
went back to their forces and new ones were recruited, leaving little time for members 
of the development team to become settled in their roles. With such a rate of change 
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within the development team it was hard to develop a full understanding of the 
problem domain, leaving little time for knowledge transfer. 
 
Leadership and planning issues were also seen to have an effect on the progression of 
the project’s requirements capture. The large number of forces each with their own 
regional needs, internal processes and differing technological environments lead to a 
large number of conflicting requirements that would need to be reconciled or 
processes changed before a solution could be proposed. As a result of the time 
pressures placed on the Portal’s development and the issues of force engagement and 
limited communication, a full capture of all the forces needs failed to be fully 
implemented, resulting in fragmented requirements that were under representative of 
the true problem domain. Power bias also had a strong part to play in many of the 
issues observed. While in an ideal world all levels of users and stakeholders of an IS 
project would be consulted, ultimately the commissioning body and management at a 
national level followed their interpretation of what was needed. The lack of time to 
develop the system and the lack of a strong requirements capture methodology 
resulted in the requirements capture and the subsequent guidance of the Portal project 
being heavily skewed towards the views of a few, with insufficient priority given to 
the consultation and acceptance of the views of the end users of the system. This acted 
detrimentally to exclude the opinions and needs of the force level users of the system, 
the Call-Takers and control room staff. The use of seconded officers, while beneficial 
to the development in gaining an officer’s perspective and establishing limited 
communications with some forces, introduced a significant bias in the development 
team’s views based on the forces those officers represented. This exacerbated already 
difficult interactions with the forces and failed to generate cooperation among forces 
who felt they were under represented.   
 
The adoption of email and an attachment as the primary method of systems 
integration was seen as the simplest option available and the most likely to encourage 
force adoption. Email provided the relevant information to forces without having to 
worry about interfacing with many different crime systems and required little 
technical integration however it provided the least overall functionality to the system 
and represented a point of contention amongst the forces when attempting to 
demonstrate systems benefit. 
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Public engagement in the requirements process was also problematic. While the need 
for the public’s use of the system was never in doubt the development team never 
truly engaged them as an equal stakeholder in the systems development. Given the 
diverse nature of the public as a whole, their involvement within the development 
presented many challenges and the developers were unsure of the best approach for 
the engagement of the public. While the public were acknowledged as needing to be 
involved in the system the development team was uncertain as to how to initiate such 
contact and involve them within the process. This is particularly relevant to 
organisational knowledge as the individual forces already had strong links to the 
public via community liaison committees. The requirements for the Portal were 
incomplete in their assessment of the publics needs and as a result a number of 
unexpected behaviours such as the high business use of the Portal were not predicted. 
 
Unexpected usage from the public can be seen as a result of this limited consultation 
or consideration of the public as a stakeholder in the Portal’s development process. 
Initially it was only considered that individuals would submit crime reports online, 
however, members of the business community also started to use the system in a way 
that, while not unwelcomed, was unexpected by the project. As such, this placed 
additional load on those operating the system. 
 
The limited implementation methodology within forces manifested in the 
development team’s response to problems as they occurred in the development. The 
approaches adopted in the solution of problems identified were seen as a 
manifestation of limited force wide organisational awareness. As a result of not truly 
understanding the global problem domain and resultant inability to foresee possible 
problems within the development, the development team was sometimes on the ‘back 
foot’, acting in a reactive fashion to issues as they arose at a force level. The speed of 
response to issues was further shown to be curtailed by the lack of communication 
with forces with many problems remaining unidentified through a lack of proactive 
dialogue. 
 
Further along in the development process, implementation and post implementation 
planning were seen to have suffered, with limited guidance provided to the forces. 
The complex variations in control room operations across the forces resulted in a 
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decision to leave the integration of the incoming NoC inbox to the forces as the best 
judges of how to integrate the system into their business processes within the control 
room. However as seen in the force themes this did not go as expected, with little 
knowledge of issues such as the priority flags, and the volume of NoCs expected, 
forces were seen to implement the Portal in novel and sometimes very inefficient and 
detrimental fashions, placing considerable stress on the operators. A lack of 
established communications with the forces and limited post implementation 
evaluation procedure resulted in forces having little avenue to communicate issues 
back to the development team, and left the development team unable to examine 
implementations to see if issues were occurring. This highlights the limitations of the 
operational knowledge held by the development team of how the Portal was operating 
once implemented within a force. The management team viewed their knowledge of 
the statistics of submission volumes as a sufficient indicator of a successful 
implementation without monitoring the forces’ ability to develop effective processes 
and protocols to capitalise on the functionality of the system whilst reducing 
integration and data entry effort. Few systems were in place to capture relevant 
implementation data and the development team was not equipped to facilitate future 
analysis of this information to establish trends and issues within forces operating the 
Portal system. 
 
5.8 Finalisation of the theme set 
Upon completion of the data-collection phase of this research the themes developed 
from the initial investigation, force investigation and development team were then 
cross compared. Common themes across these three sets were merged and 
reorganised to represent the issues apparent across the whole development with 
themes that were viewed as isolated were removed. This resulted in a final theme set 
taking a holistic view of the development process and the problems encountered from 
all levels examined. The initial political pressures accelerated the Portal’s 
development with the organisational regionalisation effects serving to greatly increase 
the complexity of the problem domain and exacerbate problems already present 
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Final Theme 1 
Label External political influence 
Definition National bodies and political figures are seen to be exerting 
pressure on the Portal’s development. Short deadlines or attempts 
to steer the course of the project were observed.  
Derivation Development Team Theme 1. 
Table 5.27 Final Theme 1 
 
Final Theme 1 again reflects the significant impact that national political pressures 
and a lack of legislative mandate had on the efforts to develop the Portal system. 
From the very inception of the Portal project the time pressures that were introduced 
as a result of national political action severely hindered and constrained the project’s 
development, resulting in the lack of a clearly defined problem domain and 
compromises to the development methodology. 
 
Final Theme 2 
Label Organisational regionalisation 
Definition The segmentation of the police into multiple autonomous regions 
results in a significant increase in the number of stakeholders 
present and an associated increase in the variance of organisational 
requirements across the forces. 
Derivation Revised Initial theme 3/4, Cross Force Theme 2/6 Development 
Team 2b. 
 
Final Theme 2a 
Label Willingness of forces to cooperate with the development 
Definition The degree of participation from each force varied considerably 
based on a number of factors. 
Derivation Revised Initial Theme 3, Cross Force Theme 3/3a Development 
Team 2a/2b. 
 
Final Theme 2b 
Label Regional innovation 
Definition Prior systems replicating functionality of the Portal present an 
additional component for comparison within the force. 
Derivation Development Team Theme 2c. 
Table 5.28 Final Theme 2 
 
Theme 2 represents the amalgamation of themes representing the considerable extra 
strain the regionalised organisational makeup of the forces placed on the development 
process. The operational autonomy of the forces led to a diverse operational 
environment with each having its own differing regional circumstances. 
Technological choices and the differing business processes adopted within the forces 
resulted in each force having its own needs and expectations from the Portal system. 
Such a structure presents a large volume of very similar stakeholders but with subtly 
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differing and often conflicting requirements for the same processes. What works in 
one force will not necessarily work for them all, placing additional strain on the 
requirements capture process when attempting to reconcile the many differing 
opinions present. With such a large group of disparate stakeholders, a lack of 
communications was seen to be a significant issue affecting all areas of the 
development. Establishing adequate representation of this group proved exceptionally 
problematic for the development team as they failed to adequately demonstrate the 
benefits of the system and take into account existing negativity towards the NPIA. 
 
The lack of willingness to cooperate from many of the forces strongly impacted the 
Portal’s development process. Without adequate participation of all forces their 
differing requirements and needs could not be accounted for. As shown, this lack of 
willingness had its roots in a number of factors. Historically, as an organisation the 
police forces were prone to being very insular and protective. Forces acted to preserve 
their independence and autonomy, seeing the Portal as a risk to these. Mistrust of the 
NPIA as an organisation exacerbated by the lack of an ACPO ‘champion’ further 
discouraged forces to engage with the Portal development team. The lack of active 
engagement from the NPIA further acted to foster the feelings of mistrust within the 
forces, leading some to feel excluded from the development team while seeing others 
being welcomed. Willingness to participate was also seen to be affected by the degree 
of alignment of the one-size-fits-all approach that was adopted to the individual 
force’s goals. Those who felt their requirements had been ignored or undermined in 
the new system were much less likely to continue to be actively involved in its 
development. Such issues were seen to be further exacerbated by regional innovation 
within the forces. By ignoring the accomplishments of other forces’ portals, existing 
mistrust and tensions between the forces and NPIA were heightened and those with 
existing systems felt that they were being offered an inferior product. 
 
Final Theme 3 
Label Lack of clear leadership and planning 
Definition Throughout the project a failure to establish clear ownership of the 
project and methodological problems hinder the projects 
development. 
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Final Theme 3a 
Label Lack of organisational understanding 
Definition The development team and leadership fail to significantly take into 
account the effect the organisational structure and regionalisation 
of the forces will have on the Portal development. 
Derivation Cross Force Theme 6, Development Team Theme 2. 
 
Final Theme 3b 
Label Issues within the requirements capture process 
Definition As a result of problems with project definition and issues with 
consulting forces the requirements capture process is incomplete 
and under-representative. 
Derivation Revised Initial Theme 2/4, Cross Force Theme 1/5, Development 
Team Theme 3a. 
 
Final Theme 3c 
Label Lack of full public consultation 
Definition As a result of a lack of consultation with the public as a significant 
stakeholder use cases and opportunities for systems development 
were missed. 
Derivation Revised Initial Theme 4, Development Team 3b. 
 
Final Theme 3d 
Label Development team structure 
Definition The development team structure and makeup further serve to 
exacerbate planning problems and the issues communicating with 
the forces. 
Derivation Development Team Theme 3/3a. 
 
Final Theme 3e 
Label Slow and reactive approach to problem solving 
Definition Portal team and forces are slow to identify and react to problems 
when they occur. Problem solving is done in a reactive fashion. 
Derivation Cross Force Theme 1a, Development Team Theme 3c. 
 
Final Theme 3f 
Label Limited implementation planning and post-implementation 
evaluation 
Definition Limited availability of implementation planning and a lack of 
post-implementation evaluation. 
Derivation Cross Force Theme 1a/4/4a/5, Development Team Theme 3d/3e. 
 
Table 5.29 Final Theme 3 
 
A lack of clear leadership and planning throughout the process of the Portal was seen 
to contribute significantly to the failure encountered within the development. Initial 
political pressures resulted in the project starting out with poorly defined and 
conflicting leadership, with ownership of the project within the NPIA rather than 
within the forces. Confusion led to a poorly defined project scope. When combined 
with the time constraints this led to compromises in planning and development that 
had a considerable impact on the projects ability to deliver. The structure and 
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organisation of policing within the UK presented a number of challenges for the 
developers of the Portal. The strong regional variations across forces, their operational 
independence, and the forces’ reluctance to engage on national level projects 
presented significant difficulties.  Difficulties that the development team struggled to 
recognise and respond to. As a result of a failure to understand the increased 
complexities of the regionalised organisational structure and the scale of consultation 
required, many forces were not heavily involved in the development process. A 
failure to account for this increased complexity and the dialogue needed with 
everyone involved resulted in a failure to establish formal communications channels 
with the all the forces on a routine basis. Without this communication, key 
stakeholders in the development process (the Call-Takers) went unconsidered and 
forces were alienated by the lack of engagement from the NPIA. 
 
As a result of these concerns attempts at requirements capture were significantly 
curtailed, with the lack of proper and detailed requirements capture having a 
significant impact on the project. Pressure from the commissioning group and the 
resulting time constraints placed on the development team to produce an operational 
system had a significant impact on the time allowed for requirements capture and 
ultimately had a significant effect on its execution and accuracy. Power bias from 
those commissioning the system was seen to skew requirements in their favour and 
away from the end-users, those who would ultimately be using such a system. This 
was exacerbated further by NPIA’s compromised reputation amongst some of the 
forces. A failure to proactively engage forces resulted in fragmented requirements that 
were not representative of the overall problem domain, resulting in a system that 
placed considerable strain on the Call-Takers using it. The requirements capture was 
further complicated by the failure to acknowledge the public as an equal partner in the 
development process and the lack of their full inclusion and consultation resulted in a 
number of unexpected systems usage approaches. The rapidly changing makeup of 
the development team served to exacerbate the problems encountered within the 
development. With such turn over of staff, efficient knowledge transfer became 
problematic. The use of seconded officers, while beneficial in many respects, again 
created bias in the requirements in favour of those forces which were represented and 
further reduced the willingness to cooperate of forces who felt underrepresented. 
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As seen in the development themes, a failure to establish proactive communications 
channels with the forces and limited post-implementation planning resulted in a slow 
and reactive approach to the investigation and solution of problems. Without an 
adequate communication with the forces the development team were unaware of 
many of the problems being encountered in the forces. This lack of information meant 
that the development team could not pre-emptively plan for and respond to issues 
much earlier in the development cycle. 
 
As a result of this and assumptions of ease of use, the Portals implementation within 
forces was left to the individual forces to decide. A lack of consideration of the end-
users and training for the system was also shown. The OCR system as implemented 
within forces was regarded as very simplistic and intuitive from the perspective of the 
development team. As such it was assumed that forces would be able to implement 
such functionality with little or no training on the system. This assumption was made 
without consideration of the different IT environments within each force and without 
the knowledge of the considerable extra workload the OCR system would require 
from those operating it. While XML functionality was included to allow forces to 
develop their own automation software for data entry into their crime systems this 
option was not adopted in any known force during this study. 
 
Limited thought was given to the Portal’s existence within the police forces post-
implementation. Through a lack of consideration of the Portal’s effects once 
implemented, the national development team was left with few avenues to check how 
the system was truly operating within forces. Instead the team concentrated on its own 
role as the maintainer of the technical backbone of the system, relying on the national 
level statistics provided by the system and limited dialogue with the forces establish 
the level of implementation of the system across the forces. The ill effects observed to 
internal force business processes and issues such as operator stress went unreported to 
the national team. Instances of innovative implementation and instances of irregular 
unplanned usage of the system were not seen by the development team. 
 
Within this final theme set one theme has been deleted. Revised Initial Theme 5 
(Difficult Regulatory Environment) was removed as it was felt that while the 
regulatory environment did present challenges to the development team they were not 
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sufficiently severe to warrant inclusion in the finalised theme set and their occurrence 
across the data collected was minimal.  
 
5.9 A Problematic Development 
Ultimately, while regarded as a brief success and a useful tool by a number of forces 
and the public alike, providing a considerable and valuable new tool for 
communicating with the public, the external pressures exerted upon it and the choices 
made during its development and implementation resulted in a system that did not 
take into account the needs of a number of the forces using it. The purely 
technological approach adopted by the development team lead to a failure to 
recognise the complex regionalised organisational nature of the police environment 
and the strong effects such an environment would have on the developments 
progression. Assumptions of technological simplicity were found to be erroneous 
when the system was actually implemented within the complex dynamic of the 
control room environment. An inability to control political pressure and time 
constraints exerted at the national level and a failure to take into account competition 
resulting from the historic organisational structure lead to a limited requirements 
capture that was unrepresentative of the true problem domain. The public as a 
stakeholder was ignored despite many avenues for possible engagement being present 
within the police. The development was viewed as complete as soon as 
implementation had finished with little planning for how the system had been 
accepted within forces and the impact such a system may have had. 
 
5.10 Summary 
This chapter has evaluated the data collected in the progress of this research. It has 
identified common themes across the forces studied and within the NPIA 
development team, combining these into a coherent set of concepts highlighting areas 
of weakness in the Portal project’s development. In Chapter 6 the results of this 
analysis will be discussed within the wider context of public information systems 
development literature. Conclusions will be drawn to assist in the examination and 
development of future system and a new Public IS STS model will be proposed based 
on these. 
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Chapter 6 
The Complexity of Public Information Systems: Regional 
Structure and External Political Factors 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As highlighted in the previous analysis, the regional structure of a public organisation 
and the external political factors influencing an IS development within this context 
can be seen to have a significant deleterious effect on the likely chances of project 
success. This chapter outlines an extension of the STS model previously adopted in 
Chapter 2, expanding the four core components to highlight areas of concern specific 
to public information systems that were identified through the themes emerging from 
the case study. The value of this model is identified before progressing to a detailed 
discussion of its core components. It is then evaluated against secondary data, 
examining the development of other UK public projects as reviewed by the National 
Audit Office (NAO) in order to assess its utility outside the policing context with 
resultant changes then explained. 
 
6.2 Value and Purpose 
The Piccoli (2007) STS model discussed in Chapter 2 provides the grounding for an 
overall understanding of the interactions between the components of an IS and allows 
for a more in-depth examination of failings in the development process; however, the 
use of such a generic STS model also presents a number of issues. Such a generalised 
model, while valid for the examination of a large number of IS projects, fails to 
highlight the subtleties of IS design and operation within certain domains. As seen 
from the STS models developed by ODPM (2003) and Sittig & Singh (2010), specific 
areas such as e-government and Health Information Technology (HIT) have been 
shown to benefit from a more tailored approach in their adoption of a STS model. 
Both these models highlight that, as a result of environmental concerns and 
constraints unique to each of these operating environments, a more generic approach 
to STS modelling misses important descriptive details of these systems. Instead, these 
authors seek to tailor a model that best portrays the concerns specific to the domain 
under scrutiny. E-government approaches seek to highlight the importance of public 
engagement in their modelling with HIT seeking to highlight the importance of the 
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user interface as key in the effectiveness of the system. Just as the remodelling of IS 
STS models was seen as valid and required in these examples, it is proposed that as a 
result of the case study conducted, there is sufficient evidence for the proposition of a 
new STS model relating to the examination of public information systems.  
 
As seen from the case study, the Portal experienced many of the same development 
problems as IS developments from the private sector, as identified in Chapter 2. A 
lack of leadership and planning, poorly defined requirements and poor communication 
led to a system that was not representative of the problem it was trying to solve and as 
a result caused considerable stress for its end users. These problems were seen to be 
considerably compounded by the public nature of this development. The inherent 
regional organisational structure and external political pressures common to many 
public IS developments, which will be examined later in this chapter, were found to 
amplify issues within the development. This greatly increased its scale and 
complexity and placed additional constraints on the project’s leadership which led to 
damaging concessions and compromises.  
 
6.3 Model 
Just as with the HIT and ODMP models, the purpose of this revised STS model is to 
provide a more focused lens for the investigation of IS development, and with 
particular reference to the public sector. This model will highlight important areas of 
concern identified from the Portal case study and how these concerns interact with 
and affect the core components of such STS. The purpose of this is to allow such a 
model to be used in the examination of past, present and future public information 
systems projects in order to provide for a more detailed and thorough understanding 
of the issues that could be encountered. This allows for the incorporation of such 
knowledge to inform the future adoption of development methodologies that could 
account for and incorporate the issues that were identified into an IS system’s 
development. 
 
As shown by the case study, the public nature of the IS had a considerable bearing on 
the progress and ultimate failure of the project. External political pressures acted to 
place considerable constraints on the project’s development from its inception 
resulting in a flawed approach to the Portal’s execution. Development was further 
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complicated by the regionalised organisational structure of the UK Police, creating a 
much larger and more diverse and complex range of stakeholders than would 
otherwise have been present.  A failure to understand the effects of the regionally 
autonomous forces, the unique nature of policing within these regions and the effect 
this organisational structure had had on the people, technology and processes within 
each force had a considerable bearing on the outcome of the development. The issues 
encountered as a result of these concerns have been mapped onto the original STS 
model used in Chapter 2 (Piccoli, 2007) in order to present a more tailored model of 
these effects within a public system. The components on which they act are 
highlighted in figure 6.1 and discussed in greater detail below. 
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Figure 6.1 A public STS model. 
 
While ostensibly the discussion below will present the four components of this model 
separately, given their heavily interconnected nature it is impractical to present them 
in isolation from each other. 
 
6.3.1 Structure 
Regionalised organisational structure represents the core issue at the heart of the 
model proposed. As shown in the case study, the regionalisation of the police forces 
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within the UK served to fragment the organisation and affects all components of a 
socio-technical system such as the police Portal. Instead of a single entity with an 
easily definable management and set of end-users, regionalisation resulted in there 
being a large and divergent set of stakeholders. Autonomy within regions led to 
fragmented, differing environments within each force with technology and processes 
evolving as a response to the needs and available resources of the forces. This 
fragmentation was observed to have a profound effect on the progression of the 
development, greatly increasing the challenges faced when communicating with such 
a large number of varying stakeholders. Similar challenges are also seen to occur in 
the reconciliation of the varying regional differences when engaging in requirements 
capture. In contrast to the ODPM(2003) model, the structural component of a public 
STS is shown to be key when examining such systems in a national rather than local 
context. 
 
Regionalisation is not unique to the police and can be seen as a common 
organisational structure across many of the public services within the UK. All 
emergency services, the NHS, passport services, education (primary and secondary) 
and the courts systems operate under a regionalised organisational structure, with 
varying degrees of regionalisation and autonomy in each situation. As seen in the 
police, where the public service needs of the population differ, as a result of local 
factors, such an organisational structure allows for a more tailored service provision 
that is responsive to these local needs. As seen in the case study, such a structure, 
while beneficial for service provision, presents significant challenges for those 
wishing to develop an IS across such an environment. These are challenges that must 
be taken into account within the development methodology at an early stage.  
 
6.3.2 People 
Regionalisation and the autonomy that comes with it can be seen to have a profound 
effect on the various aspects of the People components of this development. As 
identified repeatedly throughout the case study, the independence amongst the regions 
can lead to significant competition between them. With the exception of Scotland, 
where forces successfully formed a homogenous coalition, relationships between 
regions were often observed to be fractious at best, only sharing information and 
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cooperation where such cooperation was mandated through legislation. Whilst some 
cooperation between forces was observed, it was not identified as the norm. 
 
This competition was also reflected in the relationship between regional bodies and 
their national counterparts. As seen between the forces and the NPIA, this relationship 
is an elaboration on the subtle police attitudes towards non-force entities identified in 
Horton and Wood-Harper (2006). As a result of regionalisation and the organic 
growth of the organisations within these regions, regional branches can, rightly so in 
many instances, come to the view that they know best how to deal with the unique 
circumstances within their areas. Coupled with the considerable powers invested in 
each chief constable there was a strong resistance to change within the forces. Forces 
resisted changes that they felt threatened their autonomy, strongly mimicking the 
internal political manipulation observed in Kling & Lamb (1999) in a larger and more 
regionally diverse manner, amplifying the effects of such manipulation and rejection 
when issues are echoed from such a large number of stakeholders. 
 
The strong subdivision of policing into 53 regional forces also presented significant 
issues within the development in terms of the collection of data from such a large 
group, their involvement with the development process and the establishment of 
proactive communication between the many regions and the development team. This 
large subdivision can be seen to greatly amplify the task of data collection and 
requirements capture when considering future IS development. Rather than a single 
homogenous entity with a limited number of viewpoints to consider, as in the 
Akkermans & Van Helden (2002) study or the CAPSA system examined by Fortune 
& Peters (2005), large public IS present a number of specific challenges. The large 
number of autonomous regions in many public services, 53 within the UK Police, 46 
within English fire services and, as will be seen, 130 regions within the NHS, results 
in a vastly increased pool of systems users. These are users with their own regional 
needs and views that must be collected, conflicts resolved and compiled into a 
representative view of a much greater complex system. As observed, this task can 
prove to be a considerable challenge when many of the regions may have strongly 
conflicting needs.  
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This large number of regions also presents issues with regard to their involvement 
within the development process. While end-user participation is viewed as a key 
factor in the success of a development, the selection of end-users from such a wide 
user base can be seen to present considerable difficulties. As observed in this case 
study, representation was provided through the use of seconded officers. These helped 
to provide some formalised contact with the forces, however, the degree of variation 
amongst regions meant that the size of the selection used was unrepresentative of the 
true requirements of all 53 forces. That said, allowing full representation of each force 
via seconded officers would have placed considerable strain on the development team 
and presented additional constraints and time concerns. The adequate engagement of 
such a large number of varying regions can be seen as a significant contributory factor 
in this case. Regional representation also presents issues with regards to the 
competition presented previously. When regions are seen to be in conflict, the 
representation of some forces to the exclusion of others was observed to strongly 
affect the willingness of those under-represented regions to cooperate with the 
development. 
 
In addition, public representation within such systems can be affected. As already 
observed within the ODPM STS model (ODPM, 2003), public consultation was 
highlighted as a significant factor in local e-government projects and was also seen as 
an issue in this study. The scope of a national scale project presents many problems 
when engaging with the public as a stakeholder. The needs and views of the public 
vary considerably across any number of regional and cultural boundaries, presenting a 
number of difficulties when attempting to capture their perspective on a potential IS 
and encouraging members of the public to engage with the development process.  
Many public bodies have relationships and contacts with groups such as the police 
liaison committees observed in this study, yet such groups often go underutilised as a 
consultative intermediary within the development. Unseen in the ODPM investigation 
was the effect of unintended use of the system. Rather than the lack of adoption seen 
by the ODPM, the Portal system was well accepted by those members of the public 
who were aware of the system, however their unexpected use of it to submit 
emergency crimes, despite numerous warnings, presented significant challenges to the 
forces using the system. 
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6.3.3 Technology 
Issues of technological diversity (differing operating systems, software, hardware and 
configuration) within an organisation are not new to the literature (Williford & Chang, 
1999). However, the extremely high degree of such diversity present in public IS as a 
result of regionalisation, autonomy and the resulting technological change can be seen 
to have a profound and unique effect on the development of public IS. As highlighted 
in this study, the regional autonomy of each force allowed them to make their own 
unique IT choices based on their regional needs and available resources. These 
choices resulted in an extremely wide divergence in the quality, application and 
standards of technology implemented across each region. While a number of forces 
adopted similar crime systems, the overall trend was that of an uncoordinated 
approach to the acquisition and implementation of IT across the regions. 
 
This fragmented technological landscape can present significant problems for an IS 
development which has an aim of generating coordination at a national level. A lack 
of uniform, technological standards across regions can result in a system being 
developed to suit the ‘lowest common denominator’, considerably impacting the 
system goals and performance within regions whose technological choices may be 
perceived as more advanced. This generates frustration amongst such forces. The 
variety of systems in place across regions has been seen to restrict efforts to integrate 
new national systems into regional ones due to the significant level of work and 
investment that would have been required to customise the integration and the 
necessary business processes with each differing regional level system. 
 
In addition, the different levels of technological innovation at a regional level may 
impact the progress of a national development by acting as a comparative tool for 
regions to judge the national systems effectiveness. As seen in the Portal case study, a 
number of forces pre-empted the national vision for a homogenous portal system 
creating their own portal tailored to their individual needs and requirements. Such 
innovation, if embraced properly, offered the chance for a national system project to 
learn the lessons from their regional level counterparts, and could have provided 
significant problem domain expertise from these developments. If ignored or 
underutilised this innovation has been seen to stifle the attempts at providing a unified 
national approach to such system. Where regions feel their attempts at systems 
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creation are being undermined or overlooked or where the specification of a national 
system felt short of their own implementation, regions became reluctant to participate 
and engage with the national development. Such bodies would feel that they were 
being offered an inferior product and that their often considerable investment was 
being diminished and ignored. 
 
6.3.4 Process 
One of the strongest observations within this study has been the observation of the 
considerable variation in implemented business processes within each force due to 
their regional autonomy. While constrained to some degree by data handling 
legislation, as a result of organic growth and development, the business processes 
within each force have evolved to handle the unique nature of the criminal 
environment within each region and the attitude of management within each force. As 
a result of this autonomy and unique set of needs there can be considerable and often 
conflicting divergence in the business processes in use within each region. 
 
The degree of divergence of often conflicting processes across regions can present a 
number of difficulties. There is a common recognition within the literature of the 
needs for business process reengineering to occur at the same time as IS 
implementation (Katzenstein & Lerch, 2000) and such simultaneous change is 
implicit within the adoption of a STS approach to information systems. However, care 
must be taken when attempting to amalgamate regional needs. Differing regional 
processes have resulted from unique circumstances and balances must be struck in the 
understanding and unification of business processes at a national level. Alignment of 
these views through the simplistic one-size-fits-all approach used in the Portal to form 
a single unified national model was seen to result in loss of functionality for certain 
areas, again prompting change resistance from those regions. Attempts to create a 
unified standard for the NoC system resulted in system input that collected the bare 
minimum of information required rather than the information that was often desired 
by forces. Providing a one-size fits all solution without recognising that each region 
has differing integration needs presents further problems. Without providing adequate 
support for the implementation of such systems within the regions their efficient 
deployment can prove problematic. Without the provision of support via adequate 
training and instruction, or through individual region by region implementation 
Chapter 6 
The Complexity of Public Information Systems: Regional Structure and External Political Factors 
Page 114 of 160 
planning, coupled with monitoring of this integration with local support processes, 
very inefficient local implementations of national systems may emerge. 
 
6.3.5 External Political Influence 
External political pressure placed on an information systems development is not a 
new phenomenon and has been seen to be exhibited in IS developments before, 
(POST, 2003). Within public systems, with their inherent high visibility and cost, the 
threat of political interference is increased. Supporting POST (2003), the examination 
of external political influence within the context of this study has also been seen to 
have a considerable impact on the progress and development of public STS. While not 
part of the four core components of the STS, the actions of external actors on an IS 
development can amplify existing difficulties and are seen to have a profound effect 
on such systems.  Politicians acting to be seen as responsible and engaging with the 
public view as well as being accountable also need to be seen to be acting on external 
triggers. As seen in the Portal’s inception, politicians reacting to the London 
bombings put considerable pressure on the system’s development. While such initial 
pressure was seen to be at least partially beneficial, in this case spurring the Portal’s 
development from purely concept to a finished product, the timescales placed on the 
project were observed to be unreasonable. This time scale and the additional political 
pressures that exerted upon the development resulted in shortcuts and compromises 
that further serve to exacerbate the problems already encountered within the 
development.  
 
The scale and complexity of national developments coupled with the difficulties 
presented through regional variations result in a number of variables and concerns that 
can take considerable time and effort to reconcile into a workable national 
representation of a system. External pressures acting on this already delicate process 
have been seen to considerably amplify the difficulties encountered. 
 
6.3.6 Model Summary 
As seen above, the regionalisation of organisational structure that was highlighted 
within the Portal was shown to cause fragmentation across the entire STS. People, 
Processes and Technology are all strongly influenced by the local environmental and 
political factors that result from a regionalised Structure. The fragmentation of such 
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processes results in greatly increased complexity when examining these systems. A 
national level approach in their examination was seen to be invalid and incomplete as 
it does not encompass the high level of variation that is present amongst the regions or 
the strong impact this variation has on the system as a whole. The culture of IS design 
and the choice of development methodology when pursuing the implementation of 
such systems must be carefully selected in order to account for these factors. Such a 
methodology should account for the differing needs and context of the regions and 
encourage participative engagement of each region in such away that national 
priorities can be rationalised to meet local requirements. As seen in the Portal case 
study, an overall failure to acknowledge this complex structure and the resulting over 
simplification of the problem domain to a few isolated cases coupled with external 
pressures on the system led to poorly constructed requirements. This ultimately 
resulted in a system that was neither fully aligned to the needs of the local regions nor 
implemented correctly within the internal business processes. 
 
Within the context of national bodies with a regionalised structure, the importance of 
understanding this complex distribution and divergence of responsibilities and 
processes prior to the instigation of requirements capture can be seen as a preliminary 
key factor to the successful development of such systems. The large number of 
isolated regional entities requires significant planning and effort to fully engage with 
the development process. Regions must be engaged by a central vision of the benefits 
such systems can provide and encouraged to view changes in their internal processes 
as positive enhancements to the way in which they operate. Disparate views must be 
aligned through active cooperation and engagement rather than mandated in order to 
avoid regions becoming defensive and withdrawn. Innovations within regions should 
be embraced, with the lessons learnt from previous efforts acknowledged and 
integrated into national developments. Institutional competition must be accounted for 
when examining such systems, as it can play a significant role in deciding the level of 
engagement each region exhibits. One must consider carefully these attitudes and 
their influence on other components within the system. Representation of regions 
must be carefully considered in the context of these attitudes and balanced to ensure 
that regions do not feel ignored or sidelined. 
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6.4 Evaluation of Model against Past Projects 
While the above model was constructed based on data gathered from the examination 
of the Police Portal, it is necessary to rule out regionalised concerns as a phenomenon 
unique to the police environment and ensure that this model can be generalised within 
the public domain outside of its original policing context. An evaluation of the model 
will be conducted through its application to three existing public IS developments. As 
seen in Chapter 2 very little literature provides an in-depth full lifecycle evaluation of 
problems encountered in public IS development within UK projects. As a result of 
this and the need for detailed information in the evaluation of the proposed model, the 
secondary data used in these evaluations were primarily gathered from the results of 
National Audit Office (NAO) reports. The NAO is an independent body tasked with 
the examination of public projects within the UK. The reports provide a detailed in-
depth analysis of the issues encountered within projects, providing detailed timelines 
of events and allowing for an exploration of these issues from the perspective of the 
STS model proposed.  Similarities and differences in their execution and progress will 
be highlighted, together with the issues that regional organisation presented in the 
development of these systems. 
 
6.5 The Libra Project 
The first project to be used in this evaluation is that of the Libra project (National 
Audit Office, 2003). The Libra Project was commissioned by the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department, as it was known then, to provide a national IT infrastructure to the 
regionally devolved magistrates’ courts within the UK. The aim was to provide a 
unified case handling system across the regional courts and to provide direct links 
with other criminal justice agencies, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Prisons 
Service, The Probation Service and the Police. 
 
6.5.1 Organisational Background of the Project 
Similar to the structure observed within the policing case study, the organisation of 
the magistrates’ court system is broken down into semi-autonomous regional 
divisions. At the time of the project’s inception the magistrates’ courts were based 
around 42 regional court committees aligned to the boundaries of the police forces 
they served and under the ultimate jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor’s Department. 
Just as with ACPO and the NPIA, while responsible for the execution of the law 
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within these committees, the Lord Chancellor’s Department had no direct control over 
their internal business processes and operations. As a result of this lack of a national 
unified approach for the management of internal business processes, IT infrastructure 
and as a result of the differing regional pressures placed on each court, there were 
considerable variations in place within each magistrates region. As with the Portal, 
every court had adopted its own unique business processes for the purpose of case 
handling and the systems it utilised towards this aim. 
 
The growing disparity between differing court systems presented a number of 
difficulties for the Lord Chancellor’s Department. Differing technological capabilities 
and data storage approaches meant that the sharing and compilation of data across a 
large number of court bodies was impossible. Efficiency targets set for the courts 
were also seen as difficult to assess as a result of the poor access to relevant statistics 
at a national level. Recognising this, the Lord Chancellor’s Department sought to 
develop a national IT standard for the UK magistrates’ courts and from this the Libra 
system was born. 
 
6.5.2 Issues Encountered within the Libra Development 
Similarly to the Portal case study, the regionalised organisational structure of the UK 
courts system was seen to cause a number of issues within the project’s execution. 
While no active regional competition existed between the individual courts, the 
regional court committees acted against the national body when they felt that their 
regional autonomy was under threat. The Lord Chancellor’s Department had the 
power to force the implementation of technological change across the regional courts 
but it had no authority or mandate to push for business process changes within these 
regions. This resulted in a conflict between the regions and the national body. As with 
the police forces, individual court committees felt that they best understood and 
recognised their unique regional circumstances and felt that their internal business 
processes were best equipped to manage these needs. While attempts at full regional 
representation were made in the process of the Libra development, the often divergent 
and conflicting requirements of the differing regions meant that a unified specification 
of the system placating each region was impossible. 
 
Chapter 6 
The Complexity of Public Information Systems: Regional Structure and External Political Factors 
Page 118 of 160 
The addition of Libra not being a new system but replacing a large number of older 
regionalised systems also exhibited many of the issues observed within the innovation 
conflicts within the Police Portal. Having prior systems in place allowed the 
individual regions to compare the national offering to those already in place within 
their region. This increased resistance from those who felt the system did not add 
benefit to their own or did not capture the same level of data as their existing systems. 
 
As a result of the lack of mandate to implement business process change and with the 
courts reluctance to engage in such a process voluntarily, insisting that their regional 
processes not be dictated from a national plan a compromise had to be made to allow 
for a national systems roll-out. Instead of seeking large scale change to existing 
business processes, the Lord Chancellor’s Department decided to implement Libra as 
a system designed to support existing processes within each court. While the 
nationalised implementation of such a system would require the standardisation of 
some components across the courts system, mirroring the Portal project, each 
committee was left to decide its own relevant working practices surrounding the 
physical implementation of the system within their jurisdiction. This was seen as the 
only viable compromise at the time; however this decision was ultimately viewed as 
the point of failure within the development. Despite considerable involvement of the 
representatives of each of the courts committees, attempts to define clear requirements 
for the needs of the system ultimately failed as they were unable to reconcile the 
needs of each region into a common standard. By failing to develop new processes at 
the same time as a system’s development, the differing business processes and 
required information at each court were always in conflict with each other, resulting 
in requirements for the project being poorly defined. 
 
While parts of the Libra system were ultimately delivered, as a result of these issues, 
the project arrived incomplete, heavily over budget and faced long delays and legal 
wrangling over its eventual delivery, with plans for its replacement already underway 
before its completion. 
 
6.5.3 Evaluation against Proposed Model 
Within the Libra project many of the problems predicted by the model were seen to 
occur. Regional autonomy led to diverse and fragmented technological and business 
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process landscapes within the regions with each having its own unique needs and 
desires based on its regional environment. These factors combined to create increased 
pressure and problems within the requirements capture process. Regional 
representation proved problematic with a range of participation based on perceived 
benefit to the individual regions and the degree to which each region felt threatened 
by the perceived devolution of their autonomy. Comparable past systems showed a 
similar effect to the innovation concerns perceived within the Portal. These systems 
allowed a side by side comparison of the new system versus the old and acted as a 
catalyst for rejection when such systems failed to adequately replace existing 
functionality. 
 
As a result of this system being a purely back end system, public representation was 
not observed to be an issue in this instance. Regional competition was also not seen to 
be present. As a result of a less competitive organisational culture, regions in this 
instance were willing to participate should systems allow such cooperation. 
 
6.6 Case Recording and Management System (CRAMS) 
The consequences of a regional organisational structure can again be seen to manifest 
in the CRAMS project. Again resulting from a lack of examination of such projects 
within the literature, the analysis of the CRAMS project is conducted from secondary 
data gathered from the NAO and HM Inspectorate of Probation reviews of the 
problems encountered in this project (National Audit Office, 2001; HMIP, 2000). 
 
The CRAMS project was commissioned as the main software component of the 
National Probation Service Information Systems Strategy (NPSISS) seeking to 
establish a common IT infrastructure across the UK National Probation Service 
(NPS). 
 
6.6.1 Organisational Background of the Project 
The organisational structure within the NPS strongly mirrors those previously seen. 
At the time of this project’s development probation services within the UK were 
divided into 54 regional offices that were independent and autonomous, managed by a 
probation committee with each regional service being headed by a chief probation 
officer appointed by the committee. While being autonomous, as with the Courts 
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system, the probation service must operate within a nationally legislated statutory 
model and adhere to a common set of national standards administered by the Home 
Office, reporting compliance at regular intervals. Just as was seen with the previous 
two cases this independence led to an extremely diverse and heterogeneous IT and 
business process environment with each region having its own unique ways of 
processing information and their own custom built systems. The degree of 
technological differentiation was of specific note in this instance with some regions 
having predominantly paper based storage systems with others having more 
developed IT processes in place. 
 
6.6.2 Issues Encountered within the CRAMS Development 
The subdivision and differentiation of autonomy and business processes was again 
seen to play a pivotal role in the progression of this IS. The generation of meaningful 
requirements and acceptance was hindered through the failure of maintaining 
adequate communications with each of the regional bodies. While meetings of chief 
officers were conducted at least once a month, many decisions regarding the key 
functionality of the system were made by the Home Office and no formal 
communications methods outside of this monthly meeting were established with the 
regions. As a result of the failure to engage each group, only 50% submitted the 
required business cases and review of needs for the system therefore the goals of the 
system were not clearly defined. Regionalisation was again seen to amplify the 
problems faced in the accurate collection of specification for such systems. With the 
unique needs and demands of each region and the dissimilar and conflicting business 
processes implemented in support of them, additional burdens were seen in the 
reconciliation of these requirements. 
 
The project’s choice to provide an enhanced version of one region’s IS as the national 
version of such systems presented additional challenges to the development. The 
software selected for enhancement was unusual as it was based on a mainframe 
architecture, a considerably different technology to that used by the majority of other 
regions. It was a well designed and functional IS within its confined environment. 
However, the redevelopment of it to be used for the server technology in other regions 
was not a scenario that its original developer had intended. As a result, a number of 
issues arose in this process; functionality was curtailed from the original design and a 
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once stable platform became unreliable when implemented outside of its original 
technological environment.  
 
Business processes were being incorrectly mapped onto existing system constraints 
and valuable reporting features were lost as a result of technological incompatibilities 
with the new host environments within each region. Implementation was again 
considered to be a regional level responsibility and no national level plan was put into 
place to assist with the implementation of the system within the regions. Despite 
dramatically differing IT implementation and management capabilities within each 
region, each region was left to negotiate the implementation of the system with the 
project’s contractor as needed. 
 
As a result of the poorly defined requirements on the system and challenges face in its 
development the system, as delivered, failed to support many of the operational 
features required within each region. This ultimately resulted in further fragmentation 
of the internal IT environment of each region as each probation committee 
commissioned the creation of additional software to manage these omitted features. 
This issue was further compounded by the lack of adequate communication with the 
regions. The full functionality of the system was not explained and demonstrated, 
which resulted in the duplication of software development processes within regions. 
Where regions erroneously believed that functionality was missing within the system, 
in-house development was conducted to design software to fill these perceived gaps. 
In a number of cases such gaps did not exist, the functionality was provided by the 
system it had just not been highlighted or trained out to the regions. 
 
One of the principle arguments presented by the regions in their dismissal of the 
system was the poor quality of the GUI presented by the system and the stress it 
placed on the operators. While acceptance testing had been conducted, it was 
conducted within a very limited number of the regional areas and the software 
presented during testing was of such low quality that a number of regions actually 
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External political factors also drove changing requirements that the development 
failed to take into account. When legislation was introduced requiring the individual 
monitoring of high-risk offenders within each region. The CRAMS system failed to 
respond to this changing demand and again the local regions were forced to develop 
their own additional solution. 
 
Ultimately, as a failure to adequately understand many of the subtle nuances of the 
organisational structure of the Probation Service and adequately engage all regional 
committees to gain a true understanding of the problem domain, the project failed to 
be fully implemented. This ultimately resulted in a more fractured if not more up-to-
date technological landscape than existed prior to CRAMS implementation. 5 regions 
failed to participate in the CRAMS project, rejecting the system and investing their 
own money to develop an alternate system, ICMS (Integrated Case Management 
System). These regions considered this system to be of higher quality than the one 
offered nationally. 12 other regions opted to use alternative systems post CRAMS and 
15 developed systems to supplement it. 
 
6.6.3 Evaluation against Proposed Model 
The CRAMS project examination reflects similar adherence to the problems predicted 
by the proposed model, mirroring those experienced within Libra. The initial 
technological and business process fragmentation presented many challenges for the 
system’s development. In the case of CRAMS the stark degree of technological 
fragmentation and the methods employed for adapting the new system to this 
environment played a pivotal role in its demise. Differing regional needs were not 
taken into account and a standard national template was used in the implementation of 
the system. Regional representation and communication were considered to be 
minimal outside the scheduled leadership meetings and contributed to the mistrust 
surrounding the implementation of the project. While no active resistance based on 
threats to autonomy were observed from the data available, the availability of similar 
projects within each region again allowed for comparison with existing systems. This 
built resentment in those regions whose systems were more advanced, to the point that 
5 regions did not even join the CRAMS scheme.  External political pressures served 
to exacerbate problems within the development by forcing requirements change at 
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various stages of the projects development leaving the CRAMS system missing 
additional vital components. 
 
Again as a result of this system being a purely back end system public representation 
was not observed to be an issue in this instance. Regional competition was in fact 
observed to be contradicted in this case with a strong desire to share information 
present within the regions. 
 
6.7 National Health Service Program for Information Technology (NPfIT) 
The final project used in this comparison is that of the NPfIT and ongoing IS 
development project aimed at unifying the existing disparate information systems 
architecture of the NHS. This examination is based on secondary data obtained from 
the analysis of the NAO review (National Audit Office, 2006) in light of the proposed 
model. 
 
6.7.1 Organisational Background and Pressures Present within the NPfIT 
The NPfIT has been described as the largest civilian IS project undertaken in the 
world to date, (Clegg & Shepherd, 2007) and presented significant challenges to those 
undertaking its development. At the project’s inception the NHS was broken down 
into 130 regional primary care trusts (PCT) each responsible for their own processes, 
systems and implementation resulting in considerable variation in degrees of 
functionality of systems between trusts. The scale and complexity of these systems is 
far greater than that seen in the systems already reviewed. As a result of the NPfIT’s 
aim of replacing many disparate systems within the many sub-specialties of the NHS 
means that the number of systems in use across all the areas of the NHS within the 
NPfIT remit reaches well into the thousands. Each NHS organisation within a PCT 
may be comprised of multiple sites, each with many functions and specialisations.  
Each of these functions and specialisations may have their own custom built IS and 
even differing numbers of systems for the same task. An example of this is an Oxford 
hospital which was observed to have 7 pathology systems within the same facility. 
Each of these systems may well be unique to the hospital or the PCT in which they 
reside and often have a very limited ability to share information between systems even 
within GPs surgeries or within the regional level. Many data transfers within the NHS 
still take place using paper as the primary transfer medium. 
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The high degree of technological and process fragmentation resulting from the 
regionalisation of such a vast organisation presents many problems for the developers. 
As seen in the previous two projects the management of requirements capture and 
systems development presented considerable challenges when faced with a 
comparatively smaller numbers of regions and covering only a limited number of 
internal processes and systems. Recognising this, and in an attempt to mitigate the risk 
of a total collapse of the project should some systems be found to be inadequate, the 
PCTs have been divided into 5 regional areas with each area allocated a different 
industry supplier, known within the NPfIT as a local service provider. Common 
communication and networking specifications were created, known as the National 
Spine, to allow for interoperability of the systems designed for each region. While this 
subdivision has served to reduce the scale of the task faced by any one contractor, the 
number of PCTs and NHS organisations within each NHS PCT is still considerably 
larger than observed in the other projects and presents a number of conflicting 
requirements and views that must be considered in the design of such systems. This is 
especially true of a number of systems that could be classed as critical systems where 
the life or quality of life of patients could be adversely affected if they were to fail. 
 
Recognising these concerns and the effects of replacing existing innovative system, if 
highly functional systems are already in place, provided they are made compliant with 
the communication and integration standards of the Spine they need not be replaced 
with NPfIT systems until the latter achieves an equivalent or greater level of 
functionality or greater level of integration across local health communities. Systems 
are to be deployed in conjunction with the host organisation at times convenient and 
suitable to them, thereby helping to reduce tensions and worries amongst those who 
fear incoming systems are less suitable than existing solutions. 
 
The business process variation has also been recognised by the NPfIT leadership. 
While some systems will require varying degrees of standardisation, they have 
recognised that the many organisations within the NHS are operationally unique and 
attempts at such generalised standardisation may do more harm than good. Region-
wide systems will be implemented but in a more tailored fashion with local service 
providers required to tailor their general solution to each individual organisation’s 
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requirement. While considerably more work is required utilising this approach, it is 
believed it will reduce resistance to the project, produce a more integrated system and 
reduce the issues of region wide requirements conflict. 
 
GPs have been observed to be particularly hard to account for in the development of 
such systems. With such wildly varying needs across thousands of practices, and with 
each used to complete self management and autonomy many GPs were reluctant to 
change systems, especially when they had implemented existing systems at 
considerable expense to themselves. Agreements had to be put into place to allow GPs 
to stay with their existing suppliers as the NPfIT progressed. Considerable attempts 
have been made at ensuring adequate communication with all levels of staff and 
operations within the NHS. However, surveys at the time still illustrated measurable 
concern from staff over the lack of clarity of the functionality provided by many of 
the systems proposed. 
 
Public engagement is also seen as a significant issue within the NPfIT, many of the 
developed systems have some interaction with members of the public and nearly all 
will hold personal and confidential information on them. As has been seen in the high 
profile rejections and resistance to some of the national patient record storage 
approaches, communication and transparency with the public was observed to be key 
(Cayton, 2006; Leigh & Evans, 2006). Many attempts at public communication have 
been implemented within the NPfIT but communication and engagement with such a 
vast number of people with differing needs and regional and cultural variation will 
always be problematic. 
 
External political pressures on the NPfIT have also been severe. Given the sheer scale 
of the project, its large cost and the reputation of the NHS as one of the UK’s greatest 
institutions, national political interest in the project has been great. Politicians keen to 
be seen as accountable and responsible for the public finances exert pressure to ensure 
that systems are developed in the most cost effective way. External constraints placed 
on NHS budgets restrict what may be operationally possible or serve to push for more 
modest improvements. The national political agenda changes with a new government 
and the recent restructuring of the NHS presents additional challenges for the 
developers of such systems. 
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6.7.3 Evaluation against Proposed Model 
As seen, the sheer scale of the NPfIT and the granularity of its regionalisation and 
segmentation within the regions present vast challenges to the system’s development. 
Technological and process fragmentation is present across thousands of systems and 
organisational groups that must be considered in order to produce viable replacement 
systems. Recognising the need for considerable communication with regions many 
systems have been put in place to ensure that people are aware of change and dialogue 
has been established to ensure that all views are represented. Fragmentation has been 
taken into account through the adoption of regionalised customisation rather than 
through the application of a blanket national or regional template on newly designed 
systems. The ability of past systems to affect acceptance is also recognised in the 
statement that such systems will not be replaced until such time as incoming systems 
meet or exceed their specification. Public representation and involvement has also 
been seen to be a significant factor in the development of the NPfIT. While a limited 
number of systems are directly accessible to the public, many backend systems, 
holding confidential information on them, are within the project’s remit. Failures in 
initial public engagement led to strong resentment against such systems and ultimately 
required changes in the system to placate this feeling. Politics were again observed to 
play a significant factor in exacerbating problems within the NPfIT. Financial 
pressures and the politically instigated reorganisation of the NHS all serve to 
complicate development further and constrain the development’s progress. 
 
6.8 Model Review 
Regional organisation is not inherently negative and is often beneficial and necessity 
for the provision of an efficient public service. As a result of the sheer size and scale 
of the service offerings required at a national level it has been seen in many examples 
that such organisation is required for the adequate tailoring of national services to 
individual regional needs in order to make best use of resources available. When 
implementing IS at a national level it is important to take into account the added 
complexity and conflict such an organisational approach can bring to an IS 
development. As seen in this analysis, the model highlights and predicts many of the 
problematic issued observed to be created or exacerbated as a result of this regional 
autonomous distribution and the external political pressures inherent from the high 
value and visibility present in many national public projects. Taking into account the 
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results of the evaluation of the model, ‘public representation’ has been extended to 
‘public representation and communication’ in order to reflect the level of dialogue 
required in the NPfIT. Representation was sufficient to gather the requirements of the 
public, however true and accurate communications and engagement were also seen to 
be necessary. They were required in order to engender support and cooperation with 
the project, to explain the benefits of the systems provided and to engender trust in the 
data that was collected and amalgamated within such systems. Regional innovation 
was also amended to describe the impact of any prior systems on the development 
process. Within the police the issue was encountered by those in the process of 
developing their new regional systems along side or in close proximity to the 
beginning of the Portal system. The comparison has shown it is not just recent 
innovations that cause such issues, but any prior system’s functionality, that allow 
such comparison to incoming national systems. Regional competition, while not 
observed within the three comparison projects, have been left in to allow for their 
possibility within other organisational cultures. Given the strength of the competition 
observed within the police forces, it is believed organisations of a similar competitive 
nature could also experience such issues. An amended model has therefore been 
proposed below: 
 







Large Scale Business Process 
Differentiation
Prior Systems Comparison
Strongly Differing Regional 
Needs
Regional Competition
Resistance when Regional 
Autonomy Threatened
Regional Representation and 
Communication
Public Representation and 
communication
Regionalised Structure 
Fragments System Components 





Large Scale Technological 
Fragmentation
Red Text Indicates Amended Effects
  
Figure 6.2 Amended Public STS Model 
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Ultimately the development of this model has highlighted the profound complicating 
effects that the regionalisation of national public services can have on the 
development of national IS solutions. Care must be taken to understand the 
relationships within such regions before undertaking such developments. 
Regionalisation leads to a complex political, social and technological environment 
presenting conflicting requirements that must be considered to engage and enrol all 
regions within the development process. As seen in many of the examples, a failure to 
take into account this fractious and diverse nature from the very beginning of an IS 
development can have considerable detrimental effects on the progress of such 
projects. 
 
6.9 Model Applicability 
Given the findings of the confirmation exercise it is believed the proposed model is 
suitable for use in the analysis and planning of IS development scenarios in any 
national level public body with an organisational structure that is based on the 
segmentation of organisational responsibility into well defined, geographically 
regionalised offices or departments. Thus allowing for the examination and 
consideration of the effects of regionalisation on IS development and the issues that 
may arise on a region by region and intra-region basis together with their likely 
relationships with their national bodies. 
 
While not tested on smaller fragmented organisational structures within local e-
government, where organisations are fragmented in a smaller scale across an 
administrative area, the model may still hold, however further research is required to 
establish its validity in such areas. 
 
This model is not, however, applicable to national organisations with a non-
regionalised development such as higher educational institutions. The organisational 
structure of such entities is not as rigid as wholly national bodies. In such instances 
national bodies have little discretion over their operation and tend to act as isolated 
entities with no national frameworks or governance outside of nationally recognised 
standards and no formalised shared responsibility between regionalised bodies or 
representative over a geographic domain. National bodies where no regionalisation is 
Chapter 6 
The Complexity of Public Information Systems: Regional Structure and External Political Factors 
Page 129 of 160 
present and where offices are treated as a whole national entity are also not considered  
to be applicable in this study. 
 
6.10 Further Discussion 
This study strongly supports the observations by Olphert & Damodaran (2007) and 
Clegg & Shepherd (2007), that public IS developments are commonly disconnected 
from social considerations, with developers ignoring many of the social concerns with 
the development process. It has demonstrated that a lack of clear understanding of the 
organisation in which an IS is to be developed has a strong impact on the ultimate 
success or failure of such projects, It has also shown that the adoption of an STS view 
in the analysis of an IS development can be a powerful tool in understanding the 
complex interactions and relationships between the many facets of a development. 
The balance between broad models, Piccoli (2007), and those which are more 
narrowly defined, Sittig & Singh (2010), was highlighted, with the need for the 
specification and choice of a suitable model being illustrated. This shows the benefits 
that refinement of such models can have on the identification of problem areas within 
an IS. Interestingly, as stated previously, the refinement of the Piccoli model directly 
contradicts that of the ODPM (2003) model that was proposed for local government 
IS whereby structure was not considered an overriding component of such systems. At 
a national level, the scale and complexity of both the host organisation and IS were 
observed to have a critical role in the successful progression of a system’s 
development. 
 
Literature surrounding critical success factors also fails to acknowledge the need for 
tacit and direct understanding of the host organisation’s structure and culture as key 
factors in their own right. While many models consider the social aspects of 
communications, planning and leadership to be key factors in a project’s success, 
(Somers & Nelson, 2001; Holland & Light, 1999) and some have begun to recognise 
the significance of multi-site developments, albeit from a purely technological 
perspective, (Umble, Haft & Umble, 2003) many still fail to explicitly outline 
organisational understanding as a primary factor in the success of such developments. 
Instead, such knowledge is implied as a result of other factors within these models, in 
that without adequate understanding of an organisation true and valid planning and 
the adequate engagement of stakeholders would be difficult. This study has shown 
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such implicit recognition of the need for organisational understanding is insufficient 
and that given the findings presented above a true and accurate understanding of an 
organisation’s structure and culture prior to the commencement of IS development is 
a critical factor in its own right, underlying the entire development process and one 
that must be considered from the early stages of such projects. 
 
Within the examination of failure, these issues must be taken into account when 
examining large scale national projects. As seen in the confirmation examples, 
(National Audit Office, 2006; National Audit Office, 2001; HMIP, 2000; National 
Audit Office, 2003) the initial, obvious causes of such failures can have subtle and 
differing root causes when viewed with a wider lens looking at the whole 
organisation, across the whole lifecycle. This study has shown the amplifying effect 
that regionalised organisational structure can have on the problems being experienced 
within public bodies, exacerbating what may have started out as minor concerns to 
issues of a critical nature within project development. In addition, the many differing 
views observed, which are generated by the regionalised and disparate stakeholder 
groups present in a regionalised organisational structure, further serve to complicate 
the very definition of failure itself. As observed by Sauer (1993), the very nature of 
failure within IS becomes difficult to define due to its strong integration with the host 
organisation and the resulting large number of stakeholders and perspectives that are 
present. The magnification of stakeholder views evident in a regionalised national 
project further increase the likelihood that the project will be perceived to have failed 
by a larger number of stakeholders as compromise across such diverse needs is shown 
to be very difficult to plan and manage. As seen with the Portal project and CRAMS 
once negative perceptions were present they became engrained and spread across 
regions resulting in additional regions becoming hostile to the IS development. 
 
Within such organisations practitioners must take care to recognise the threat that 
nationalised IS development can pose to the operational sovereignty of each regional 
body and the inherently defensive reaction this was observed to provoke in the 
management at this level, supporting the view of Lucas (1984) that perception of 
threat is a key cause of user rejection of such systems. National scale IS developments 
have been shown to often involve very large scale change to the host organisations 
and its processes and the correct selection of change management methodology is 
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critical to the acceptance of this. While strong communication, dialogue and 
participation from all levels of an organisation across the entire development cycle 
should always be encouraged in the management of change, (Bruhn, Zajac & Al-
Kazemi, 2001), this study has shown that dialogue with regional management must be 
carefully planned and moderated and cannot be treated as a one-size-fits-all approach. 
Top management support is considered a critical factor in the success of IS 
development, (Holland and Light, 1999) and while the very top management of the 
Police at a national level supported the project, the senior management within each 
region was neglected. As shown by this study these regional heads had a strong effect 
on that region’s acceptance of the incoming system and inadequate engagement with 
them led to under-representative requirements and insufficient access to stakeholders 
within the region. Regions have differing needs and the benefits of the incoming 
system must be explained in relation to each of the differing regional circumstances. 
Change across regions must also be managed in a coherent way, just as change across 
organisational ‘sub-systems’, such as departments within an organisation, must ensure 
consistent and effective operation between each of these sub-units during periods of 
change, (Fernandez & Rainey, 2006). This study has highlighted the need for change 
to occur simultaneously across the independent regions. 
 
Within e-government this study has illustrated that additional dimensions must be 
considered when examining large national-scale projects and that backend public 
systems are just as vulnerable to failure as their more studied and more visible public 
facing counterparts. The internal political problems remarked by Vigoda-Gadot & 
Kapun (2005) were strongly supported by the evidence in this study. At a more 
granular level this study has shown that these internal political struggles can be seen 
to repeat on a region by region basis as result of the differing goals and aims of each 
region conflicting with those of the system and other regional entities. Differing 
expectations and requirements served to ‘blur’ the scope and definition of the project, 
resulting in conflicting views of the benefits and purpose of such a system again 
showing the amplifying affect regionalisation can have. External political pressures as 
identified by Parker & Bradley (2000), were observed not only to have an effect on 
the behaviour of the target organisation but a significant impact on the IS 
development process itself. These act as an external steering influence from outside 
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the primary organisation with negative repercussions when the external political will 
did not adhere with internal organisational expectations. 
 
6.11 Summary 
Building on the analysis of problems encountered within the Portal case study this 
chapter has highlighted the pivotal role an understanding, or lack thereof, of the 
regional organisational makeup and external political pressures had on the 
development of the IS. Recognising this, the STS model utilised in Chapter 2 has been 
extended to take into account the effects of these pressures in a public sector IS 
environment. This model was then evaluated against existing public IS projects in 
order to allow for its expansion and confirmation outside of the policing domain. 
Chapter 7 will present a conclusion to this research and outline the limitations of the 
study conducted together with opportunities for future work within this area. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Future Work 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis sought to identify and address the complex issues involved in the 
development of large scale information systems within the public sector. It was 
motivated by the high degree of project failure that was observed occurring in IS 
development and specifically within the public sector together with the gaps identified 
in the literature examining issues encountered in the development of public IS. The 
result of this investigation was the generation of a tailored STS model highlighting 
these issues and illustrating their relationship with the main components of such 
systems. It provided a tool to allow for a more focused examination of past public IS 
projects and for its use in the consideration of future developments in order to 
mitigate the issues that have been identified. Such a model contributes to the 
academic understanding of the role that regionalised organisational structure and 
political pressures play in the amplification of development problems within public 
sector IS.  
 
Concluding this research, this chapter reviews the investigation conducted within this 
thesis, and illustrates the contributions made. The limitations of this study are then 
discussed and future work is proposed. 
 
7.2 Research Overview 
The literature review presented in Chapter 2 explored and examined the issues of 
information systems failure. Highlighting the reliance of both industry and public 
services on their now tightly integrated IS. The definition of failure was found to be 
complex and dependant on the views of the individual/stakeholder group, with no 
clear, single definition found within the literature. Examining public IS design 
specifically, the literature was found to attribute many of the issues identified in their 
implementation to the technological approaches adopted in their development. 
Moving away from a rationale that explains public IS failure mainly in light of 
technological issues, this research uses a STS approach in the examination of 
problematic areas within the IS development lifecycle from the literature. This has led 
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Future Work 
Page 134 of 160 
to the review of a number of published studies highlighting the predominantly social 
nature of the IS failures that were identified. Gaps were noted in the literature 
regarding the exploration of failure within public sector organisations with specific 
focus on issues and concerns within the development cycle. The literature also seemed 
to be neglecting the analysis of back-end public systems, while privileging the 
examination of e-government applications. 
 
In order to study these gaps further a case study was commissioned to investigate the 
development lifecycle of a newly commissioned public IS project, the Police Portal. 
This was a suite of tools designed to increase the communication and intelligence 
gathering capabilities of the police and was selected for this study as it provided a 
number of unique opportunities to examine a large scale public IS project as it was 
developed and implemented.  
 
A Grounded Theory case study approach was adopted for the exploration of issues 
within the Portal development process. After initial familiarisation with the police 
environment, a research agenda was established to guide the investigation of the 
Portal’s development with both the development team and within regional forces. 
Data collected from these studies were then triangulated in order to isolate a set of 
common themes emergent across the development’s progression. From this analysis it 
was identified that the effects of organisational regionalisation and external political 
pressures imposed additional complexity and strain on the development process, 
resulting in compromises that had a significant detrimental effect on the Portal’s 
design and implementation. 
 
Considering these concerns in the context of the STS model utilised in Chapter 2, the 
author proposes an extension of the STS model to encompass the issues observed. The 
resulting STS provides a more tailored lens for the evaluation of public sector IS 
projects along with a tool for their planning. Using the primary data collected in the 
case study, an extended STS model is presented and applied in the evaluation of a 
number of public information systems; LIBRA, CRAMS and the NPfIT.  
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7.3 Contributions and Conclusion 
Expanding existing literature on problems encountered during IS development, this 
research has provided an in-depth analysis of the full development lifecycle of a 
public information system. It has illustrated a number of critical factors affecting large 
scale IS development within the UK public sector. The regionalised organisational 
structure of many public services has been shown to be a significant factor in the 
progress, success or failure of IS within this domain, having profound effects across 
all components of such systems. Fragmented technological and business processes, 
regional innovation, internal competition and hostility, problems consulting with the 
public and change resistance have all been shown to have their roots within the case 
investigated. The external political pressures placed on such projects have been 
highlighted as an amplifying factor on projects already experiencing such difficulties. 
This thesis has proposed the extension of an existing generic STS model to encompass 
these factors so as to allow a more focused lens for the examination of the problems 
affecting public information systems development.  
 
The proposed model has shown that structure should not be omitted from 
consideration in the development of public IS, this is in contrast to the ODPM (2003) 
model examining such issues at a local level. Structure is in fact a key component of a 
national scale system and has a profound effect on its other components.  Technology 
and process under such a structure are shown to be far more fragmented and disparate 
than envisaged by the original model and seen to considerably complicate the 
gathering and reconciliation of requirements across regions. The people components 
of public STS are also seen to be heavily affected. The segmentation introduced by 
the structure component increases the variability of stakeholders within a system and 
introduces additional strain when communicating with these. It introduces the concept 
of competition between regions and that of autonomy within such a structure, 
resulting in resistance when people feel such autonomy is threatened. External 
political influences are added to the STS model in order to reflect the considerable 
amplifying effect these pressures exerted on the main components within the STS, 
adversely affecting a system’s development. 
 
The proposed model can be applied in the examination of past, present and future 
public IS projects in order to permit a detailed and thorough understanding of the 
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problems associated with regionalisation that might be encountered. This provides the 
opportunity for the incorporation of such knowledge to inform the future adoption of 
development methodologies that could account for and incorporate the issues 
identified into an information system’s development. 
 
It has outlined the importance of truly understanding and planning for the nature of a 
host organisation before undertaking project design and implementation. If developers 
are aware of the fractious nature of a host organisation and the many ripple effects 
regional organisation has on the implementation of a given IS, such issues may be 
mitigated. Regional autonomy cannot simply be ignored when developing systems to 
suit such a large and diverse range of stakeholder groups. Care must be taken to 
assimilate and reconcile the views of these many groups, aligning the regional and 
national views of the development and generating voluntary and planned business 
process change within the regions. 
 
A further contribution of this thesis is that of a detailed investigation within the 
context of UK policing and the elaboration of its operational culture and environment 
at both a regional and national level within the literature. Within national frameworks 
(NCIS, 2000; Centrex, 2001), the Portal was envisaged as a method for the public to 
interact with the police and vice versa, a powerful tool for the collection of 
intelligence and a mechanism for reducing call volumes within already busy 
command and control rooms. While such a system was implemented and to a degree 
was successful within certain areas, a failure to recognise and account for the 
complicating effects the organisation’s regionalised structure would have on the 
development, coupled with the politically charged environment surrounding the 
Portal’s inception, ultimately resulted in the failure of the system.  
 
This study has highlighted the need for the reconsideration of the definition of critical 
success factors and the recognition of organisational understanding as a key stand-
alone facet of IS design success rather than as a sub-component of other factors. It has 
shown that a regionalised organisational structure acts as an amplifying factor in IS 
failure which should be taken into account and considered when examining the true 
root causes of a system failure, beyond purely technical and financial considerations. 
Change management has been shown to be vulnerable to organisational structure and 
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that regionalised independence brings with it additional layers of top management that 
must be engaged before true change can be instigated within each region. Care must 
be taken to ensure that change is managed at an equal rate across each region involved 
in an IS development. This study has expanded the literature on public sector 
organisations’ internal political environment within a policing context, highlighting 
the duplication and entrenchment of internal political activities as a partial result of 
the regionalised structure of the organisation and the effect this competitiveness and 
differing goals can have on IS development. 
 
7.4 Limitations and Future Work  
Given the vast scale and high degree of complexity observed in many public IS the 
time restrictions placed on this research prevented the examination of more than one 
large scale project. While a full examination of all of the forces within the Portal 
project would have been the ideal for this investigation, the time constraints of PhD 
research in combination with the premature termination of the initial Portal project 
after implementation prevented the expansion of this study beyond the four forces 
involved. Data collection and retention were also limited by the prevalent security 
concerns within the police, though it was not seen to be overly detrimental to the 
quality of the data that was collected. 
 
Another limitation is that this study was conducted purely within the UK and within 
the emergency services arena. Although comparison of these research findings was 
conducted against secondary data from sources outside of this arena, primary 
investigation outside of the emergency services may provide further extension to the 
model proposed. The confirmation of the finding of regional competition in other 
competitive environments would also be recommended. 
 
Further work could be conducted examining the issues raised within other public 
bodies outside of the emergency services area and with more time conducted across 
the full range of regions within such organisations. In addition, the applicability of the 
proposed model to locally geographically distributed services at a local council level 
could provide valuable insight into whether such issues occur on a smaller scale. 
Comparisons to non-UK based organisations may also reveal additional findings, 
widening the scope of this research area. The extension of this model across national 
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borders, examining supranational public entities such as the EU and the UN, studying 
the effects of cross-culture regionalisation could provide valuable insight into the 
effects of organisational culture on such entities. 
 
Lifecycle specific examination of the problems identified could also be instigated in 
order to investigate methods of mitigation and inclusion. Use of the model in the 
predictive identification of problems might allow for early mitigation. Exploration of 
issues outside the regionalised organisational structure could also prove valuable. As 
highlighted in this thesis, many national organisations employ a regionalised structure 
to implement their service offerings based on the principle that differing regions have 
differing needs. While this is the case for a large number of public services a number 
of public bodies such as the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency, Department of 
Work and Pensions and the Food Standards Agency operate on a more homogenous 
national level with very little devolved regional authority. Regional effects may be 
much less pronounced in such organisations and investigations into such bodies 
would help to extend the literature further in these areas. In addition, the comparison 
of the identified issues against a private sector IS from an organisation with a 
regionalised structure and devolution of authority would further add to the 
development of the proposed model, allowing the further identification of aspects that 
are intrinsic to the public sector.   
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Appendix A 
Examples of Police Portal Data 
(Given the confidentiality of forces involved some items within the appendix may 
contain redaction.) 
 
A.1 Police Portal Screen Shots 
This section provides a screenshot of the Police.UK homepage. The following eight 
images then illustrate the process by which users submit a crime to the OCR systems 
of the Portal. While the process continues on beyond the final image, progressing 
further on the site would have counted as false reporting of a crime and therefore 
illegal in this instance. 
 
 
A.1 Police Portal Home Page (police.uk) 
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A.2 Stage 1 
 
 
A.3 Stage 2 
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A.4 Stage 3 
 
 
A.5 Stage 4 
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A.7 Stage 6a 
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A.8 Stage 6b 
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A.9 Stage 7 
 
A.2 PMB SMS Messages 
The Following contains example SMS messages as received by subscription to the 
PMB services of the police Portal: (sections are blanked out in order to maintain the 
anonymity of the forces involved) 
 
“From:88588 
Bulletin 88 now available at ‘www.police.uk’ This bulletin contains specific 
information in relation to the 7
th
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“From:88588 






Anti-terrorist operation 10/08/06 updates can be accessed via www****police.uk or 




*****Special Bulletins Re:unexplained death of ****** ******, ****** Bulletin 99 




***************** Bulletin 95now available, also details of the recent terrorist 




Please visit www.police.uk to see the *** response in relation to the recently 




A.3 PMB Email Messages 
This section provides examples of email messages received by subscribers to the 
PMB services of the police Portal: 
 
Date Received: 02/09/2006 
Subject: *********** Police Information Update 14:30hrs 02 September 2006 
============================================================ 
The *********** Police ****************** Team will be provide 
updates when they become available in relation to yesterday's Anti 
Terrorist Branch arrests.  
 
Officers from the *** Anti-Terrorist Branch have arrested 14 men 
under the Terrorism Act 2000 in a pre-planned, intelligence-led 
operation. 
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The men were arrested last **************and during the early hours 
of **********************on suspicion of the commission, preparation 
or instigation of acts of terrorism and are currently in custody at a 
*****************police station. 
 
The arrests in south and east ********* follow many months of 
surveillance and investigation in a joint operation involving the 
Anti-Terrorist Branch, ***** Special Branch and the Security Service.  
 
Searches are being carried out at residential premises in south, east 
and north *******.  
 
The arrests are not linked to the counter-terrorist operation of 
9th/10th August 2006 or the terrorist attacks in London on July 7 
2005. 
 
We can confirm that police are carrying out a search at a premises 
the in *********************************as part of the on-going 
operation.  
 
The Police operation being conducted by ***************** Police is 
not linked to the operation in *****************. 
 
 
If you have any information that can help make ******** Safer click 






********************@****police.uk or phone 0800 ******** 
 
Below are useful website links: 
 
**************Police:  http://www. *****.police.uk/ 
 
******Police: http://www. *****.police.uk/ 
 
******************Police: http://www. ***.police.uk/ 
 
 
Date Received: 08/09/2006 
Subject: **********Police Information Update 14:30hrs 08 September 2006 
======================================================== 
The *************Police ******************Team will be provide 
updates when they become available in relation the Anti Terrorist 
Branch arrests on ***************************.  
 
Officers from the ****Anti-Terrorist Branch were ****** * * * * * * 
*********granted warrants of further detention for 9 people arrested 
during the anti-terrorist operation that took place overnight on 
1.9.06. 
 
The police were granted warrants of further detention for: 
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2 people until Monday *********. 
1 person until Wednesday ********* 
4 people until Friday ********2 people until Saturday ******* 
 
To re-cap - On ********officers from the ***** Anti-Terrorist Branch 
were granted warrants of further detention for 3 people arrested 
during the anti-terrorist operation that took place overnight on 




If you have any information that can help make ************click 






*******************@*****.police.uk or phone 0800 ********* 
 
Below are useful website links: 
 
********** Police:  http://www. ******.police.uk/ 
 
****** Police: http://www. ****.police.uk/ 
 
************r Police: http://www. ****.police.uk/ 
 
 
Date Received: 07/02/2007 
Subject: ***** ********** Bulletin 103 ***** 
============================================================ 




This bulletin contains: 
 
 
 1. Suspicious Packages  received nationally 
 
 2.Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland Press Statement 
 
 3.   Secondary schools link up with Safer Neighbourhoods website 
 
 
# ******** gets safer update 
 
# ************* Police Faith & Race Hate Crime Report overview 
 
 
UK Threat levels  
 
  
Mi5 The Security Service 
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 Information for people intending to travel overseas can be obtained 









Date Received: 21/02/2007 
Subject: ****************Bulletin 104 ***** 
============================================================ 
 
Communities Together Bulletin 104 is now available, to view please go 
to http://www. *****.police.uk/*************/docs/bulletin_104.pdf 
 
 
This bulletin contains: 
 
Crimewatch (BBC) programme will next be broadcast on Monday 5th March 
2007. Their website currently contains a number of current ****** 
appeals that can be viewed.  
 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/crime/crimewatch   
 
 1. Police appeal over the murder of ********* 
 2. Police appeal for witnesses and information following the death 
of  three people  
 
*       New Temporary Taskforce 
 




# **************** Police Faith & Race Hate Crime Report overview 
 
 
UK Threat levels  
 
  
Mi5 The Security Service 
 






 Information for people intending to travel overseas can be obtained 
from Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
